Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

260. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 10, 1967, 10–11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Chinese Representation in the United Nations

PARTICIPANTS

• Chinese
  • His Excellency Yen Chia-kan, Vice President/Prime Minister of the Republic of China
  • Chow Shu-kai, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
  • Li Kwoh-ting, Minister of Economic Affairs, Republic of China
  • Liu Chieh, Ambassador to the United Nations
  • Sampson C. Shen, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China
  • Lai Chia-chiu, Director of the Information Department, Republic of China
• Americans
  • Secretary of State Dean Rusk
  • Walter P. McConaughy, Ambassador, American Embassy Taipei
  • James W. Symington, Chief of Protocol
  • William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
  • Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
  • Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
  • Josiah W. Bennett, Country Director, Republic of China Affairs

During his call on the Secretary May 10, Vice President Yen, after a discussion of recent mainland developments, told the Secretary he hoped the United States would continue to support the GRC in the United Nations. He said that since the days of President Kennedy, the United States had assured the GRC of support. The Secretary interjected humorously to say that United States support for the GRC in the United Nations dated back to the days of Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The Secretary went on to say that there may be some difference on tactics between us but our purpose has not changed. The voting situation in the General Assembly has changed from what it was years ago and we also have many nervous friends. In the last General Assembly, for example, Canada could have shaken many apples off the tree and we might as a result have lost five or six essential votes. The Secretary noted that events on the mainland have probably helped rather than harmed our position on Chinese representation in the United Nations. He thought that the events of the Cultural Revolution must have caused great revulsion among intellectuals on the mainland. He said we would like to talk with the GRC about ways of stimulating this revulsion and giving it a push.

Yen told the Secretary that he would visit Expo 67 at the invitation of the Canadian Government on China’s National Day next October. Ambassador Chow commented that, in regard to the previously expressed Canadian intention to recognize Red China, the Chinese Communists were taking a very rigid position which helped the GRC in Canada. The Secretary said that he wanted to make it clear that there had been no U.S. collusion with the Canadian initiative in the General Assembly last year, and he described in some detail our problems in dealing with the GOC on Chinese representation.

Ambassador Liu said he would like to take advantage of this unusual summit meeting to consult together on Chinese representation tactics. He said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taipei was reverting to the “Dean Rusk tactic” of a moratorium formula. He has already exchanged views with Mr. Sisco on this and Ambassador Liu realized that there were difficulties in seeking a moratorium. Liu then went on to say that GRC attaches great importance to President Kennedy’s assurance, contained in a letter, with respect to the Security Council.

The Secretary said that it is not 100% clear that there could be a veto on the credentials question. We think so, but it is not certain that we would find agreement on this. The Secretary also pointed out that, if we were to say we will veto admission of Communist China in the Security Council, others would be able to get a free ride, confident that the United States would prevent Communist China from being admitted. On the other hand, if we plan our tactics carefully, we should be able to get a sufficient number of abstentions for the vote to fail without ever needing to veto.

Ambassador Liu noted that of the Security Council’s fifteen votes, only nine were in our favor. Liu added that the Security Council has not met since January and that this month the GRC is the President.

In response to a question from the Secretary, Ambassador Liu said that he had no reason to think the Soviets are planning an initiative and Fedorenko had given it as his personal view that the Soviets would not take an initiative on Chinese representation in the Security Council. Ambassador Chow interposed that the Soviets in Geneva recently had used a new formula containing the clause that “Formosa does not represent China.” He thought this might foreshadow some new Soviet attitude. Ambassador Liu observed that there is no evidence of a change in the Soviet attitude in the United Nations itself.

Ambassador Liu then said that, from the point of view of his Government domestically, President Kennedy’s assurance has importance as showing that the United States proposed to use the veto if necessary. The Secretary commented that domestic political needs in Taiwan may sometimes cut across the subtle needs of winning international support for our position on Chinese representation in the United Nations.

Returning to the question of a moratorium, Ambassador Liu said he thought that having discussed Chinese representation now for five sessions, the General Assembly might this year want to put the subject aside. The Secretary replied that he thought we ought to look at this together. We had not expected the moratorium to last as many years as it did. We were not sure that a moratorium would, in fact, be possible this year.

Mr. Sisco, invited to comment by the Secretary, said it was necessary that we look at the situation in the United Nations very carefully before deciding as to tactics. The events on the mainland were two-edged, he thought; in some respects helpful to our position but, in other respects, working against it. Mr. Sisco thought Soviet statements in the specialized agencies, such as the one referred to by Ambassador Chow, were “record” statements. It was necessary to watch the Soviets in the United Nations itself in judging their attitude. Mr. Sisco went on to say that we have reservations as the possibilities of a moratorium being agreed to in the next General Assembly. The only safe thing, he thought, is to assume that the Albanian resolution will be proposed again this year. Mr. Sisco said that we had done a good job in educating many new members how to deal with the Chinese representation issue substantively, and that reversion to the moratorium tactic would be both confusing and ineffective. Vice President Yen commented at the close of this portion of the conversation that we must have close cooperation between us in Chinese representation.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHINAT. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bennett on May 12. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Although not indicated on the source text, this was part 3 of a 4-part conversation. Memoranda of the other portions of the conversion are ibid., Visit Files: Lot 67 D 587, V–31.