Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

268. Telegram From the Department of State to Embassy in Poland¹

Washington, May 29, 1967, 12:24 p.m.

204093. Gronouski-Wang talks: Guidance for 133rd meeting, June 7, 1967.

1. It is our turn to open. In general we anticipate that atmosphere in which this meeting takes place likely to be cooler than for some time. Current meeting considered from our standpoint primarily as “holding operation” in which our minimum objective is to keep open some dialogue with ChiComs. Our opening statement is considerably briefer than at last meeting and we would hope this would set framework for general brief, uncomplicated session. We anticipate, however, ChiComs will focus very hard on Vietnam, question of US use of Thai bases, alleged violations of ChiCom territorial air and water and other incidents, and US-Soviet and US–GRC collusion against Peking. Your opening statement deals with some of these points in effort blunt ChiCom attack in advance. In general, we believe that in rebuttal you should not become involved in detailed comments on US military actions in Vietnam other than to emphasize that US actions not aimed at Peking and general comments on US purposes in undertaking military involvement in Vietnam. Kreisberg will provide you with additional material on specific anticipated ChiCom allegations, including possibly Hong Kong. FYI. We do not wish Hong Kong to become involved in Warsaw talks, at this point at least, other than in our replying in low key to ChiCom comments on calls by US vessels and personnel at port. End FYI. Main contingency current guidance provides for is effort by ChiComs to end or suspend talks.

2. Suggest you open as follows: “Mr. Ambassador, I would first like to reiterate a point I made at our last meeting in January: that my Government believes it is useful for these meetings, even though they may be brief, to take place at more frequent intervals than every 4–1/2 months, particularly in a period such as the present. I realize this anticipates our consideration later today of the time for our next meeting, but I wish to underline the importance which my Government attaches to the opportunity which these meetings present for our two sides to frankly and openly exchange views on matters of mutual concern and interest.

3. Mr. Ambassador, I have set forth in previous meetings my Government’s position on the conflict in Vietnam. I have emphasized our willingness and fervent hope to find some means of ending the conflict and enabling the people of South Vietnam to resolve their own political problems peacefully and in their own way so that they may get about the urgent tasks of improving their lives and those of their children. I have indicated to you here in these meetings, and more importantly, my Government has made clear to the Government of North Vietnam, that we are ready at any time to discuss with them how this can best and most rapidly be achieved.

4. Mr. Ambassador, the US is prepared at this very moment to discuss arrangements for a general stand-still truce, to enter into preliminary talks with the Government of North Vietnam, and to participate in a reconvened Geneva Conference. We are prepared to halt the bombing of North Vietnam as a first step in a general effort to achieve a de-escalation of the violence and a start on meaningful negotiations, provided we receive the kind of assurances indicated in Amb. Goldberg’s speech last September at the UN. We do not intend to invade North Vietnam; we do not seek to overthrow the Government of North Vietnam; we are not trying to change the political system in the North. We have taken the actions that we have with deliberation and care to see that the area of the conflict not be expanded. All our actions are directed at demonstrating to the GNVN that its efforts to impose an arbitrary and unilateral political solution on the people of SVN will not succeed. We believe that the interests of North Vietnam lie in seeking, through confidential negotiations, an equitable peaceful settlement rather than replying entirely on the use of force by NVN directed forces in the South.

5. Mr. Ambassador, I shall not recapitulate all our efforts during the last few years or during the most recent 4 months to find a means of peacefully resolving this conflict. I am aware that your Government is thus far not a direct party to this situation and there is no need for me to go into detail on this subject. The GNVN, however, is well aware of our efforts and my Government continues to be hopeful that these will ultimately bear some fruit. I would only hope, Mr. Ambassador, that your Government will lend its moral support and encouragement to those efforts which men of good will of virtually all political persuasions throughout the world are making to bring this conflict to an end. I would further hope that your Government’s firm support for ‘the people of Vietnam’, of which you spoke at our last meeting, will be exerted with equal firmness to any efforts by the GNVN to achieve an honorable and just settlement of the conflict through negotiations.

6. Mr. Ambassador, repeatedly during the last 4–1/2 months, radio broadcasts and official announcements by your Government have alleged US harassment and firing on vessels of your country, intrusions into your territorial air and water, and, in April and May, the shooting down of a number of US aircraft. We have examined these allegations as they have appeared. I continue to regret your Government’s refusal to engage in joint investigations of such incidents when this might be useful and productive. We have ascertained one or two occasions when US aircraft may have unintentionally and briefly intruded into your airspace. At these times we have publicly acknowledged the facts. Our investigations also revealed several occasions, including individual incidents on February 25, April 7, and April 26, when vessels apparently belonging to your country fired on US aircraft in the Gulf of Tonkin area without provocation but without, I may add, eliciting counter-fire. We have found, however, no basis whatsoever for the overwhelming preponderance of your allegations. I am at a loss to understand the reasons for their being made unless your authorities are simply misinformed by the sources originating these stories.

7. It should be clear to you that we have had no hesitation in acknowledging intrusions into your territory when we are able to confirm that such intrusions may accidentally and unintentionally have taken place. This is because, as I have repeatedly told you, US Air Force and Naval pilots are specifically instructed and cautioned to fully respect the territorial air and sea of your country.

8. But, Mr. Ambassador, we find most puzzling the claims that your Government has put forth relating to the shooting down of US fighter aircraft on April 24 and May 1. As your Government must be aware, no US aircraft intruded into your territorial air, none were shot down over your territory, and no US aircraft were missing anywhere near your frontiers during this period. If you have any further details on these allegations. I should welcome them.

9. I must point out that allegations of incidents which have never taken place not only create a needless atmosphere of tension; they also will make more difficult the ascertaining of facts and their assessment should such incidents actually occur.

