Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

235. Memorandum From Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, January 27, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Roche Request on Chinese Nuclear Facilities²

It can be safely stated that the Lop Nor test site and Shuang Cheng Tzu missile test centers in China cannot be “played with” if overrun by Red Guards. They are complexes sophisticated enough so that only the very few qualified Chinese technical personnel can cope with them.

It can be further stated that the USSR has no particular need to seize such facilities; they are of no use to the Russians who are a dozen years ahead of the Chinese in systems and guidance. Their only interest would be the same as ours in case of war, to utterly destroy them for purposes of denial.

It is probable that Soviet planners are well aware of the potential unifying factor in the Chinese picture should there be foreign intervention. After a tradition of many decades of “foreign devils,” the Russians would be most unlikely to intervene short of all-out war.

The intelligence community has a daily watch on the order of battle and military buildup on the Sino-Soviet frontier. A recent study was completed analyzing its growth over a 24-month period. The increase is gradual and logical in the light of tensions and is not believed to indicate sudden action at this time. These matters are under constant review by the United States Intelligence Board.

It might be pointed out at this time that whereas the average reader perhaps considers that the Russians are chortling with joy at the apparent chaos overtaking China, serious Soviet thinkers, government officials, and Communist Party hierarchy are deeply concerned by the events since this is a failure of the system and may have distinct repercussions in other parts of the communist world.³

PJ

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Nuclear Factories. Secret.
2. The President’s Special Consultant John P. Roche stated in a January 26 memorandum to Rostow that he suspected the Soviet Union was making contingency plans “to seize the Sinkiang nuclear factories if the roof goes up.” He added that the Soviets were “not going to leave that stuff lying around loose for Red Guards to play with.” Noting that such action would presumably involve an airborne task force, he concluded: “I trust our intelligence services will keep an eye out for any indications of preparations for such an operation.” (Ibid.)
3. Jenkins also commented in a January 27 memorandum to Rostow that Roche’s scenario seemed highly improbable. (Ibid.)