Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

221. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy), the Legal Adviser, and the Acting Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (Heymann) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, December 1, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Removal of Passport Restrictions for Travel to Communist China

Discussion:

A. The Requirements of the New Regulations

1. We have carefully considered the language of Section 51.72 of the Department’s new passport regulations (Tab A)² in terms of its relevance to Communist China. The regulations authorize us to impose area restrictions on travel of American citizens only in the event of hostilities or in cases where we find that unrestricted “travel would seriously impair the conduct of United States foreign affairs”. This rather strict standard for restricting travel paraphrases the even more limiting language of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, authorizing restrictions only “when it can be demonstrated that unlimited travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare of . . . the nation as a whole”. Under the terms of the regulations, if we are to maintain travel restrictions, we must publish by December 19th the names of the areas which meet this standard “along with a statement of the circumstances requiring the restriction”.

2. We have strong doubts that a persuasive case can be maintained that removal of the current restrictions on travel to Communist China would “seriously impair the conduct of United States foreign affairs”. In a very real sense, we have already taken the position that the travel of American citizens to Communist China does not in fact “seriously impair” the conduct of our foreign policy toward that country. The categories of American citizens whom we are prepared to allow to visit mainland China have, over the past year, been expanded to the point where literally tens of thousands of individuals can qualify³ (although only about 300 have applied and been granted passport validations). Moreover, our general position, as formulated by the President on July 12, 1966, that “the greatest force for opening closed minds and closed societies is the free flow of ideas and people and goods” also makes it difficult for us to argue in public that restrictions on travel to Communist China are necessary or desirable.

B. Foreign Policy Considerations (for additional memo from “L” on this subject, see Tab B)⁴

3. The benefits and risks of removing the present restriction on travel to Communist China depend (a) upon how Peking responds to our action and (b) upon the timing of our actions.

4. We have little doubt that our national interests would be served in an important way by the travel of some thousands of Americans to Communist China each year. As is indicated by the President’s statement referred to above, the gradual expansion of the categories of American citizens whom we are prepared to allow to visit mainland China, and our efforts at Warsaw, our interest in increasing the number and scope of our peaceful relationships with Communist China is as much a part of our long-range policy for China as is our firm commitment to resist that country’s aggressive actions vigorously. Opening a wide and mutually profitable range of peaceful contacts is a necessary complement to resist-ance to Communist Chinese aggression. Both have the same end of eventually persuading mainland China to turn its energies into non-aggressive, responsible channels.

5. There are, we believe, several risks of unrestricted travel to China which should be considered.

(a) First, there may be significant effects on the flow of intelligence. For example, China might attempt to make use of ethnic Chinese in the United States to obtain classified information which is not now available to them. We believe that the prospective gains to the U.S. in intelligence about China, a closed society, would be greater than those which would be realized by China. Much of the information we lack about China would be filled in by ordinary observation. The information they lack cannot be obtained without a security clearance.

(b) Second, unrestricted travel would, to a small extent, increase Peking’s power to harass the United States by imprisoning Americans, if this were its desire. The increase in power would, however, be small. It has ample opportunity for harassment today in the form of the exceptions for newsmen, doctors, scientists, scholars, and people prominent in commercial, cultural, athletic and other fields. The experience of other nations whose citizens travel to China suggests that this risk is not excessive, despite such recent events as the detention of the Dutch Charge and the excesses of the Red Guards. On balance, we believe that Peking will accept responsibility for any Americans that it permits to enter. More important, its opportunities for harassment are almost as great today as they would be after restrictions were removed. We would, of course, issue a written warning of the risks to any American indicating an intention to travel to Communist China and could review at any time the desirability of a reimposition of travel restrictions if this seemed warranted.

(c) The complete removal of travel restrictions to Communist China would enable the Chinese to selectively invite individuals and their invitations might focus on persons who have extreme political views. This could well create a flow of traffic which might not only increase the ability of the Chinese to influence “left wing” political groups in the United States but also create a body of one-sided propaganda advocates for Peking in the U.S. who could boast they “had been there”. We believe that Peking would quickly find itself on untenable propaganda grounds if it pursued a policy of admitting only advocates of the “far left”. Their policy toward other countries has been to allow a reasonable cross-section of public opinion to visit the mainland even though they have attempted to channel visitors from the “left”. In any event it is now and will continue to be possible for American communists or other sympathizers with the Peking regime to clandestinely visit Communist China and return to the U.S. It is probably in the U.S. national interest to try and surface such visitors in public by permitting or even encouraging them to apply for passports.

(d) A total dropping of the present travel restrictions might be interpreted as a far more significant political move than the earlier partial relaxation of our travel restrictions and as indicating a qualitative shift in the U.S. attitude toward Communist China. We believe, however, that the present palpable strength of our posture in Vietnam provides us with an ideal opportunity to take this step without undue risk of misinterpretation that we are changing our fundamental position on communist aggression. The Republic of China has expressed its misgivings about the relaxation in U.S. travel restrictions in the past but in a very low key. In the immediate context of the ChiRep debate in the 21st UN General Assembly, however, this reaction would probably be considerably stronger to the presently proposed move.

