Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland¹

Washington, January 3, 1967, 7:07 p.m.

111764. Gronouski-Wang Talks: Guidance for 132nd Meeting, January 11, 1967.

1. It is Wang’s turn to open. We anticipate rigid and hard presentation from him focusing on allegations of US provocations against Chinese territory, ships, and ChiCom Embassy in Hanoi. Wang will almost certainly refer to Vietnam and the increase in US forces and may refer to US alleged intention to further “escalate” war by sending B–52s to Thailand. He will probably repeat ChiCom intentions to “fight side by side” with Vietnamese but we doubt he will make more specific ChiCom threat of intervention. Wang may also return to point made at last meeting that US-Soviets colluding on Vietnam and against ChiComs. We believe we must respond to some but not all these allegations. Wang may refer to US press reports of our offer at last meeting to exchange seed samples and again charge US violation of integrity of talks in effort to forestall comment by us on his unilateral publication of opening statement at last meeting. It possible that Wang may again move to release text of his opening statement after present meeting in order to further degrade significance of meetings and provide ChiComs with defense against Soviet innuendos at US-ChiCom collusion. We also do not exclude possibility that the Chinese side may take an initiative to propose a shift in the talks to another site. Even more seriously, they could take some action to suspend the talks although current evidence continues suggest they still find these meetings of some value. We have, however, included specific contingency guidance for such developments. Following is approved guidance for your opening presentation.

[Here follow paragraphs 2–26.]

27. FYI. In view rumors circulating over last few months of ChiCom desire move talks to Rangoon or elsewhere from Warsaw, believe we should be prepared respond to any ChiCom initiative this regard but should not ourselves at present time take initiative to suggest change in venue if ChiComs do not raise subject. Following is contingent guidance in event issue arises:

28. If ChiComs suggest move in acceptable manner either during regular meeting or in private discussions afterwards, you should probe as far as possible for their motivations in suggesting change and their suggested alternatives for meeting site and agree take subject under advisement without indicating US reaction. Our present thinking is that we would be willing move talks in order obtain greater security of contact if agreement could be reached on mutually acceptable site. We will want, however, to consider our specific response to ChiComs in context their approach.

29. We do not exclude possibility ChiComs may wish find some way to suspend present series of meetings without accepting public responsibility for breaking contact. One approach could be direct move to suspend talks on pretext that they unable talk with us in Warsaw while we “bombing” their Embassy in Hanoi. Alternative might be to launch ad hominem attack on you (as suggested by Geneva’s 1466 rptd Warsaw Deptel 80795)² and refuse further discussions while you US representative.

30. Basic US objective is to maintain Ambassadorial contact with ChiComs if this at all possible but, if talks suspended, to endeavor place responsibility for suspension clearly on ChiComs. If ChiComs express intention suspend talks on basis US bombing their Embassy in Hanoi, you should first reject their charges along lines para 22 above, refuse accept such charges as pretext for suspending talks, emphasize US willingness and desire continue meetings, and continue with presentation of guidance. If ChiComs indicate intention walk out of meeting or refuse agree to set date for next meeting, you should emphasize seriousness of move, emphasize importance of maintaining communication in times of stress citing 1958 and 1962 Taiwan Strait crises as examples, urge them reconsider, and, if they persist in their position, express deep US regret and your intention make statement to press on subject. Press statement should follow line outlined in this para. Specific language left to your discretion in particular context of ChiCom action.

31. If ChiComs lodge personal attack on you, we would expect you strongly repudiate charges, emphasize unprecedented nature of accusation, and demand an explanation for ChiCom action. We believe you should then complete delivery of prepared guidance but move immediately thereafter to end meeting and suggest date for next meeting if ChiComs in rebuttal return to their allegations against you. We would propose two week interval on this occasion and emphasize that purpose of this to provide opportunity for ChiComs to reconsider allegations they have made. Emphasize as in para 29 above US desire continue talks and willingness do so in Warsaw or elsewhere if there genuine and reasonable grounds for shifting site but that such discussions cannot take place in context unjustifiable accusations made by Wang.

32. We anticipate that if the ChiComs have decided to suspend the talks there is little we can do to affect their decision other than maximize their embarrassment. We would assume such a ChiCom decision would be based on their desire be relieved of political embarrassment of dealing with US in confidential talks at same time that they attack Soviets for doing same thing and warn Hanoi against negotiating with US.

33. If ChiComs choose break or suspend talks, approaches outlined above obviously do not exhaust possibilities. We cannot provide you with exhaustive responses to all possible ChiCom gambits but believe line outlined above provides sufficient general guidance handle other situations which may arise.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Kreisberg on December 28; cleared by Vietnam Working Group Director Robert H. Miller, Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs George H. Aldrich, Bundy, J. Stapleton Roy of EUR/SOV, Holland and Anderson of DOD/ISA, Jacobson, and Jenkins; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Moscow, Saigon, Taipei, and Hong Kong.
2. See footnote 2, Document 208.