Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

234. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, January 25, 1967, 1929Z.

1822. Gronouski-Wang Talks: 132nd meeting.²

1. Meeting lasted 3 hours 15 minutes. Wang opened with refutation of Pres. Johnson’s expression of U.S. hopes for reconciliation and development cooperation with Chinese people. Described this position as “big lie” and reviewed at length recent “serious warnings” and series of alleged U.S. violations of ChiCom territory and attacks on ChiCom fishing boats and Embassy in Hanoi to demonstrate U.S. intensifying provocative acts. (Wang also raised incident of GRC-ChiCom air clash last week with accusation that this U.S. instigated.) Conveyed “serious warning and strongest protest” against these incidents but in routine language. Wang handed over five photos including damaged CPR Embassy Hanoi and equipment said to have been jettisoned from U.S. plane over Kwangsi Sept. 9.

2. Wang then moved to Viet-Nam on which no new themes raised. Emphasized that total withdrawal only way out for U.S. Accused U.S. of working together with Soviets for peace talks.

3. These only two subjects covered in opening statement which short and routine. Only conspicuous aspects were repeated references to Mao and his thought and to Lin Piao call for Chinese people to support people of Viet-Nam. (Lin identified as Vice-Premier and Minister of Defense.)

4. I responded using guidance Deptel 111764.³ It evident at this point that Wang well briefed and that most of his material kept in reserve for rebuttal (which also salted with quotes from Mao). Wang raised Taiwan issue, reiterating old line that key to U.S.-ChiCom dispute not over mutual visits and exchanges of seed samples or meteorological information but U.S. “occupation” of Taiwan and interference ChiCom internal affairs. If this unresolved, “absolutely impossible to improve U.S.-Chinese relations.” Wang charged U.S. trying “deceive” Chinese people and “lull their fighting spirit” with proposals for contacts so that it can “impose war on Chinese people at appropriate time.”

5. Wang then rejected my description of incident involving rescued Chinese fishermen. He lodged strong protest against U.S. treatment of fishermen, claiming they had told ChiCom authorities of being imprisoned, interrogated about ChiCom military and economic intelligence, maltreated, and that attempts made recruit them as spies or defectors to Taiwan. Claimed Chinese had irrefutable evidence that U.S. had not rescued but forced fishermen into Vietnamese ports against their will.

6. Wang rejected as unacceptable suggestion that U.S. forces would withdraw from VN in six months after conflict subsided, demanded immediate U.S. withdrawal now, charged U.S. had attacked ChiCom Embassy Hanoi in effort intimidate Peking. (Later in meeting he reiterated this, noting no other Embassy in Hanoi damaged but Chinese.) Wang continued at length on subject Viet-Nam including quotations from Harrison Salisbury articles on U.S. bombing of civilian areas in Viet-Nam and warning to U.S. not to “misjudge opponents and make miscalculations.”

7. In prepared text comment on outer-space treaty Wang charged treaty had nothing to do with peace or disarmament, another fraud “like the test-ban,” and that treaty would not prevent U.S. and Soviets from launching military payloads “such as spy in the sky.”

8. Wang repeated stock position on U.S. prisoners on mainland, emphasizing this internal ChiCom matter, that Captain Smith a criminal and that visit of Smith family members to Peking not proper matter for Ambassadorial talks but for Red Cross. In counter-rebuttal I emphasized propriety of discussing prisoners and failure of Chinese to live up to 1955 agreement. Wang acknowledged U.S. right to express its views on subject in meetings.

9. Wang defended his release of opening statement after last meeting on grounds need clarify U.S. distortions through repeated disclosures of contents. I responded, reemphasizing desirability maintenance of confidence in meetings.

10. In counter-rebuttal I focused on uselessness of dwelling on issues on which both sides knew our views at variance, such as Taiwan but emphasized need to attempt create climate better understanding within which larger problems might become easier to resolve. Emphasized absurdity of allegation that U.S. intention in proposing private cultural, journalistic contacts was to lull ChiCom into euphoria in order attack them. Said our purpose precisely the opposite—to diminish fear of attack and war by both sides. I reviewed at length U.S. position on Viet-Nam peace negotiations and urged ChiComs if they feared U.S. presence in Viet-Nam posed threat to them to join in move toward peace. On fishermen, I quoted at length from fishermen’s statements in Saigon’s A–327⁴ in refutation Wang’s allegations.

11. Wang responded by going over old ground on prisoners, Chinese fishermen and Viet-Nam. He launched into prolonged, extemporaneous excursion on “hundreds of years of U.S. oppression, slaughter” of Chinese people, emphasizing inconsistency between U.S. actions and words and insisting U.S. words could not be believed. As meeting already in course three hours, I limited my response to reiteration U.S. position on prisoners and expression of incredulity that simple human-itarian gesture in helping fishermen in distress should be interpreted as U.S. plot.

12. I then proposed April 5 for next meeting. Wang said all of April and May inconvenient for him and refused move from this position. He proposed June 14 and “retreated” to June 7 but prolonged discussion unavailing in moving him from what apparently firm instructions hold to June date. Wang repeated position he first advanced at last meeting that more frequent sessions unnecessary and that there no need adhere to past practice of 3–4 month intervals. I finally agreed after emphasizing my belief more frequent contacts desirable, and told him I would inform press we had suggested earlier meeting but that this not agreeable to Chinese side. He interposed no objection and I so informed press.

13. Atmospherics. ChiComs all appeared in identical dark blue Chungshan uniforms with Mao Tse-Tung buttons on left chest. Wang brought along new “advisor”, Chang Chu-hsuan (Commercial Counseler in diplomatic list), but gave no hint of reason for change or whereabouts of previous advisor, Li Lien-pi. Repeated references to “great leader of Chinese people,” Mao, and to thought of Mao an unusual feature in talks although this had begun appear (on much less noticeable scale) at last meeting. Chinese side immediately caught reference to unidentified quote from Mao used in my presentation and laughed in acknowledgement. No significant change in general atmosphere of meeting from others this year. At end of meeting he took initiative to come to me to insist I look at photos he had handed over to me and to insist these “proved” U.S. provocations and hostile acts against them. He said “These should be sent directly to President Johnson.” I agreed transmit them back to Dept. In response my question whether he planning return shortly to Peking, he said it was not certain.

14. Kreisberg and Anderson will go to ChiCom Embassy tomorrow, as usual, to exchange opening statements with ChiCom interpreter.

15. Comment: While more explosive contingencies for which we prepared fortunately did not arise, ChiComs clearly operating under extremely tight limitations from Peking. They obviously do not want to have to meet with us any more frequently than absolutely necessary at least under present circumstances (both internal and foreign). Four and half month interval between talks probably represents even more frequent meeting period than they wish. At same time, I am encouraged to believe that their present intention is to avoid any break or suspension of Warsaw channel to U.S.

16. Unusually large press turnout for meeting. Wang apparently declined agree permit newsmen or photographers in conference room before meeting. I issued routine press statement after talks.

Gronouski

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, London, Moscow, and Taipei. Passed to the White House.
2. Gronouski reported in telegram 1821 from Warsaw, sent 3 hours earlier, that the meeting had been without incident. He sent a detailed record of the meeting in airgram A–465, January 26. (Both ibid.)
3. Document 228.
4. Dated December 22, 1966. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–7 VIET)