Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, November 10, 1966, 11:56 p.m.

83437. Subj: GRC Reaction to Canadian Chirep Initiative. Following uncleared record of conversation is FYI Noforn and subject to revision on review:

1. Secretary together with Asst Secretaries Sisco and Bundy saw GRC Ambassador Chou this evening at latter’s request. Chou covered many of same points made in Taipei to Ambassador McConaughy² but at no point claimed study committee proposal would be “even worse than a two-Chinas resolution.” Nor did he imply threat that GRC would consider walking out of UN if study committee established.

2. Chou told Secretary GRC profoundly distressed by Canadian move and did not understand how Canadians could contemplate such disservice to free world at this time except perhaps in terms of Paul Martin’s special preoccupation with issue. GRC had found that its reaction was shared by many countries, especially Japan and Australia, and it hoped US would use this additional support to stop Canadian initiative and hold to previous tactics. GRC has been humiliated for 17 years in UN over Chirep issue and could not face additional humiliation of being held in suspense while study committee deliberated recommendations.

3) Secretary emphasized that we fully agree with GRC’s strong objections to Canadian proposal which we found bad, ill-timed and mischievous. Having spilled “a lot of blood” over this issue with Paul Martin in many rough encounters over past two years, Secretary stressed that he wanted it reported very clearly to Taipei that there has never been any collusion between Canada and US. Secretary had tried to persuade Martin that Canadians should defer on this matter to countries with real responsibilities in Asia, but Martin has persisted on grounds of domestic pressures in Canada which he claimed necessitated Canadian initiative this year. Perhaps wheat sales and other factors played role but in any case GRC should understand that we have been doing battle for them including very strong letter which Secy has sent Pearson yesterday after talking to President.

4. Secretary noted that Canadian move could not have come at worse time because it threw confusion into situation which could not stand confusion—i.e., number of countries such as Italy, Belgium, Chile which had been on verge of shifting position before Canadian initiative could no longer afford to resist domestic pressures and carry on with traditional approach. We had great trouble with Italians last year and could hardly expect Fanfani to drop study committee concept this year in face of Ottawa’s action. Facts were that Canadians had not consulted us and we had not been able to dissuade them from initiative, including possibility they would still go ahead and table highly objectionable res.

5. Situation we now face, according to Secretary, remains essentially same as one month ago in that we must still sustain important question procedure and defeat Albanian resolution, but in view Canadian decision we now had to use counter measure to retain our support for these same purposes. Actual result of study committee, which designed to avoid pre-judgment of issue, would be to put off decision on Chirep just as we have done since 1950. Secretary urged that GRC not draw conclusion about Chirep before UN does thereby give open field to Communist China. Despite annual debate GRC remained in both GA and SC.

6. During remainder conversation Ambassador Chou engaged in repetitive but insistent request that US marshal other governments in all-out effort to deter any Canadian initiative, refrain from supporting study committee proposal, and hold to past tactics on Chirep even if this course risked defeat. Chou argued Canadian move was largely bluff which could be called by firm US response and he claimed we would have adequate votes (53–48) to hold line against Albanian res despite Canadians. Ambassador emphasized that if on contrary US were to continue support for study committee while GRC made all out efforts against, result would be deplorable division between allies.

7. In response Secretary explained that we did not expect GRC support for study committee but simply asked that GRC not prejudge situation by making prior assumption about outcome of such tactic. Study committee might not materialize and if it did group would not necessarily recommend ChiCom membership in UN. Quite possible that over next few months some move would be made to inquire about Peking’s attitude and if Peking refused various schemes advanced in UN, Communist China would not be admitted. Secretary asked why, if GRC could go along with study committee in 1950, it could not do so today. Our problem was votes. Without some move which would assure support from number of particular countries we thought it very likely that Albanian resolution would achieve simple majority this year and there was also serious question whether we could hold support for important question procedure. This was unacceptable risk for US and it was for this reason that we were prepared to support study committee.

8) Although Ambassador Chou argued GRC vote count against Albanian resolution was adequate despite impact of Canadian move, he asserted we should in any case risk be willing defeat because any change would be first crack in crumbling dike. Question involved national honor and if situation in UN had in fact deteriorated to point where study committee-type tactics necessary it would be better to face defeat now rather than be humiliated over course of next year.

9) Both Secretary and Sisco used specific examples to illustrate how Canadian initiative would erode our support against Albanian resolution unless many countries were offered some other alternative. They also disputed Chou’s insistence in assuming inevitably bad consequences of study committee by showing that GRC had in past agreed to shifts in tactics without disastrous consequences. Ambassador’s response was to repeat that GRC had its back to wall on this issue and preferred defeat to going along with change which would be interpreted domestically and internationally as advance acknowledgment of failure, making ultimate humiliation that much greater. Chou also pointed out that GRC considered any switch particularly regrettable because likely impact within Communist China would be to encourage militancy.

10) Secretary interjected that Ambassador was fully aware of our special concern about dangers of ChiCom militancy since we had to bear military consequences in Viet-Nam. It was our judgment, however, that defeat on Albanian resolution this year would be far more damaging in this sense than our agreement to study committee as alternative to Canadian resolution.

11) Secretary repeated that we do not expect GRC to support study committee idea and said we think it most useful for GRC to put its views strongly to Canadians. We also hoped Canadians would be made sharply aware of Australian, Japanese and other negative reactions. Even so we had to consider our tactics in light of newly confused situation in GA, and we hoped the GRC would not retreat before battle by making premature judgment about outcome of study committee.

12) In summing up Ambassador Chou stated that GRC was opposed to any change as beginning of uncontrollable process and asserted GRC had to consider matter in terms of its national honor and dignity since its leaders were answerable to history. Secretary said he could not complain about this view but could not accept it. We did not agree with Ambassador’s estimate of current situation in GA and we strongly disagreed with his judgment about effects of Canadian resolution. We would, of course, continue to take account GRC’s views and Secretary suggested that strategy group in New York resolve conflicting estimates of likely votes on various resolutions.

13) Secretary concluded by stating that we were in agreement with GRC on importance of reaffirming important question procedure, we were in agreement on opposition to Albanian res and we were in agreement in our common opposition to Canadian res. Insofar as study committee was concerned, however, Secretary declared that we were prepared to support this measure because we had too much at stake to accept defeat on the Albanian res in GA this year.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Gleysteen and cleared by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Rome, Brussels, Tokyo, Wellington, Canberra, and London.
2. Telegram 1382 from Taipei, November 10, reported discussions between McConaughy and Foreign Minister Wei, in which Wei argued that the United States should exert maximum pressure on the Canadians to abandon their proposal or any substitute, such as a study committee. He declared that in the GRC view, a study committee resolution would be “even worse than two-Chinas resolution” and that if such a resolution were adopted, the GRC would have to consider taking the step intimated by Chiang Kai-shek in his June 30 conversation with McConaughy (see Document 162), that is, withdrawal from the United Nations. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM)