Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

261. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 11, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Informal Discussion of Ambassador Sullivan’s Comments on the Taiwan Question

PARTICIPANTS

• Walter P. McConaughy, Ambassador, American Embassy Taipei
• Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA
• Ralph N. Clough, S/P
• Harald Jacobson, EA/ACA
• Josiah W. Bennett, EA/ROC
• Thomas P. Shoesmith, EA/ROC

1. It was generally agreed that Ambassador Sullivan’s specific suggestions as to courses of action by which Taiwan might be kept separate from the mainland are not realistic, although it was recognized that these were offered only as possible starting points for a consideration of the problem. Specifically, it was felt that the notion of positioning a ready reserve division in Taiwan as a means of persuading the GRC to reduce its force levels and, perhaps, as a bargaining counter vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists was entirely infeasible. Mr. Barnett pointed out that such a move would be exploited by the Chinese Communists as proof of the U.S. “occupation” of Taiwan, would be suspect by the GRC and most unlikely to persuade the GRC to reduce its military strength.

2. There also was general agreement with Mr. Jacobson’s view that U.S. policies and actions should not be directed to precluding either the permanent separation of Taiwan from the mainland or eventual unification of Taiwan with the mainland should the people so desire; rather our position should remain flexible so that we can respond, in a manner which will best serve our national interests, to changes likely to take place both on the mainland and in Taiwan. The discussion did not focus specifically on the question of whether U.S. national interests will best be served by maintaining Taiwan separate from the mainland, although it was agreed that this is the practical thrust of our present policies.

3. It was agreed that no basic change in the position of Taiwan as defined by the GRC is likely during the lifetime of President Chiang. There was a difference of opinion, however, concerning the degree of support within Taiwan for remaining separate from the mainland which might be present should such change become possible. On the one hand, it was pointed out that as the island continues to develop economically, and as younger mainlanders come into position of responsibility, many mainlanders, as well as Taiwanese, will become increasingly reluctant to have Taiwan rejoined with the mainland, to which there will be a gradually declining sense of commitment and identification. On the other hand, Mr. Barnett noted that with the passage of time and changes in leadership, those in control on the mainland may find it in their interests to reach some compromise with the GRC and be willing to make substantial concessions to that end. He suggested as one possibility an arrangement under which the government on Taiwan would retain independent control of domestic affairs, including major economic and trade policies, but would have a single Foreign Office with the mainland. (Others, however, pointed out that this would be wholly inconsistent with policies adapted by the Communist regime to date—such as their relations with so-called “autonomous areas.”)

4. Mr. Barnett suggested that the “Taiwan problem” should be approached from the question of the significance and implications of the GRC occupation of the Offshore Islands. In this connection, there was considerable discussion as to the probable effect of a U.S. decision not to assist the GRC in retaining control of the Offshores. Mr. Barnett thought it quite likely that even if the Chinese Communists were reasonably confident that the United States would not assist the GRC in defending the Offshore Islands, they would not necessarily attempt to seize them. He suggested that for the Chinese Communists the GRC occupation of the Offshores not only symbolizes the continuation of the civil war but the direct association of Taiwan with the mainland. To drive the GRC from the Offshores would be to confirm its separation from the mainland. Mr. Clough, however, thought that the Chinese Communists might consider it to their advantage to administer a decisive military and political defeat to the GRC, since this could seriously weaken morale on Taiwan to the extent that the Chinese Communists might be able to force a political settlement. Mr. Bennett also noted that in view of Chiang’s determination to hold the Offshores alone, if necessary, any indication that the United States would not come to the GRC’s assistance even should its forces on the Offshores face certain defeat could only be regarded by the GRC as tantamount to the abandonment by the United States of its commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty. This could have a serious adverse impact across the entire range of our relations with the GRC.

5. It was agreed that no useful purpose would be served by undertaking a staff study along the lines proposed by Ambassador Sullivan. Mr. Barnett suggested that it would be useful, prior to the next Chiefs of Mission Conference, to prepare a brief memorandum addressed to the general problem as a reference paper for the conference. Mr. Bennett noted that in commenting on Ambassador Sullivan’s views, EA/ROC had recommended that a study be undertaken by EA/ROC, together with S/P, addressed to the question of whether it is in the long-range U.S. interest that Taiwan be kept separate from or rejoined to the mainland. He stated that he continued to believe that, apart from the merits of Ambassador Sullivan’s specific proposals, such a study would be worthwhile. No conclusion was reached on this point, however.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret. Drafted by Shoesmith on May 26.