Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

259. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 9, 1967, 12–12:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Chinese Vice President C.K. Yen with the President: Review of Events on Mainland China; Sino-Soviet Relations; Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS

• Chinese
  • His Excellency Yen Chia-kan, Vice President/Prime Minister of Republic of China
  • Chow Shu-kai, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
  • Li Kwoh-ting, Minister of Economic Affairs, Republic of China
  • Liu Chieh, Ambassador to the United Nations
  • Sampson C. Shen, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China
  • Lai Chia-chiu, Director of the Information Department, Republic of China
• Americans
  • The President
  • Secretary of State Dean Rusk
  • Walter P. McConaughy, Ambassador, American Embassy Taipei
  • James W. Symington, Chief of Protocol
  • William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Vice President Yen delivered the warm greetings and good wishes of President Chiang to President Johnson and handed President Johnson a letter (attached) which President Chiang had entrusted to him for delivery.²

A copy of President Chiang’s letter is attached but not printed.

Vice President Yen opened the conversation by recalling the assurances which President Chiang had given to Ambassador McConaughy on May 1, to the effect that the GRC would always be faithful to its commitments and obligations to the United States as a close ally.³ Vice President Yen mentioned his President’s statement that his Government would never do anything which was inimical to U.S. interests and would continue to regard basic U.S. interests as being in line with the basic interests of his own Government. The Vice President said President Chiang hoped that the U.S. Government felt the same way.

The Vice President then turned to the situation on mainland China. He said it was the assessment of his Government that the conflict on the mainland would continue. There had been no physical liquidation by Mao of the opposition leaders so far, but this did not mean that the struggle was not intense. Mao had refrained from moving toward the full liquidation of his opponents only because he feared a widespread adverse reaction to such an extreme measure—a reaction which he could not control at this time.

The Vice President identified three stages in the cultural upheaval on the mainland as follows: (1) the public denunciation in Shanghai in 1965 of certain writings identified with Liu Shao-chi; (2) the development of the full fury of the Cultural Revolution, May–August 1966; (3) the emergence of the full-fledged open “power struggle,” beginning in Shansi in January 1967.

The Vice President said the origins of the conflict go back seven years to about 1960 when the former Defense Minister, predecessor of Lin Piao, was liquidated. The Vice President thought that no one leader or faction is in effective control on the mainland now. Mao is now branding all of his opponents indiscriminately as “Revisionists.” The word is being used very loosely without any precise meaning, other than that it means anti-Mao. Liu Shao-chi actually does not have a historical record of being pro-Soviet; nor does the Governor and military commander of Sinkiang Province, Wang En-Mao, have a pro-Soviet record either. Wang helped to defeat the Soviet effort some years ago to set up an “East Turk-estan Autonomous Republic.”

The tactic of Mao is to vilify his opponents in every way he can. The revolution has become something distasteful to almost everybody except the pro-Mao group and Mao seems to take satisfaction in openly characterizing his revolution as something which is violent and something to be feared. He openly uses the Chinese phrase “tsao fan” (to make rebellion) in describing his own movement. The Vice President estimates the opposition to Mao is still very strong. Liu and other elements still have a considerable following and this limits Mao’s freedom of action. The Vice President’s conclusion is that the fight will go on. Mao cannot quell the dissenters, not all of whom are pro-Liu. There is a large anti-Mao group of Communists who now have something in common with the majority of the people, who are not identified with the Communist Party but who have been fairly neutral so far. As the economic situation deteriorates further, the continuing struggle will produce a steady growth in anti-Communist sentiment.

The Vice President said the GRC considered that the efforts against the Chinese Communists should be “70 per cent political” and only 30 per cent military. The GRC has “many agents” working on the mainland. The tactics being used by the agents are different from what they were before 1959. They are now instructed to mingle openly with the people, posing as fanatical pro-Communists. Some pretend that they are pro-Mao, and some pro-Liu. They are trying to broaden and deepen the conflict. The GRC predicts that the turmoil will lead to disastrous results, especially as to production of basic food requirements. It is believed that spring planting is down at least 11 per cent. The grain loss will be seriously felt in the fall. With the further deterioration of the food situation, the GRC believes that anti-Communist sentiment will grow and the discontent will lead to an expansion of the fighting.

