Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

190. Memorandum by the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency¹

ONE Special Memorandum No. 14–66

Washington, September 23, 1966.

SUBJECT

• The China Tangle²

1. The situation in China today is one of confusion, contradiction and rapid change. The more spectacular events have been widely reported: Mao has chosen a new successor, Lin Piao, re-juggled the top leadership, and most important, launched an extensive purge of the party. With the removal of Peng Chen and the demotion of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, the men who have run the party for Mao have been forced to give way to a new group. Military men, notably the old Marshals of the PLA, are prominent in the revised Politburo. Moreover, elements of the old party machine are now also under attack by the Red Guard, which has been formed primarily for this purpose by Lin and Mao, and to some degree is overseen by the PLA.

2. It seems to us that the party cannot have been subjected to such a radical upheaval merely because it had been sluggish or unresponsive to Mao’s orders. More likely Mao was confronted with actual open opposition in party forums, leading him to conclude—possibly with good reason—that he could no longer trust the party as it had been constituted and led to execute his basic policies. To be sure, Mao may be simply suffering from the pathological suspiciousness of a senile autocrat, yet we still do not believe he would have wrapped himself in the mantle of the PLA and unleashed the Red Guards unless he had good reason to think there was some real and potent threat to his authority.

3. There may have been specific policy issues which brought on the crisis—such as the Vietnam war, military questions, the Sino-Soviet conflict or economic problems. This cannot be demonstrated from the available evidence. It is reasonable to believe, however, that the manner and style of Mao’s approach would generate opposition among those who had to run the country’s affairs, and would, by its nature, have to be opposed by a more moderate line.

4. Lin Piao is still a shadowy figure. We do not know how far he is loyal to Mao or how far he is pursuing an ambitious plan of his own. We are inclined to believe that Mao deliberately turned to Lin as he lost confidence in the party, but that the proximity of power is acting as a strong stimulant in Lin. If Mao and Lin successfully purge the party and replace Liu’s and Teng’s men with their own, then Lin will obviously have gone a long way to consolidating his role of heir apparent. However, even with the power and prestige of Mao behind him, and perhaps allied with the wily and astute Chou En-lai, Lin’s task remains difficult and dangerous. The leaders of the old party machine are not without assets. They are presumably working now to turn the tide against the Red Guard. The forces arrayed against them are formidable—Mao, Lin, the PLA—but even in defeat the former party leaders could throw the nation into great confusion.

5. Thus a basic instability could continue for some time, possibly until Mao leaves the scene and a successor regime finally consolidates its control. In any case, we expect protracted and complicated maneuvers. Some further turmoil at the top is likely, and sharp reversals of policies cannot be ruled out.

6. There are indeed some few signs that reason and sanity have not totally departed the Chinese scene. Despite the flood tide of harsh criticism against moderates and pragmatists, the regime has not yet abandoned the relatively realistic and restrained approach to economic policy of recent years. As spokesman for this policy, Chou En-lai has called on the Red Guards to leave the farms and factories alone; Lin Piao, however, has not touched on this aspect but has called for heavier blows against those within the party “who have taken the capitalist road.” In attempting to curb unnecessary disruptions to the economy, Peking has shown particular apprehension over potential threats to the fall harvest. In view of the disappointing early harvest, there is valid cause for concern. But while Mao and Lin appear to have conceded Chou the need to maintain some stability in the economy, we cannot be sure that Mao will not again veer in an extremist direction and launch a campaign against the ideological impurities now being tacitly ignored. Action against the peasants private plots would be a key indicator that such an extremist campaign was underway.

7. Caution is also being shown in foreign affairs, specifically on Vietnam. Concentration on the enemies within has resulted in a drop in press attention to Vietnam and to foreign affairs generally. China has not abandoned or even eased its stand on Vietnam, but it has pushed the matter to the back burner for at least the time being. Aside from some heavily qualified hyperbole about the Red Guards being ready to “fight a war at any time,” the current upheaval has concentrated on domestic issues. We estimated recently that it was unlikely that the Chinese would intervene with their own forces in the Vietnam war. And we continue to believe this is the best judgment of Chinese policy. But the questions of who is in charge in China and what he or they are seeking to accomplish certainly bear on the matter. It would only be prudent to allow for some chance that turmoil in China will produce a radical break with the caution that has so far characterized Chinese policy in Vietnam.

8. There is one further aspect of the Chinese crisis that is of great interest for the US. This is the effect on Hanoi. Thus far, the North Vietnamese have appeared to act as if nothing has happened in China. But they must be concerned over the disruptions and uncertainties. At the very least, China is increasingly exposed as a rather uncertain and unstable ally, and the net result may be a loss of influence in Hanoi. If so, this might improve the chances for other interested parties, particularly the USSR if it was so minded, to encourage Hanoi to consider a political settlement.

9. As for the longer term, the present crisis cannot help but have a profound effect on China. It is already apparent that Mao’s permanent revolution is meeting resistance. The recurrent trauma of government by exhortation as a substitute for effective policies to deal with real problems, is clearly taking its toll among the Chinese people. Despite a widespread support for Mao’s objectives of building a strong and independent China, there must be growing disenchantment with his methods for reaching this goal. Attempts to modernize China by following doctrines coined in Mao’s guerrilla days must appear increasingly ridiculous. Some intellectuals and even some party leaders were aware of this earlier but it has by now probably reached broader sectors of opinion.

10. No amount of glorification of the omniscient leader will dissolve the tightening constraints of the economy. Most Chinese will judge any government on its ability to help them meet their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter. The present regime has yet to come up with a reasonable plan for feeding its over 750 million people and at the same time financing an economic development program. As the growing population pushes against the limited resources of the stagnant economy, the risk of a major economic crisis will grow.

11. In the face of these problems, only a pragmatic leadership seems likely to make any progress at all in dealing with China’s immense problems. Such a leadership would also be forced to make an important reassessment of the premises of Mao’s foreign policy, including, probably, relations with the USSR. If we are correct in these assumptions, the long range trends are moving inexorably against Mao’s brand of socialism, and his desperate effort to reverse the tide may actually hurry his ultimate defeat. In short, his fears of “revisionism” in China are probably well grounded.

For the Board of National Estimates:

Abbot Smith
Acting Chairman

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. VII. Secret.
2. This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Directorate of Intelligence Research Staff. [Footnote in the source text.]