186. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
Taipei, September 20, 1966,
0932Z.
901. Meeting with Chiang Ching-Kuo.
- 1.
- DefMin Chiang Ching-Kuo yesterday called on me at his request, with major purpose of discussing mainland purge developments and GRC desire to take advantage of opportunities GRC sees in present situation.
- 2.
- CCK said he was directed by his father the Gimo to present GRC views on changes in situation since Secy Rusk’s conversations with Gimo July 3–4. Major elements, CCK said, are (A) Red Guard activity on mainland; (B) decreased possibility for starting Vietnam peace negotiations; (C) further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations.
- 3.
- CCK stressed that GRC policies and actions continue to be synchronized and coordinated with USG and that GRC would, as in the past, keep firmly in mind US desires and interests. He reiterated Gimo statement to Secretary that first and most urgent thing is to solve Vietnam problem, and that return to mainland was secondary and longer range objective. However he said GRC believed that now is opportune time for action to topple Peiping regime. He said USSR would like to see US bogged down in a war with the Chinese Communists, and Peiping hopes that in the end the US and USSR will come to a nuclear exchange. The GRC did not want to see a large scale war with Peiping either by the US or by the USSR, because Peiping would have too many advantages in terms of very large population and large territory in which to maneuver. Only the GRC possesses unique advantages capable of solving the ChiCom problem without setting off larger conflagration and without running risk of bogging down as foreign invader on China mainland. Interestingly, he indicated that this should be done while Gimo still holds reins of government, since in present circumstances GRC possesses both military and political force capable of toppling Peking. (It is not entirely clear, but perfectly possible, that CCK intended the inference to be “if not used during Gimo’s lifetime, US may not have this weapon at its disposal later” presumably because political drawing power would be diminished.)
- 4.
- A further reason for acting now, he said, is the grave danger, as GRC sees it, that result of dragging out of Vietnam war will be direct conflict between USG and Peking.
- 5.
- He said that Red Guards on mainland are: (a) anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist, which means anti-US; (b) anti-revisionist, which means anti-USSR; and (c) against traditional Chinese culture, which means anti-GRC. CCK said that ChiComs have stated that if Cultural Revolution not successful, Chiang Kai-shek will return to take over. (This is based on paragraph in Liberation Army Daily June 6 and both CCK and Gimo have referred to it before.) CCK pointed out that Soviets would like to topple Mao, and this is also desire of GRC and USG, making curious identity of aim. He said that SOVs, however, hope to see establishment of pro-Soviet regime, but that Chinese people would not easily acquiesce again in Communist regime, particularly after recent excesses of Red Guards. He said that GRC should be used to advantage to ensure an anti-Communist China.
- 6.
- CCK closed his presentation by saying that this was for my reference and study, and that no immediate reply was expected. He hoped that we could have further discussions of these and other views.
- 7.
- I expressed satisfaction with his frankness, and said I would have to think over his presentation and consult Washington. I reminded him that basic US policy has been not to use force against the mainland regime, and said I knew of no change in this policy. I said USG was not sure that regime was crumbling, and that while there were obviously great convulsions occurring, Mao and his chosen lieutenants were still in apparent full control. Perhaps more repressive measures would be used to continue the control, and end result could be a regime more formidable than before. The elements being purged had been as extremely hostile to the US as are the surviving elements. We assume that present leadership will continue to be hostile in any event. I said there might be ways by which to capitalize on the present situation but it was questionable that use of force was the right way, and stated that CCK should be prepared for a negative reaction from Washington.
- 8.
- CCK also conveyed Gimo request that we keep GRC informed of any substantive US-Soviet discussions on the subject of China.
- 9.
- I asked CCK if he considered that our talk was within Blue Lion framework. His answer made it clear that he considered Blue Lion talks to be talks about particular detailed plans, and that he wished to set up briefings for me to go over some of the proposed contingency plans. He emphasized that the briefings would be for my background information only, and that no comment or policy discussion of plans would be expected from me.
- 10.
- Comment: GRC has recently given [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. CCK has made strong on-the-record statements in speeches and in recent interview with US news reporter to effect that now is the time for return to the mainland. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] also has been reporting strong desire of Gimo for action by GRC, and [Page 394] Gimo dissatisfaction that plans presented to him are inadequate. All these signs lead to conclusion that Gimo (and perhaps others) are determined to re-open USG discussion of mainland return that was cut off in February when we refused to discuss a particular plan.
- 11.
- Our objective is to continue promised dialogue on mainland situation on useful basis, fend off mainland attack pitch without too flat a turndown, without running risk of giving ChiComs wrong signal if they learn of talks, and without lending any unwarranted hopes to GRC leadership that US attitude may change. I want to think over my next move, and will have opportunity to probe further Sept 30–Oct 1 when CCK has invited me on trip to Tsoying-Kaohsiung (this is same trip scheduled for Sept 15–16 which was canceled by typhoon).
- 12.
- Memcon being pouched.2
McConaughy