Answering a question of Secretary Rusk’s about Chou En-Lai, the Vice President doubted that Chou could ever become a “third force” in the Communist hierarchy. He was well-known to many GRC leaders, and he was clearly identified as a man who always tried to side with the winner. He had once been close to Teng Hsiao-ping, the No. 2 man in the Liu group. Then he had wavered when he thought the Liu group was losing ground and had gone over to the Mao side. He had then tried to exercise a mediating influence between the Red Guards and the Communist Party elements. He had then been subjected to some censure. He did not have the strength to emerge as a third force. Yen thought Chou would be used by Mao as long as the struggle continued, and that he would lose favor with Mao after the eventual purge of Liu. He would have a place of some importance during the struggle.

Yen thought that the regime and the entire country were in a state of confusion. The regime was not capable of effective control. Both the Army and the Party were split and disorganized. How can a regime which cannot control Army or Party control the country? There was a probability of further dissension and eventual purges. In this situation the chances for a reunified China under a different leadership were greater than ever before. In this connection, Vice President Yen said, “We have our aspirations.”

The Vice President referred to the urgent efforts of the ChiComs to develop nuclear weapons. He thought that the GRC information on ChiCom nuclear weapons progress tallied closely with U.S. information. He mentioned our close consultation and effective exchange of information on this subject. Yen thought that the ChiComs had hoped to have their sixth nuclear test on the Red Holiday, May 1. They had missed this date, but Yen thought the next explosion would come soon.

Yen spoke of the feverish preparations of the Communists for war. Despite the economic failures and the poverty of the people, a population of 700 million has a high productive capacity. By ruthlessly lowering the living standard of the people still further, the Communists can accumulate large resources for production of nuclear weapons. Even though the regime had immense troubles, these troubles themselves make the regime more aggressive and not less so.

Yen thought that Sino-Soviet relations would not change essentially. The rift between the Soviets and the Mao faction is getting worse, but some sort of agreement apparently has been reached permitting the freer transit of Soviet war material overland to North Viet-Nam. Yen thought that the agreement was only “technical” and did not signify any real improvement of relations. It was a renewal of a 1965 transit agreement.

Secretary Rusk said there were some reports that the transit agreement provided for the delivery of the arms supplies to North Vietnamese personnel at the Sino-Soviet border.

Assistant Secretary Bundy said he agreed with Yen and noted that he did not believe that the Soviet transit traffic across China to North Viet-Nam had ever been significantly interfered with.

In response to a query as to the relative influence of the ChiComs and the Soviets in North Viet-Nam, Yen said he thought the Chinese Communists have more influence and are pulling most of the strings. The Chinese Communists have the advantage of proximity and can control the land supply route. They can give a green light or a red light. The sea route of supply is difficult at best and places the Soviets under a handicap. Yen thought that the Liberation Front in South Viet-Nam did not listen entirely to Ho Chi-minh’s orders. The Liberation Front were mostly trained in Communist China and they are responsive to Chinese Communist direction. This gives the Chinese Communists as much influence over the Viet Cong as anyone. In other remarks Yen also suggested that Peking had some control over Hanoi.

Yen thought that the number of Chinese Communist personnel in North Viet-Nam might run as high as 60,000 to 80,000, although he could not be sure. The Chinese Communist disposition of personnel in North Viet-Nam is ostensibly for defense of the Chinese border, but the ChiCom elements in North Viet-Nam watch Hanoi very closely.

Yen said that the Generalissimo points out that the “root of the evil” is on the mainland. Of 10 Chinese Communist Army Field Marshals, one, Marshal Lo, has been purged. All the others, except Lin Piao, have been censured. 16 Communist deputy prime ministers had been disgraced in one form or another. At the provincial level, thousands and thousands of officials have been removed. There is dissension on a big scale. An immense effort is being made against Mao, and Mao is heavily burdened by external problems as well as his major internal challenge. President Chiang is convinced of the necessity for the allies to think ahead and plan for the long pull as well as the immediate crises. The Generalissimo believes we should think in terms of 20 to 30 years.

In response to a query from the President as to the GRC view of the likely course of the war in Viet-Nam, Vice President Yen noted that the United States and allied forces in Viet-Nam are far superior. But control of much of the countryside by the enemy poses a difficult problem which must be dealt with by political as well as military means. Pacification is a difficult task but is an indispensable part of the over-all effort to counter the Liberation Front. Rural development work is of prime importance. Communist control of “the surface” between the urban centers gives the Communists a big advantage. The Vice President said his Government considers that the emphasis which the United States, since the Honolulu Conference, has accorded to pacification and effective civil government is correct. The Vice President mentioned the technical assistance which the GRC is contributing in Viet-Nam, which he termed of modest proportions.

