Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

189. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/MC/52

New York, September 20, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September–October 1966

SUBJECT

• ChiRep

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser
  • Mr. Bertus Wabeke (Notetaker)
• Canada
  • H.E. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs
  • H.E. A.E. Ritchie, Ambassador in Washington
  • Mr. H. Basil Robinson, Assistant Under Secretary, Department of External Affairs

Mr. Martin raised the question of Chinese representation by asking when the Secretary expected the issue to come up and how he saw the vote. The Secretary replied that our tabulation and those of our friends show some slight improvement. He added, however, that in his opinion this improvement was not very significant. This, he said, is an “important question.” He went on to say that he was bothered by the cynical attitude many UN members were taking toward the Charter on such issues as Article 19 or the importance of Chinese representation. Martin readily agreed that it was “important all right,” but predicted the issue would cause us trouble.

Martin then inquired where Senegal stood on ChiRep. The Secretary stated its vote seemed in doubt, it might abstain. Martin explained that they had had Senghor in Ottawa the day before. The impression of the man had been that he was a scholar and an intellectual. Martin recalled that last year Senghor had abstained. Now, according to Martin, Senghor said he would vote for an Albanian-type resolution “without reservation.” Martin confessed: “This shook me.” The Secretary commented that this change in attitude on the part of Senghor was probably due to French influence.

The Secretary then invited Martin to consider what are the important countries with regard to this issue. The Secretary pointed out that the ten countries on the Pacific that are living under the gun of Chinese Communism are all firm. He cited the strong resolution which the Asian Parliamentary Union had passed on the subject. Martin agreed that one had to give weight to such considerations. But he went on to say that if the US were not so powerful and friendly, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand would long ago have taken a “positive decision.” As it is, Martin said, “we do think twice. After all, I would rather be popular in Washington than in Peking.”

Martin then assured the Secretary that “we have not made up our minds what we are going to do, and we shall consult first.” He argued, however, that it is pretty hard not to let the ChiComs in, “provided Formosa is not thrown out.” To admit the ChiComs, according to Martin, “would create a wonderful atmosphere.” On the other hand, “if we go through the General Assembly, and Canada stays with the old decision, we lose a lot of respect in our country.” Martin claimed that public sentiment in Canada was “overwhelmingly” in favor of ChiCom admission. At a later stage of the discussion, Martin cited the latest Gallup Poll, which reportedly showed 59% in favor of admitting Red China. The Secretary suggested that all Martin needed to do vis-à-vis his own public was simply to tell the Canadians how it would be with the ChiComs in the UN.

The Secretary went on to state that it might be possible to consider ChiCom admission if they did not constitute the major obstacle to settling the Viet-Nam war. Furthermore, the Secretary made the point that if the ChiComs were to be seated in the Security Council, the Security Council would be “dead”. And he speculated that if they had been in the Council when the Kashmir conflict arose, this problem could not have been settled the way it was. Martin agreed that if the ChiComs came in, there would be confusion, but he seemed prepared to take this into the bargain. He stated he thought the U.S. had made a great mistake. He claimed that everywhere Canada was being taunted for being “just a satellite of the U.S.”

The Secretary then suggested that Martin look at the question in terms of Canadian national interest. Martin countered that “if we miss this season, we create a tragic situation for the world. The ChiComs will acquire more bombs. In a few years you would not be able to do much about China. The interest of mankind is involved.” Martin speculated what would happen if Canada, after consultation with the U.S., were to take the plunge and vote for ChiCom admission. At first, according to Martin, there would be “hell” in the country. As in 1955 under Eisenhower, some would worry about reprisals by the U.S. “We would go through Gethsemane.” But after that things would quiet down. “The tactical picture would not have changed one bit. But we would have gotten the problem off our necks.”

The Secretary made the point that this was not the time to make the ChiComs feel their policy is right. The Secretary stated that President De Gaulle had prolonged the war by his statement in Phnom Penh. The ChiComs should be allowed to find out that their policy is leading them into a dead end. Martin countered that the same could have been said about the Soviets some years ago and concluded that “if we had the ChiComs around the table, things could not be worse than they are now by having them in isolation.”

The Secretary reminded Martin of the Berlin crisis and the Cuban crisis as far as the Soviets are concerned, and pointed out that those who have diplomatic relations with Communist China don’t seem to have any discussion with them. Martin insisted, however, that the attempt must be made “to get the ChiComs into international society.” When the Secretary argued that we should not mislead the ChiComs to think that their behavior pays off, Martin objected that the ChiComs surely do not believe that to let them into the UN could be tantamount to sanctioning their system. Sooner or later, according to Martin, the ChiComs will be in anyway. He concluded, therefore, that the “right course politically, is to get it over with now.” Martin then stated that for him the crux of the matter was whether or not the issue was so important that “we can afford to disagree with the U.S.”

The Secretary remarked that he would weigh Martin’s views more heavily if Canada had troops in Viet-Nam. As it is, the Secretary stated, ”you have no risks.” Martin replied that he was not ashamed of what Canada was doing in Viet-Nam. The Secretary then assured him that he was not pressuring Canada to be in Viet-Nam. After a brief dissertation by Martin on the debate over recognition of Communist China within the U.K. Government in 1950, the Secretary concluded the conversation by urging Martin not to surprise us and asked him to keep in touch.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83. Confidential. Drafted on September 29. Approved in S on October 18. The source text is Part III of III. The meeting was held at the Barclay Hotel in New York City.