Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

220. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, November 29, 1966.

SUBJECT

• The Vote on Chinese Representation

Today’s votes on Chinese representation were even better than we had anticipated, doubtless due in large part to the existence of the study committee alternative to the Albanian resolution. The important question resolution was carried 66–48–7 as opposed to last year’s vote of 56–49–11. The Albanian resolution was defeated 46–57–17, in contrast to last year’s tie vote of 47–47–20.

By a surprisingly large vote of 51–37–30 the Assembly decided that the study committee resolution fell under the important question procedure. Syria’s unexpected initiative, which produced this vote, undoubtedly contributed substantially to the overwhelming defeat of the study committee resolution, 34–62–25.

The voting on the procedural question and the Italian resolution reflected the strong desire of the Communist countries and their non-aligned supporters to ensure defeat of the study committee resolution. Ironically, the Syrian move also served the interest of the GRC—to bury the study committee idea. The absence of a roll call on the Syrian motion was helpful to us in not highlighting our negative vote.

You might be interested in a few significant points which we have noted in our first reading of the results. The most striking was Canada’s decision to abstain on the Albanian resolution while voting in favor of the important question and the Italian resolution. Other interesting results were:

1) Japan voted in the same manner as the U.S. on all three resolutions;

2) The U.K. abstained on the study committee resolution;

3) Indonesia acted in accordance with its assurances by voting in favor of the IQ resolution, in favor of the Albanian resolution and abstaining on the study committee;

4) Disappointingly, Ghana voted “no” on the important question and “yes” on the Albanian resolution;

5) Sierra Leone managed to keep its delegate in line; he voted “no” on the Albanian resolution;

6) Senegal, in spite of our efforts, voted against us on both the IQ and Albanian resolutions;

7) Iran proved obdurate to the end by abstaining on all resolutions;

8) Saudi Arabia shifted from their threatened abstention to a negative vote on the Albanian resolution as we urged;

9) Australia, the Philippines and Thailand all voted against the Italian resolution; and

10) Chile voted along with us on all three resolutions.

The effect of today’s decisions is for the time being to strengthen the GRC’s position in the UN and to increase the difficulty of either replacing the GRC by Communist China or of moving toward a two-China alternative. In this context our handling of the events precipitated by the Canadian initiative has been successful. The GRC, too, dealt with the situation skillfully.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Gleysteen and Popper. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Secretary Saw.”