Office of the Historian

219. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1

Taipei, November 29, 1966, 1110Z.

1589. ChiRep. Reference: Taipei’s 1587.2

1.
Shen called me to Mofa at 4 pm Nov 29. Also present were DCM and Mofa officer Wang Meng-hsien.
2.
Shen said he had been instructed to tell me that the original GRC position on what the GRC would have to do in the event of passage of Italian resolution had been changed. He said this was the result of letters GRC had received from President Johnson and Secretary Rusk and of my representations. He said that GRC had decided it could not take a position that USG considers detrimental of US interests.
3.
He then read the text of declaration (now canceled) which FonMin Wei would have been instructed to make in UN after passage of Italian resolution, if GRC position had not been changed. That statement included the phrases: “This leaves GRC no alternative but to withdraw from the UN. This does not mean any loss of face for the GRC, but it does not mean GRC cannot allow itself to be sacrificed on the altar of appeasement.”
4.
Shen then said present instructions to FonMin Wei were to proceed with a kind of walkout, and to be absent from the GA for a time. He said that GRC position was that if nothing at all were done, Chinese people would think GRC under the thumb of USG. If GRC were to stay with no reaction, there would be no way to explain to Chinese people.
5.
He then read at dictation speed full text of new declaration which FonMin Wei now instructed to make (reported septel).3 Shen explained that GRC intended effect of this statement to be temporary withdrawal from GA only and not from other organizations. He said GRC might even return to current session GA at any time to join debate if delegation so instructed. I pointed out that unfriendly elements in UN could still seize on GRC declaration of withdrawal and assert that Chinese seat in UN was vacant. I suggested that clearer language might be used so as to avoid misunderstanding.
6.
Shen said Chinese text only of text of this declaration had been sent to ChiDel, which would make its own English translation.
7.
I suggested ChiDel should consult with USDel parliamentary experts so as to minimize possibility that language of declaration might be used to bar GRC. I said USG is fearful that hostile elements could seize on any walkout and through parliamentary tactics try to declare China’s seat to be vacant. I recalled that present GA President is not sympathetic on this issue. I urged that great caution be used in wording of declaration so that no bridges could be burned. After some discussion with DCM of wording of Chinese text, it appeared that better and more accurate translation for ChiDel phrase “withdraw its presence” might be “absent itself.” Shen agreed to telegraph ChiDel to consult with USDel on this point.
8.
I expressed my own gratification, and that of my govt. with GRC decision. I said I appreciated that it could not have been easy and that grave and sober consideration had produced this result.
9.
Shen said he had conveyed to President Chiang “every word” I said to Shen yesterday after meeting with Chiang (Taipei 1568).4 Shen said Gimo had called a meeting this morning at which present decision had been taken.
10.
Mofa official Wang Meng-hsien seemed quite confident that Italian resolution would be defeated, on basis of his examination of reports of statements made during last few days in GA. I expressed hope that no walkout problem of any sort would be created. Meeting ended with mutual compliments and congratulations as I expressed happiness with statesmanlike GRC basic decision.
McConaughy
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent also to USUN and passed to the White House.↩
  2. Telegram 1587 from Taipei, November 29, reported on McConaughy’s conversation with Shen. (Ibid.)↩
  3. The text was sent in telegram 1587.↩
  4. Document 218.↩