Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, November 10, 1966, 9:21 a.m.

82445. Subj: Canadian Initiative on ChiRep.

1. Assistant Secretaries Sisco and Bundy called in British Minister Stewart to talk about Canadian proposal on ChiRep (see septel). Sisco explained our very strong objections to Canadian draft resolution, especially its prejudgment of issue with drastic proposal which amounts to “one China, one Taiwan” arrangement with Peking in SC. He thought it would be hard to devise proposal better calculated to provoke GRC into walking out of UN. Apart from unacceptability Canadian scheme, we felt this no time for move which might encourage hardline tendencies in Peking, adversely affect peace prospects in Viet Nam and create problems for many allies in Asia. Our problems compounded by shortness of time to consult friendly governments, Congress and public. In addition there was effect on UN itself; if Communist China were seated in SC UN peacekeeping actions in Cyprus and Kashmir would have been inconceivable.

2. Sisco went on to say that since Canadians were under domestic pressure to give sense of movement we were prepared, on assumption of continued Canadian opposition to Albanian resolution and support for important question procedure to go along with alternative arrangement of study committee to study all facets of Chirep in both GA and SC and make recommendations to next regular session of GA. Study committee would permit us to pursue question in evolutionary and reasonable way with examination of all alternatives. It would moreover provide Canadians and other governments with ample opportunity to express views on substance of question.

3. After handing Stewart copy of illustrative resolution we could support, Sisco noted that we had made our views clear to Canadians yesterday telling them that we flatly opposed to their resolution and suggesting this alternative. We did not yet know ultimate Canadian reaction. We had also talked with Chinese, Italians and would today be seeing Japanese, Australians, New Zealanders and Belgians who we hoped would sympathize with our reaction.

4. FYI Only. Stewart (asking that it not be reported to other governments) said UK had already been consulted by Canadians in London and had told them UK did not like Canadian resolution and did not intend any policy change this year, i.e., British would continue support important question procedure, would support para one of Albanian resolution and would make explanation of vote on para two expelling GRC. British considered Canadian resolution a stall which would in any event fail. Stewart added quite frankly that if UK were to support such resolution they would expect to be thrown out of Peking. End FYI.

5. Stewart remarked that while British had refused support Canadian resolution they had agreed not to lobby against it and he assumed we wished British support for our alternative. Sisco confirmed this and said Amb Goldberg would want to discuss precise tactics after consultations with various governments over next few days. Officer accompanying Stewart thought it necessary to remind us that when the British reviewed idea of study committee in April this year they frowned on idea because it would appear too much a procedural device designed to avoid coming to grips with substance of issue. Stewart, however, preferred not to prejudge his Government’s reaction.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret, Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Gleysteen, cleared by Bundy and Judd, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Ottawa, and Taipei.