Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

157. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, June 15, 1966, 1005Z.

1448. 1. Following observations and suggestions offered for Dept’s consideration in connection with visit to Taipei of Secy Rusk.

2. Top GRC officials have carefully followed recent statements by US administration officials, Congressional leaders and private citizens on subject of US policy toward mainland China. While official reactions from MOFA have been restrained, and unofficial reactions (from Chiang Ching-kuo and other GRC officials) carefully refrain from raising alarm, believe GRC fully aware of implications of implied US denial of GRC national goal of return to mainland.

3. Therefore believe we have opportunity, because ground has been prepared, for somewhat franker discussion than has been customary. There are risks in being too explicit about US disbelief in GRC ever under any circumstances returning to mainland, but believe Secy can and should be forthright in acknowledging that USG envisages possibility (perhaps remote in probability and in timing) of changes in mainland regime which could cause USG to modify present policies.

4. Believe any less forthright statement would be mistake because new Ambassador will need to begin discussions with GRC of long-term implications for Taiwan—discussions which have heretofore usually been taboo in very high level conversations. Need to open this topic is also a function of possibility US ChiRep tactics may have to be changed and USG may have to try to persuade Gimo not to walk out of UNGA if some kind of resolution with “two Chinas” implications is passed.

5. Discussions with Gimo and FonMin could include following statements volunteered by Secretary:

a. Observations on SEATO and ANZUS conferences and on situation in Vietnam.

b. Importance to the US of close relations with the GRC and the importance to the US and the free world of a strong democratic Taiwan.

c. Appreciation for economic and social progress.

d. Appreciation for GRC efforts through Vanguard program to raise food production in underdeveloped countries and extend their ties with free world. Also could indicate US desire to work out appropriate ways to assist Vanguard.

e. Thanks for allowing USG use of GRC military facilities.

f. Reaffirmation of US commitments to GRC, summarizing in succinct form: Defense Treaty, opposition to ChiCom entry into UN, US use of veto in Security Council “if it would be effective”, assurances that USG will not bargain away at Warsaw any of these commitments, and any other appropriate assurances.

g. Reminder of GRC commitment to obtain joint agreement before using force against mainland.

h. Expression of concern at very high level of GRC military budget which could if further expanded hamper economic development.

6. Secretary should be prepared to deal with:

a. Request for “unequivocal” reaffirmation of US support for GRC as sole Govt of China (this is context in which US attitudes toward changes on mainland could be brought forward by Secretary).

b. Request for US public statement that if ChiComs enter UN the US will withdraw (this would be place for explanation of US concern about GA voting, hopefully including US assurance that if voting lineup continues to seem favorable then US contemplates no change in strategy).

c. Possible but improbable ultimatum by Gimo that if UN votes any kind of entry to ChiComs then GRC must withdraw from UN or at least from UNGA.

d. Ominous and cryptic GRC statements sometimes heard by EmbOffs that if goal of return to mainland disappears then stability on Taiwan will be threatened, presumably either by GRC military hotheads, or by Taiwanese demands for greater political power.

e. Request for US support of an Asian anti-Communist military alliance.

7. It is possible that in spite of GRC understanding of recent US statements Gimo will again request US logistic support for massive assault on mainland “as only means of dealing with root of Vietnam problem.” Without trying to outline detailed scenario, suggest Secretary should say frankly that American traditions and present day opinions will not support such an action, and that US is committed instead to containment of aggression while strengthening chances for peaceful solutions.

8. Believe we have passed the point where offers to study “concepts” for assault on mainland will be either useful or credible to GRC.

Hummel

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Top Secret; Exdis.