Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada¹

Washington, November 9, 1966, 1:06 p.m.

81612. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. Please convey following message from me to Pearson² urgently:

[Begin] Text.

Dear Mike:

Under Secretary Katzenbach has explained to Ambassador Ritchie the serious problems we have with the Canadian draft resolution on Chinese representation. I hope that you will be able to give this problem your personal and urgent attention.

From my conversations with Paul Martin over a period of time, and from discussions with Ambassador Ritchie, I gather that your government may be moved in part by the feeling that an offer of membership in the UN would have a constructive effect on Chinese Communist behavior, including the outcome of the present internal convulsion, and also by a related feeling that such an offer might have some favorable effect on the prospects for peace in Vietnam.

I must confess that, as of this particular time at least, both of these arguments seem to me to have little substance. None of us can tell where the present convulsion on the mainland is headed, but surely the dominant fact is that Mao and Lin Piao appear to be at least tenuously on top, and appear clearly to stand for a harsh line in all aspects of policy. Our own China experts are in total agreement that this is a time for watchful waiting, and not for injecting any new special factor if it can be avoided. (I may say that this applies equally to any military action that could be construed as a direct or indirect threat to Communist China, and I can assure you of our continued prudence in this regard.) As things now stand, I find it hard to avoid the conclusion that at this moment what must appear to be a naked offer of membership will if anything encourage the hard-liners and work against the possible emergence of different policies out of the present turmoil in China.

The same point applies to the prospects for peace in Vietnam. We have tried our utmost to have the UN play a useful role to this end, and the outcome to date suggests many factors other than the absence of Peking from New York. But surely, in any event, Peking will come only if the Republic of China withdraws, and in these conditions the encouragement to hard-line policies, not merely immediately, but for a long period to come, would only be compounded.

Moreover, there is the further imponderable of Sino-Soviet relations. Any major change in the pattern of presentation of the Chinese representation issue can only confront the Soviet Union with serious problems. In terms of the really serious interest the USSR and its Eastern European friends now appear to be taking toward peace in Vietnam, I doubt very much if they would feel that a new controversy on this issue would be helpful.

All in all, our own conclusion would have been that it was better for this year to put the issue to one side, and to deal with it on previous lines. And our soundings in New York, as well as widely in Europe and elsewhere, had indicated sufficient support to maintain this view, even among nations most desirous of some early change in the situation.

So much for our view of the merits of the case. Having followed closely the thrust of our policy over the past year, from the bombing pause in January to our handling of Communist China and the theme of reconciliation stressed by the President on his recent trip, I know that you recognize that our motives and objectives yield to none in our concern for peace in Vietnam and an eventual wider peace in Asia.

This brings me to the other main point that Paul Martin has stressed in the past, and Ambassador Ritchie most recently. This is that your government feels under strong political pressure to show some forward movement on the issue during this session, and to make clear and explicit the Canadian view that a new answer must be found along “two Chinas” lines. It would be presumptuous of me to contest this argument, which apparently leads you to the conclusion that you must put forward and support a new proposal of some sort.

But from a purely practical standpoint, I must then point out that your present proposal is almost bound to create maximum mischief for minimum result.

• First, it is an incompatible hybrid between an action and a study resolution. While ostensibly directing the GA President to explore the issue, the preamble states the exact solution to be explored. Which is it meant to be, for only the most naive could conclude that you have not pre-judged the outcome of any exploration?

• Second, your resolution states the answer for the Security Council as well as the General Assembly. Of course, this issue will have to be faced in due course if Peking should ever accept membership in the General Assembly. But surely we must all recognize that a Peking seat in the Security Council raises far more serious issues even than General Assembly membership; for the short run, any serious student would have to conclude that Peking on the Security Council would spell total ineffectiveness by the Council for a long period to come on any issue such as the recent disputes about Cyprus and Kashmir and a whole host of past examples in which Canada has often played a great part. Must we charge across that bridge in any fashion now? May we not wish to examine it at some point against the possibility of some Charter amendment providing, perhaps, for rotation of a permanent Asian seat on the Security Council among India, Japan, and China?

  I mention this point because it seems very clear that most Asian nations do not welcome the thought that Peking would sit as an Asian permanent member with a veto in the Security Council. Surely those who live at great distance from the present scene in Asia should give great weight to the views of nations most directly and deeply concerned about the irrational militancy of the present Peking regime.

  Moreover, inclusion of the Security Council as a specific element can only have the gravest effects on the reaction of the Republic of China. I have always taken at face value Paul Martin’s assurance that your government does not wish to see that government out of the UN, and I need not repeat to you the depth of our convictions on this subject, convictions I believe to be shared by the great majority of the UN membership. Yet your proposal as it stands, by including the Security Council, is bound to arouse the strongest emotions—and wholly understandable ones—in the Nationalist Chinese government, including the moderates who represent its hopeful future voice. If you are trying to force the Republic of China right out of the UN, you could not choose a better course. But that can hardly be your purpose.

