Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

162. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, July 1, 1966, 1110Z.

22. Re: Deptel 1383.² Chinese Representation.

1. I saw Pres. Chiang yesterday afternoon for hour and a half discussion at tea at his Yangmingshan residence. Also present were DCM Hummel, FonMin Wei, Secy Gen Chang Chun, Vice FonMin Sampson Shen, with James Shen interpreting.

2. I opened official conversation with statement of reasoning that had led USG to bomb POL storage in North Vietnam, as contained Depcirtel 2568.³ Chiang expressed hearty agreement with US decision and said he disagreed with Canadian and British critics who had “selfish motives” and whose views, he said, would be different if they were able to consider this problem objectively.

3. I then repeated in abbreviated form some of factors I had outlined to FonMin June 29 (Embtel 1523)⁴ that led us to believe that past ChiRep tactics might not serve in upcoming GA. Chiang indicated he had already had report from FonMin on our conversation yesterday. He minimized problems of UN tactics, saying that power of decision lies with USG. If US held firm and did not waver, there would be no problem this session. He referred several times to statement he said made recently by unidentified “US Delegation spokesman at UN” in which US support for GRC seat reaffirmed, but no mention made of opposition to ChiCom entry. This conspicuous omission, he said, could only encourage countries such as Canada, which already were wavering, to become even more unpredictable.

4. He then made following points forcefully, with some reiteration:

A. On mainland, GRC had consistently refused to agree to a coalition government with ChiComs.

B. Any sort of “two Chinas” resolution, if passed and accepted, would amount to a kind of Chinese coalition situation in the UN, which GRC absolutely could not agree to, and which would compel GRC promptly to withdraw from UN.

C. Chinese tradition for many centuries has required that there be no truckling, surrender to or compromise with a rebel regime. This was epitomized in statement by third century statesman Chu-ko Liang who said, “the legitimate government cannot agree to coexist with a usurper”. (han tsei pu liang li 3352, 6329, 0008, 9357, 4539.)⁵ This typifies Chinese national spirit in time of crisis.

D. As long as GRC exists, it will seek the destruction of ChiComs as a usurper regime; it is better to go down to defeat fighting than to compromise a principle so deeply rooted in basic tradition and morality of Chinese people. This is fundamental to the honor of the GRC. With integrity preserved, the lawful government can rise again, even from the ashes of defeat.

E. Canada probably cannot understand how important this is to Chinese, but USG should be able to appreciate the principle, because of its long and close ties with China. It is up to USG to make Canadians understand that under no circumstances will GRC compromise its UN position, and that GRC will certainly walk out of UN if any adverse vote occurs.

F. GRC has suffered many insults in UN and has derived little benefit from membership. For the UN “to allow the ChiComs to enter” would be the last straw and GRC would definitely get out.

5. I said I was authorized to assure GRC that USG will continue strongly oppose entry of ChiComs into UN. I noted that he is assuming more influence on part of US over actions of other UN countries than we possess. We are determined not have a defeat on this issue but it is essential for two governments discuss and agree on tactics best calculated to keep GRC in and ChiComs out.

6. It was imperative in our view for the GRC to resolve to hold fast to its UN seat and not allow unpalatable debate or language in resolutions to cause GRC to walk out. I understood the traditions he referred to, but there was also a Chinese tradition of not abandoning the battlefield to the enemy. I hoped GRC would not act impulsively or out of any sense of outrage; if GRC would stand fast then ChiComs almost certainly would be precluded from coming into UN. In no event should GRC allow contest to go wrong way by default. If seat became vacant, danger would become great that ChiComs would move in.

7. Chiang said we could count on GRC not acting impulsively. It would not be an impulsive decision but would be an inevitable and correct one that if GA votes to allow ChiComs to enter, then regardless of whether the resolution also has a provision retaining the GRC seat, the GRC would have to walk out. GRC will never even consider doing otherwise, and would never agree to do otherwise. To stay in UN under such circumstances would not only cause disillusionment in Taiwan (both among Taiwanese and mainlanders, he said) but would also be a betrayal of the majority of the people in mainland China who look to GRC as a symbol of hope and steadfastness. Chinese representation shared with Communists could not be explained or reconciled.

8. I set forth that problem is how to deal with dangerous contingencies which USG believed likely to arise in the UN this fall. We hoped GRC would help us keep ChiComs out of UN by accepting the tactics which a changing situation might demand. Secretary Rusk would want to discuss means of dealing with this problem in upcoming GA. We had not yet come to any final conclusion as to what tactics would be best.

9. Chiang replied pointedly that FonMin Wei would be ready for a full exchange of views with Secy Rusk on matters of UN tactics.

