Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, September 29, 1966, 6:57 p.m.

56941. Consultations with GRC. Refs: A—Taipei’s 901; B—Taipei’s A–250;² C—Hong Kong’s 2095;³ D—Hong Kong’s 2072.⁴

1. From your conversation with Chiang Ching-kuo reported refs A and B, it apparent GRC now desires resume consultation with respect to mainland and continues hope win some form US approval, even if only on contingency basis, for military action against mainland. In present situation on mainland and in Viet-Nam it crucial we and GRC avoid actions which might give wrong signal to ChiComs. As you noted to CCK, our position against initiation use of force against mainland has not changed. In circumstances now foreseen, we could not assist GRC landings on mainland and could not agree to any unilateral GRC military action against mainland. We feel GRC tacitly accepts our position in assuring us, as both President Chiang and CCK have done, that GRC gives priority to solution Viet-Nam problem over return to mainland.

2. We believe we should welcome interest of President Chiang and CCK in exchanging views with us on Far East problems and we hope through maintenance this dialogue avoid GRC feeling isolated from US policy. This consideration especially important in view seven-nation meeting on Viet-Nam.

3. Regarding ref C para 3, assume Embassy will continue monitoring GRC activities and report immediately any GRC plans for unilateral actions which could convey wrong signal to ChiComs.

4. We see no objection to Blue Lion consultations continuing on same basis as in past and with lowest possible level visibility. Regarding briefings mentioned para 9 ref A, we believe it must be made clear to GRC that original Blue Lion ground rules remain in force. We cannot become involved in contingency military planning re mainland jointly with GRC, though joint planning for defense Taiwan and Pescadores under our treaty should of course continue.

5. CCK’s separate proposal re intelligence operations, while entirely too sweeping in total, may offer way of permitting minor concession to reduce appearance of flat rejection of GRC desires and detrimental GRC reaction. We will discuss specifics with you through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] channels.⁵

6. Regarding ref A para 8, you may inform CCK there have been no US-Soviet discussions on Communist China including recent Rusk-Gromyko conversations in New York. Within recent weeks low level Soviet officials have become somewhat freer in remarking on Chinese developments in conversations with US counterparts but only to extent of repeating Soviet press commentary. We will of course keep GRC informed of any significant developments in this respect.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Bennett; cleared in draft by Roy, Admiral Lemos of DOD/ISA, Richard H. Donald of ACA, and [text not declassified] of CIA; and approved by Berger. Repeated to Hong Kong.
2. See Document 186 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. Telegram 2095 from Hong Kong, September 21, warned that Ch’en Yi’s recent comments to a Japanese delegation indicated that Chinese Communist policy was dominated by an extremist Mao-Lin leadership preoccupied with the possibility of war with the United States. It warned of the risk of giving the Chinese Communists the wrong signal at that time and urged rejection of any Nationalist proposals for operations against the mainland. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
4. Telegram 2072 from Hong Kong, September 20, commented on Ch’en’s comments to the Japanese delegation and urged extra precautions against any steps that might risk Chinese involvement or force greater North Vietnamese dependence on China. (Ibid., POL CHICOM)
5. A copy of a message agreed upon at a September 30 meeting between Berger and Colby is filed with an October 4 memorandum from William McAfee of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to Hughes, recording the meeting. (Ibid., INR Files, 1966 FE Weekly Staff Meetings)