Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

277. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–8–67

Washington, August 3, 1967.

COMMUNIST CHINA’S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAM

The Problem

To assess China’s strategic weapons policy and programs and to estimate the nature, size, and progress of these programs through the early 1970’s.

Conclusions

A. It is clear that China aspires to great power status and that its present leaders have given high priority to developing a substantial strategic capability as essential to such status. With wise management of their limited resources, the Chinese could continue to make steady progress toward the achievement of these goals over the next decade.

B. The probable extent of actual progress will remain in doubt, however, so long as fanaticism and disorder continue to infect China. Some adverse effects on the advanced weapons program are probable in any event; serious disruptions could result from pressures to do too much too soon or from a general breakdown in central authority.

C. China probably now has a few fission weapons in stockpile deliverable by bomber, and has demonstrated the capability to produce thermonuclear weapons with megaton (mt) yields. It will soon have the plutonium available to aid in reducing such weapons to missile warhead size as well as to facilitate the development of more compact, light weight fission devices. For the next year or two, the limited availability of fissionable material will place significant restraints on warhead production, but this will ease significantly in the following years as the Yumen plutonium production reactor reaches full output.

D. We believe that limited deployment of an MRBM with fission warheads is likely to begin in the next six months or so. After 1968 when increasing numbers of warheads could be made available, deployment will probably proceed at a higher rate. This deployment would be designed to threaten US bases, and major cities from Japan through the Philippines, Southeast Asia, and northern India.

E. We estimate that the Chinese can have an ICBM system ready for deployment in the early 1970’s. Conceivably, it could be ready as early as 1970–1971. But this would be a tight schedule, and should the Chinese encounter major problems, the IOC would be later. In any event, we will almost certainly detect extended range firings once they begin, and monitoring of these tests will probably provide about one year’s advance warning of IOC.

F. We have no basis at this time for estimating how far or how fast the Chinese will carry deployment of their first-generation ICBM. Assuming political and economic stability, China will probably have the resources to support a moderate and growing ICBM deployment through 1975. Beyond that time frame, there is the possibility of significant improvements to this first system.

G. Other strategic delivery means have received less priority but China may begin production of some TU–16 medium bombers this year in the plant at Sian.

H. China will probably not push ahead vigorously with the now semidormant diesel-powered missile-firing submarine program. The one G-class submarine launched in 1964 does not yet have a missile. It would probably be at least 1970 before additional missile launching submarines could be available. China has shown some interest in nuclear propulsion technology, but even if design on a nuclear submarine is already underway, the first unit probably could not be operational until the late 1970’s.

I. For political effect, China will probably attempt to launch an earth-satellite as soon as possible. This might be accomplished this year using an MRBM with an added stage or a heavier payload might be orbited using an early test vehicle from the ICBM program.

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 90 D 99. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Rufus Taylor and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 3. An April 4, 1968, memorandum to holders of NIE 13–8–67 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Miscellaneous CIA Intelligence Memoranda.