• Thirdly, as to the choice of a party to explore the issue, the President of the General Assembly seems to us to have grave disadvantages. His mandate is limited in time, and he is a single individual not necessarily representative of the spectrum of views and interests of the membership on a complex issue.

All of the above are serious defects of substance. They lead us to the clear conclusion that we would in any event have to oppose your Resolution in its present form, if it were introduced, and indeed would have to exert every ounce of our influence to defeat it by the heaviest possible margin. I need not underscore the seriousness of such a split between our two nations.

But the difficulty is even more grave than this. Again from a purely practical standpoint, the introduction of your Resolution could only create a state of total confusion in the General Assembly as it considers the Important Question issue and the Albanian Resolution. I cannot say what votes you would be able to obtain for your Resolution, but at the very least it would throw a last-minute and unforeseen element into the situation, so that the resulting vote patterns would become the result of almost unpredictable and emotional currents in New York. I cannot believe that this is the constructive way to go about resolving the problem.

Let me now turn to our own affirmative proposal for a substitute resolution. Although we would have preferred to let the whole issue lie for this session, we have always known that the issue would have to be faced at some point, and we approach the matter in a constructive spirit. The idea of a study committee has a long history in the thinking of other members and in our own contingency planning. Under present circumstances, it seems to us to avoid virtually all the grave disadvantages of your proposal, while at the same time representing clear forward movement on the issue along the line that your government feels under political pressure to obtain.

This is most definitely not a delaying tactic on our part. Rather it faces the whole issue head-on and will require a full report on all aspects of the problem by the study committee for the next General Assembly. In the nature of things, this can hardly fail to include a serious examination of the complex issue of the Security Council, as well as an examination of the conditions under which Peiping might be offered a General Assembly seat—a matter, incidentally, on which your proposal is totally silent. In short, from a substantive standpoint, it does everything you could ask and at the same time provides the period of detailed examination that we believe is required both in terms of the complexity of the issue and in light of the present uncertainties of Communist Chinese behavior.

I might add that we would wholly support membership by Canada on the study committee.

Therefore, it is our earnest suggestion that your government not submit its Resolution and take the lead with others (such as the Italians) in sponsoring a proposal such as contained in the draft Resolution that we have given Ambassador Ritchie.³ If you wish to make your own view of the desirable outcome clear, you will surely have ample opportunity during the debate, as will all the other nations involved.

We ourselves, while not sponsoring such a substitute proposal, would be prepared to join in its support, while we would expect—in accordance with our understanding of your position—that if such a proposal were put forward and were supported by us, you in turn would continue to support the Important Question and to vote against the Albanian Resolution. With the study committee resolution before the General Assembly, the latter would of course become in clear contradiction to it, while I hope that your government continues to appreciate the grave consequences for the whole work of the United Nations that would flow from any defeat on the Important Question.

We are already consulting with key interested nations in this sense, including the circle with which you have shared your proposed resolution.

Finally, let me make clear that the President, who is of course now resting in Texas in preparation for his operation Friday, has gone over this whole matter with the greatest care and has personally approved the position I have stated. We hope that your government will reconsider its position and be prepared to act as I have suggested. Please let me know just as soon as you possibly can.

With warm regards,

Sincerely

Dean Rusk⁴

End Text.

2. For Info Addressees (other than USUN): We also sending you State 81502⁵ showing line we are taking with GRC. We are talking here today with British, Australians, New Zealanders, Belgians, and second round with Japanese, who were seen last night in Tokyo. Italians were seen last night particularly with view to their interest in study committee idea. All of our conversations here will be reported to interested posts during the day. You should take no action on basis this cable unless otherwise instructed, but should carefully study lines we have taken with Canadians and GRC, being prepared to adapt these to your local situation in any discussion that may arise with host government.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Sisco and Rufus Z. Smith, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to USUN for Goldberg and to London, Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo, Rome, Brussels, and Taipei.
2. Ambassador Butterworth reported in telegram 784 from Ottawa, November 8, that he had delivered the message to Prime Minister Pearson, who was in a meeting and therefore unable to discuss its contents at that time. (Ibid.)
3. The text of the U.S. alternative draft resolution was transmitted in telegram 81492, November 8. It provided that the General Assembly, noting that “the GRC is a founding member of the United Nations,” that “the PRC has attached conditions to its representation,” and that “the complexities involved in this question require the most searching consideration,” decided to establish a committee to study all facets of the situation and make recommendations to the 22d General Assembly for an equitable and practicable solution. (Ibid.) Katzenbach gave the draft to Ritchie on November 8; their discussion is summarized in telegram 81500, November 8. (Ibid.)
4. In a reply transmitted in telegram 801 from Ottawa, November 11, Pearson wrote that he was giving serious and urgent consideration to Rusk’s letter but added that the Canadians were convinced that some forward movement on the issue was desirable and that their initiative represented a realistic and balanced approach. (Ibid.)
5. Telegram 81502, November 8, summarized a conversation that day between Katzenbach and Ambassador Chow, in which Katzenbach stated the U.S. view that the only feasible way to deal with the Canadian resolution was to try to persuade the Canadians to alter it and to give them a substitute proposal. (Ibid.)