Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada¹

Washington, July 25, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

14522. Subject: Secretary’s conversation with Paul Martin, July 22²—Chinese representation.

1. Martin opened discussion by asking about the Secretary’s visit to Taipei and our view of the voting situation.

2. The Secretary responded that Taipei was now well aware that we felt there was a serious tactical problem whether the important question/substitution approach could succeed in the next General Assembly. He noted that his trip had revealed how strongly several key Asian countries feel about the issue, and particularly reported that Prime Minister Sato had urged privately that we do all possible to round up the votes on the present approach. The Secretary said it would be a disaster if the ChiComs displaced the GRC in the GA, and that we needed the most careful possible review of the votes to see if there was a major tactical problem in preventing this result.

3. The Secretary went on to say that it was important to distinguish between the General Assembly and the Security Council. The GRC was named in the Charter as a Security Council member, and the CPR was simply not the same government. (The Secretary conceded that the British and perhaps others did not share this legal view.) The Secretary also referred to the question whether the Asian nations would really want Communist China to occupy a permanent “Asian” seat on the Security Council, and whether it might not be necessary to consider a Charter amendment to designate some other Asian country or to provide for a method of selection for the permanent seat.

4. Martin agreed on the necessity of a careful review of the votes. He thought that the ICJ decision on Southwest Africa and the Rhodesian issue—on which he saw the British not being able to come up with any answer satisfactory to African opinion—could have a serious effect on African voting patterns. On the other hand, he noted that U Thant, in a conversation held within the past 10 days, had expressed the view that there would be little change from past voting patterns.

5. On the basic Canadian attitude, Martin said that the GOC had always approached the issue with full recognition of its relationship to the US and of all that the issue meant to the USG. Nonetheless, the GRC had to recognize that there was “overwhelming sentiment” developing in Canada, as shown by the 65% in a recent Gallup Poll in favor of ChiCom admission. He noted in passing that there appeared to be a similar trend in the US. He said that Canada would have taken a different line before now but for its concern for the USG position. He then went on to say that the ChiComs might not come in if offered admission, but that “there may be a lot” in GOC acting to make admission possible. However, the GOC would never act to expel GRC, although it might take or join in steps that “would have the effect of ushering them out.”

6. The Secretary rejoined vigorously that the issue was not one that affected the vital interests of Canada; “You have a free ride on it.” On the other hand, the Asian countries who face the militancy of Communist China would feel great pain if she were admitted. The Secretary strongly questioned whether this should be done merely to please sentiment in Canada and European countries.

7. Martin responded that the state of public opinion in Canada and elsewhere was a fact that statesmen must take into account, and the Secretary rejoined that the French particularly simply had no further stake in Asia. Martin responded that ChiCom admission was “bound to happen” eventually.

8. The Secretary said that it seemed to him the best thing would be for us to compare notes on the voting and to stay in close touch. Although making a mild complaint that GOC had not been informed on Secretary’s discussions in Taipei (FYI: We had in fact given general description to Embassy officer, and Embassy had not otherwise approached us), Martin did not seem to differ from this conclusion. He did refer again to recent SYG opinion and returned to his argument about the African vote, contending that African attitudes on such issues as Rhodesia and the ICJ decision did in fact wash over into the Communist Chinese issue.

9. Comment: In the light of the indications in Ambassador Goldberg’s conversations in Ottawa in May, it seemed noteworthy that Martin did not indicate that GOC planned to take some “two Chinas” initiative in the near future. We have other information, received on an unauthorized basis from Canadian Embassy officers here, that Martin directed the Canadian Delegation in New York to submit alternative “two Chinas” resolutions, but did not find any of these acceptable. While his general remarks continue to suggest that the Canadians cannot be relied on in a pinch, and might join in an initiative from some other quarter, it appears to Department less likely that they will take any lead, at least for the present. Ottawa may wish to comment, but our general posture should be to lie low as far as direct discussions with Canadians are concerned except on voting prospects. We expect they will ask for fuller report on Taipei discussions next week, and we will give them straightforward account.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 ChiCom. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy on July 23, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for IO William B. Buffum, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Geneva for Goldberg and repeated to Taipei, USUN, Tokyo, and London.
2. The conversation took place over lunch at the Department of State. A memorandum of the portion of the conversation concerning Chinese representation is ibid.