169. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
Taipei, July 19, 1966,
0900Z.
200. Subject: Reaction to President’s July 12 speech. Ref: Depcirtel 9794.2
- 1.
- First high-level official GRC reaction (other than press) to President’s speech on Far East was elicited by Ambassador from President [Page 357] Chiang July 18 during tea the President gave for Gen. Waters. Following discussion of military situation in Vietnam and related subjects, President asked Ambassador about recent developments in general. Ambassador took occasion to mention President’s speech and to reiterate that speech did not represent change in basic US China policy, but that it did reflect a somewhat different approach in line with essential US posture of not foreclosing possibility for settling any and all differences by non-military means. If ChiComs should rebuff these gestures, it would be they rather than we who would lose by such a confirmation of their intransigence.
- 2.
- President Chiang said he had studied President’s speech closely, as had many others. He said it had created concern in some circles. Chiang said he was glad to hear that speech represented no basic change in policy. He would accept this and not criticise speech. Excitement and unhappiness stirred up by speech in some quarters around world were due to lack of understanding of President Johnson’s situation. Chiang noted that Ambassador’s assurances were in line with statements by Secretary Rusk. Chiang conjectured (without any assent from Ambassador) that motivation for speech “may have been largely domestic.”
- 3.
- Comment: Suggestion that President’s speech was designed assuage domestic critics is one of prevalent GRC rationalizations designed to minimize importance of US foreign relations developments (the other being GRC conviction that ChiComs will in any case not respond to US overtures). Fact that GRC officials so far have reacted relatively mildly should not, however, be taken to mean they are not deeply disturbed and that there is not an influential group within the GRC urging a “counterattack” against what they fear is a serious softening of US policy toward ChiComs. However so long as developments occur in limited context and without immediate practical effect, moderate reaction probably will continue to prevail, with criticism focused chiefly on “tactical” aspects (such as effect on ChiRep). Given Chiang’s favorable expression of view, Embassy expects that reaction that will eventually be forthcoming from Foreign Ministry will be generally along relatively moderate lines of aide-memoire on Secretary’s testimony before Zablocki Committee. Dept’s attention is called, however, to CAS report FCT–9275,3 which illustrates view of those within GRC who would take stronger position.
McConaughy