6. In contrast to the limited risks we believe there is a real foreign policy gain to be realized by removing the restriction on travel to China. In much of the world the U.S. is regarded as blind to the need of an eventual accommodation with the most populous country of the world and one that will soon be a nuclear power. Our policy of resisting Chinese aggression is confused with an alleged policy of unwillingness to face the realities of the future power of China. We can eliminate this confusion and make clear our desire to reach an eventual accommodation with a non-belligerent Communist China by opening every avenue of peaceful relations that is consistent with our national security and our opposition to Chinese belligerence. Removing all prohibitions on travel of Americans to China—and thus assuming the same posture in this regard as the great majority of our NATO and SEATO allies—would be an important step in that direction.

7. Despite our liberal exceptions to the travel ban, at present in the eyes of much of the world we share with China the responsibility for preventing informal contacts. For example, Peking is reportedly telling foreign visitors that, by validating passports for travel to mainland China in a discriminatory manner, the United States is attempting to dictate to the Chinese whom they may invite to their country, and that the Chinese will not accept such dictation. This is obviously a subterfuge but, considering the breadth of our present exceptions to the travel restrictions, there would be very little cost in calling Peking’s bluff by eliminating all restrictions on travel to that country. Only in this way can we make it wholly clear that mainland China’s isolation is of its own making.

C. Domestic Political Considerations

8. To a surprising extent the American people and the Congress regard travel restrictions, not as a barometer of our feeling toward a country, but as an interference with an inherent right and freedom of American citizens. This has become apparent in the surprising Congressional opposition to the Willis and Eastland bills which were intended to impose penalties for violation of our travel restrictions. An explanation by the Department of State that we are recognizing and respecting the freedom of American citizens to travel abroad wherever they wish except where our foreign policy absolutely requires travel restrictions may very well prove to be entirely acceptable to a substantial majority of the public, the press and the Congress. Certainly there is reason to suspect resentment of the present situation where we authorize chosen categories of Americans to travel to China but forbid everyone else.

9. This public justification for removing the restrictions ties in perfectly with the occasion presented by our new regulations. For the first time in these regulations we formally recognize significant limitations on our power to restrict travel in the interests of respecting the freedoms of American citizens. We could and would explain that, like Albania, Communist China was dropped from the restricted list simply because we could not meet the new strict criteria—i.e., we could not justify a continuing imposition on the freedom of American citizens. This may well be an extremely popular approach.

10. In addition, we would propose to explain it simply as a logical extension of the wide exceptions to the restrictions on travel to Communist China already in force and to emphasize that the dropping of these restrictions was completely consistent with the views already expressed by the President and yourself on the desirability of the freer exchange of ideas among nations and the U.S. hope that the Chinese will agree eventually to respond to these U.S. initiatives.

D. The Problem of Timing (for additional memo from “L” on this subject, see Tab B)

11. There are advantages and disadvantages to dropping the remaining restrictions on travel to Communist China at this time. The most serious problem is presented by the close juxtaposition of our action to the debate on Chinese representation in the United Nations General Assembly. In view of recent misunderstandings with the GRC, our action might be over-interpreted and could possibly result in an exacerbation of U.S./GRC relations.

12. On the other hand, the overwhelming GRC success in the General Assembly appears to have secured the GRC position in the United Nations for some time to come and should enormously strengthen GRC self-confidence. Under these circumstances it may be that the U.S. move to drop travel restrictions will be no more of a problem for the GRC than it has been on the occasion of our previous relaxations of travel restrictions. We recommend, therefore, that you assess the climate of U.S.-GRC relations in the light of your forthcoming visit to Taipei, and that our final decision on timing depend upon your on-the-spot instructions.

Recommendation:⁵

That depending upon your instructions after visiting Taipei, the Department either

A. Publish the names of the restricted areas on December 19 omitting Communist China as well as Albania, or

B. Publish an announcement in the Federal Register stating that the Department has not yet completed its review of the areas for which travel should be restricted and extending currently existing travel restrictions for a further 90-day period.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 104. Secret. Drafted by Heymann and Kreisberg, and cleared by Stoessel, McCloskey, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Robert A. Stevenson, and MacArthur, who added the following handwritten note: “I concur in the substance but believe that we should inform the Democratic and Republican leadership of what we intend to do and why before we make a public announcement. This would help avoid misunderstanding on the ‘Hill’. DMacA.”
2. Attached but not printed. On October 20 the Department of State published revised regulations on nationality, passports, and travel controls; for text, see 31 Federal Register 13537.
3. For texts of statements issued by the Department of State on March 10 and on July 11, see Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, pp. 491–492, and August 15, 1966, pp. 234–235.
4. The memorandum from Meeker to Rusk, December 1, is attached but not printed.
5. The source text bears no indication of approval or disapproval. On December 16 the Department of State amended the passport regulations by extending all area restrictions until March 15, 1967. For text, see 31 Federal Register 16143. For text of the Department’s statement concerning this, issued on December 23, see Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1967, pp. 102–103.