10. Chiang closed conversation with assertion that since UN Charter was clear on GRC membership as one of principal five, it should not be difficult for USG to adopt procedural tactics, such as insisting on two-thirds important question formula, so that any hostile resolution could be defeated. He said that GRC believed in determination of USG to hold line against ChiComs, and that if USG does not waver, but demonstrates its determination, then there should be no danger. If USG wavers, then attitude of other countries would weaken, and attitude of GRC would also change (presumably attitude toward USG). If an adverse resolution were to pass, GRC would certainly withdraw. USG could convey this position to Canadian Government or any other government, if it wishes, since this was a public stand.

11. This morning during course of protocol call on Secy Gen Chang Chun (DCM present, with Protocol Director Shah interpreting) I said I was concerned that President might not understand that USG influence on other countries was limited. The days were gone when US could force others to conform to US views. Situation in the UN, therefore, was not one where simple US determination could prevail. Chang said he thought Gimo understood this, but that GRC believed necessary votes could still be maintained on old formula, and certainly on important question, if we all worked hard and if US attitude did not waver. Gimo intended, he said, first to make clear that GRC could not stay in UN if UN “voted to allow” ChiCom entry. Second, Gimo wanted to say that GRC believed no change in tactics needed, but GRC willing to discuss tactics if USG had new ones to offer, providing new tactics in line with first point. GRC thought that important question formula should suffice. I reminded Secy Gen that on two occasions last fall UN organ had by simple majority vote overturned requirement for two-thirds vote on matters which were clearly “important questions” within meaning of Charter. We were not confident that “important question” rule would hold.

12. Comment: Not unexpectedly Gimo attempted take initiative in following respects: (A) he attempted rule out further discussion of new tactics at his level; (B) he was seemingly adamant in insistence on walking out of UN if any kind of “two Chinas” resolution passes; (C) he professed to believe that USG holds simple key to UN procedural problems if it will continue strongly support traditional tactics; (D) he contended USG needs only to use its influence with countries such as Canada to get them to fall in line. These positions tend to limit further discussion, and if Secy is to achieve meaningful exchange of views with Gimo he will have to deal with them quite directly. It is still unclear whether Gimo really believes USG has capability to hold traditional line; this could be genuine or it could be based on belief that USG should make a unilateral declaration that US would leave UN if ChiComs voted in. In any event best course is for us to hope, until convinced otherwise, that all these points are tactical maneuvers that will turn out in due course to be negotiable.

13. New FonMin Wei so far not very impressive figure, and it is doubtful that he has great influence on Gimo. This will make it doubly difficult to have meaningful discussions with GRC, since Gimo may not fully understand, or may not wish to understand, dangers in using old tactics in UN, and FonMin may not be able to exercise effective influence even if we can convince him.

14. One topic not touched on, which Secy should consider exploring with Gimo, is seriously adverse consequences to entire common cause if GRC walks out and gates thus opened wide to ChiCom entry. This places heavy obligation on GRC.

15. I have carefully refrained from giving any hint as to nature or language of any prospective new resolution. Hence I have not gone into the matter of the great difference between a mere left-handed invitation to ChiComs and actual entry of ChiComs into UN. Way is open for Secretary to assume that Chinese are saying they will walk out if and only if ChiComs actually appear to take UN seat. He can say that we are confident this will not happen, and ChiComs will not be able to accept any invitation so long as GRC remains in its seat. Gimo will probably try to close this off promptly by strong assertion his intention to withdraw as soon as UN “votes to allow ChiComs to come in”, but argument can be pressed with some hope of progress.

16. I plan no further explorations before Secretary’s arrival July 3. Believe subject these discussions being held closely to small group within GRC (as they are within Embassy). Vice Pres. Yen and DefMin Chiang Ching-kuo have probably been filled in. Believe Secretary may wish to raise this question in preliminary way with Vice President during his call July 3.

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra and Manila for the Secretary and Bundy.
2. Telegram 1383 to Taipei, June 24, reported that there had been a further high-level meeting on the Chinese representation question and that Rusk wanted to “make major pitch on this new tactic himself” when he was in Taipei. It instructed McConaughy to initiate talks on the subject promptly but to limit himself to the line taken by Bundy and Sisco in a June 15 meeting with Chow and GRC UN Representative Liu. (Ibid.) The June 15 meeting is summarized in telegram 2901 to USUN, June 16; Sisco and Bundy expressed concern that past tactics would not work and said U.S. policymakers were reviewing the problem. (Ibid.) Telegram 1384 to Taipei, June 24, approved by Rusk and Goldberg, conveyed guidelines for Rusk’s use. (Ibid.)
3. Dated June 25. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
4. Dated June 25. (Ibid., UN 6 CHICOM)
5. The numbers are standard telegraphic code for the Chinese characters.