10. Mr. Ambassador, my Government has repeatedly assured your Government, both publicly and through these meetings, that we intend no hostile actions against your country, have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the territory under your control, and that our actions and military activities in Vietnam are not directed in any way against your country. You have on a number of occasions chosen to express your disbelief in these assurances. You are mistaken to do so, and I would regret if I have been unable to convince you of this. I can only reiterate what I have said before: our intentions are indeed as I have stated them. We consider this forum as one in which each side must be able to communicate to the other, in full frankness, matters relating to policy and purpose. The dangers and risks of a misunderstanding are too great for us to attempt to deceive or mislead your Government, as you alleged at our last meeting.

11. Our objectives in Vietnam are, as I have said, limited. We have exercised great restraint and intend to continue to do so to avoid widening the scope or area of the conflict beyond Vietnam. We hope you will understand this restraint and understand the limitations we have imposed on ourselves. We are under no misapprehensions as to the degree to which we differ over the reasons for the current conflict in Vietnam and in our respective positions toward this conflict. But we strongly hope that your Government can accept what we see as an irrefutable premise: that an enlargement of the conflict beyond Vietnam and the entry of new, outside elements into the Vietnam situation will create grave and serious dangers which neither of our countries should wish to see.

12. Mr. Ambassador, it is my understanding that in recent years, scientists and medical personnel of your country have experimented with and successfully developed many traditional herbal cures for diseases. The scientific and medical community of my country would welcome an opportunity to share in the achievements made by the people and scientists of your country in this area of herbal medicine and also in the treatment of certain diseases, common to your country and mine, that I understand you have effectively developed in recent years.

13. We have for the last 18 months hoped that your Government would agree to permit American doctors and public health personnel visit China to exchange experiences and knowledge with their opposite numbers on your side. We regret that your Government has thus far declined to facilitate such exchanges. I would like to suggest at this point that scientists and doctors in your country might make available samples of herbs and herbal medicines and their experience in using these to interested and qualified American scientists. In exchange, if this were desired by your Government, I am sure arrangements could be made for recent American developments in similar areas of research to be made available to scientists and doctors of your country.

14. I hope your Government will consider this proposal seriously and not reject it out of hand as a propaganda or political move. Its purpose is genuinely to enable the people of our two countries, regardless of political differences, to benefit from the achievements of science, where it may be practiced.

15. Mr. Ambassador, I was disappointed at our last meeting to hear your flat and immediate rejection of my remarks on the Americans presently being held in prison in your country. I was glad that you agreed that we have a perfect right to raise this issue in these meetings. But it is more than merely the right to ‘express my views’, as I believe you put it. This right I have in any event. It is a question rather of the failure of your Government to fulfill a commitment into which we entered, and had hoped you did as well, in good faith.

16. It is furthermore a question of compassion, particularly in the cases of Bishop Walsh and Captain Smith. The fact that the Red Cross Societies of our two countries may have had an exchange of correspondence on a visit by members of Captain Smith’s family to Peking does not exclude this subject from our discussions here. I urge again that you transmit my request to your Government that Captain Smith be released expeditiously and that, pending his release, his wife and brother be allowed to visit him. In any event, after the passage of 21 months, I would hope that we might be given some indication of how long your authorities intend to continue to hold him. The pain and grief of continued uncertainty should not be imposed on his wife and family.

17. I hope, in addition, Mr. Ambassador, that your Government will give me a carefully considered reply to my appeal for the release of Bishop Walsh in view of his age and health. It is certainly not ‘interference in your internal affairs’ to raise this matter of obvious humanity. I, of course, must emphasize again that Mr. Downey, Mr. Fecteau, and Mr. Redmond should have been released 12 years ago, in accordance with our agreement in September 1955 and urge that, however belatedly, your Government carry out this agreement now.”

18. The guidance in Deptel 111764² for the 132nd meeting relating to possible break or suspension of talks (paras 28–33) continues to be applicable and should be drawn on by you in the event of necessity. We have given further consideration to possibility noted in reftel para 30 that Wang, whose turn it is to suggest date for next meeting, may decline to do so either on administrative grounds or in context alleged US hostile actions against Peking. You should strongly object to failure to set new meeting date but obviously if Chinese refuse agree we cannot force them to do so. Only precedent for this was at 73rd meeting on December 12, 1957, when, as result our decision designate new US representative below Ambassador-level, it was agreed that announcement concerning next meeting would be made subsequently. This led to nine-month gap in meetings. You should, however, reemphasize points now included in paras 2 and 10 in present guidance (which included in part in anticipation of such a contingency) and fact that past precedent except on one occasion noted above has been to set firm date for next meeting. You should indicate we prepared hold next meeting September 13, 1967, and that we will make statement to this effect following meeting, noting US willingness continue meet with Chinese, regretting ChiCom position, and emphasizing we hope for change in ChiCom position. We should not anticipate calling for meeting of Special Representatives (Deptel 116572)³ unless ChiComs tie failure set date for next meeting directly to harsh public denunciation of US hostile actions against them and/or of you personally. Precise wording of public statement which would be issued by you following meeting left to your discretion in context of actual ChiCom approach in event of this contingency.

19. In event meeting proceeds normally, you should press for September meeting. ChiComs would probably prefer one considerably later but we would hope compromise on date not later than last half of October.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Kreisberg on May 22, and cleared by Bundy, Jacobson, Robert H. Miller, Bennett, Aldrich, Dr. Oswald H. Ganley of SCI, Holland of DOD/ISA, and Ambassador Gronouski. Approved by Rusk. Repeated to Moscow, Saigon, Taipei, and Hong Kong.
2. Document 228.
3. Document 230.