In response to another question from the President, Vice President Yen said that his Government held the view that the Soviet Union would not come to the assistance of the Chinese Communists in any foreseeable international situation, and he thought they would not directly intervene in the Chinese Communist internal struggle, although they were naturally hoping for the downfall of Mao.

In response to a question from Secretary Rusk as to what outcome of the struggle in Communist China would be best from the standpoint of U.S. interests, the Vice President said he thought the conflict would go on for a long time in any event, and that a victory by either side could not be beneficial in any way. He felt that a victorious Liu Shao-chi might in the long run pose an even greater threat than Mao to the Free World, despite Mao’s violent and ruthless extremism. Liu has never actually been pro-Soviet, but he could be forced into a pro-Soviet position. A united front of the two large Communist powers which would then emerge would be the greatest threat to the Free World.

Vice President Yen thought that a continuation of the present factional struggle on the mainland would be the best situation from the standpoint of Free World interests. He thought that continued conflict would encourage the now submerged anti-Communist elements. The Vice President thought that the ordinary man on the mainland is not interested in ideologies. The ordinary Chinese will not like the sufferings that will come from economic failure. The people of the mainland will see the great contrast between the breakdown on the mainland and the success of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Hence, they will become more and more anti-Communist. “This is what we are aspiring for,” the Vice President said.

Responding to a question from the President as to whether the mainland turmoil would probably tend to bring the Chinese Communists more directly into the Vietnamese war or keep them out, the Vice President said the Chinese Communist policy would be to keep the trouble going in Viet-Nam on more or less its present scale. He thought that they would try to maintain indefinitely about the present degree of U.S. involvement.

In answer to a further question from the President as to the circumstances under which the Chinese Communists might be tempted to intervene openly in Viet-Nam as they did in Korea, the Vice President thought that the Chinese Communists would deliberately avoid the sort of direct involvement which they chose in Korea. He thought they would try to “fight by proxy,” avoiding a direct Sino-U.S. confrontation, and at the same time preventing the North Vietnamese from making a settlement of the war. The Vice President thought that the Chinese Communists would use all necessary means to “sabotage” any peace talks.

Speaking to another question from the President as to what sort of solution might be envisaged in such circumstances, Vice President Yen felt that a solution could come about only through the end of Communist control of mainland China, and he thought this would eventually happen. The President interjected parenthetically that he didn’t see how this was to be done.

Vice President Yen said that President Chiang had instructed him to reiterate that his Government wishes to maintain close contact and frequent consultation with the United States Government. The Vice President repeated his opening remarks, saying that the Republic of China considered the interests of the two countries should be identical. “We will do nothing contrary to United States interests and we hope the United States will do nothing contrary to ours.” The Vice President pointed out that the unpredictability of the mainland situation made alertness and close consultation all the more essential, adding “We will be building the Republic of China more and more.”

The Vice President noted that the outbreak of a Cultural Revolution on the mainland would have been unthinkable 10 years ago. Liu’s No. 2 position in the secession then seemed clear. The emergence of the Red Guards could not have been imagined.

The Vice President noted that currently the 4th Field Army in Kwangtung Province has shown some pro-Liu tendencies, and Lin Piao has been compelled to move some other army units into that area. The loyalty to Mao of many units in the Communist Army is doubtful. In Fukien Province, Mao has removed General Yeh Fei, an active political commissar. These are examples of widespread current troubles facing the Communists.

The Vice President predicted that the situation will gradually change in the Free World’s favor. At the same time he cautioned that there is no room for complacency and his Government clearly understands the necessity to work hard to accelerate and intensify the changes which are causing such trouble to the Communist regime.

At this point it was time for the White House luncheon, and the meeting was terminated with the thanks of the President for the helpful presentation by the Vice President of the views of his Government on these questions.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McConaughy on May 12. Approved in S on May 17 and in the White House by Jenkins on May 17. The meeting took place at the White House.
2. Vice President Yen visited Washington May 9–10. Records of his meetings with Secretary Rusk and Vice President Humphrey on May 10 are ibid., Visit Files: Lot 67 D 587, V–31. Briefing memoranda and other related material are ibid., V–30, and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Visit of C.K. Yen.
3. See Document 256.