256. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
3385. 1. Yesterday afternoon Gimo and Madame Chiang hosted large party in honor of US military, commemorating establishment of MAAG 16 years ago. This annual event was unusually large this year, with over 1,000 Americans invited.
2. Gimo asked me to arrive early so we could have half hour of private discussion just before party. Madame Chiang was present, also FonMin Wei and DCM Hummel. Fred Chien interpreted.
3. In somewhat emotional, and clearly sincere presentation,2 Gimo made the following points, directed at me as an old friend. Whether or not I wished to pass them on would, he said, be up to me.
4. (A) Gimo said USG has not always immediately understood the steadfastness and seriousness with which GRC views its responsibilities as ally of US. He stated his actions have always been based on moral principle, and will always be so based. Gimo repeatedly assured me that GRC will never do anything contrary to its commitments, or contrary to interest of US, which Gimo views as inseparable from interest of GRC.
5. (B) Gimo said he has often stated that the return to the mainland will be 70 percent political and 30 percent military. Up until recently GRC has had the view that the 30 percent of military action should precede political action, but now, Gimo explicitly stated, he intends to utilize political means first, after which at later time some military action may be necessary “to clean up the mess.”
6. (C) Breakdown and fragmentation of authority on the mainland, and general disillusionment with communism, has created a situation where GRC political efforts can be successful, and will be welcomed, Gimo said. He intends to take seriously his responsibilities as an ally of the US to do what he can to assure the peace and security of the area, primarily through political means.
7. Comment: Because interview was terminated by Gimo immediately after his long presentation, in order to join reception, I had no opportunity to probe for explanation of what sort of political means GRC has in mind. However, I doubt that any major political demarche toward mainland is imminent and I take the Gimo’s remarks to be intended primarily [Page 553] as a plea for greater trust and understanding on the part of USG, as well as an appeal for the US to refrain from taking any action that will damage GRC interests.
8. We have from time to time heard this sort of earnest appeal from Gimo before. A conversation I had with DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo on April 20 along similar lines (being reported by septel)3 was obviously intended to lay the groundwork for the Gimo’s presentation. Neither the Gimo nor Chiang Ching-kuo gave any indication that their remarks were related to current problems surrounding preparations for visit to Washington of Vice President Yen. However, I am sure that these problems (particularly wording of joint statement) which were aired in GRC Cabinet meeting April 27, comprise one of the stimuli that have caused the Gimo’s appeal.
9. Putting political action before military was clearly foreshadowed in Gimo’s New Years Day message, and the Gimo undoubtedly considers his explicit statements to me (and Chiang Ching-kuo’s also) as a major concession to US views as well as realistic response to current mainland situation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- A memorandum of the conversation was sent with airgram A–740 from Taipei, dated May 3. (Ibid, POL 15–1 CHINAT)↩
- Reference is apparently to a conversation on April 28 with Chiang Ching-kuo, reported in telegram 3390 from Taipei, May 2. (Ibid., POL CHINAT-US)↩