158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Hong Kong1
1632. 1. UK HK Charge Hopson’s report on his conversation with Ch’en Yi prior to departure from Peiping for Hong Kong for Chiefs of Missions Conference follows:
2. After referring to full exposition on Vietnam which he gave me last year, Ch’en Yi said there has been talk abroad of peaceful negotiations, the convening of the Geneva Conference, etc., to discuss an end to the war. But the Vietnamese (both DRV and SVNLF), the people most [Page 322] concerned were against negotiations. Conditions were not ripe; reason was that U.S. had no intention of withdrawing from Vietnam. The Chinese Government supported this stand. The U.S. had never expressed the intention of withdrawing; on the contrary the Americans were expanding the war and in the final stage would escalate it to China. Some people thought that events would not develop in this way but China had to be prepared. Judging from their dealings with the U.S. since 1945, the Chinese could not assume that U.S. adventurous policy had “no” limit. Nothing was unlimited, but the fact was that U.S. would not withdraw from Vietnam and last stage would be U.S. escalation of war to China. He hoped this estimate would be proved wrong. The facts, however, were more likely to prove it correct. The U.S. was meeting difficulties in Vietnam and they would meet even greater difficulties in China if they attacked.
3. There were many conditions for ending the war but the following were the two principal preconditions:
- (a)
- The U.S. must immediately withdraw from Vietnam; and
- (b)
- They must recognize the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front as the sole representative of the Vietnamese people.
4. If these two conditions (the minimum proposed by the people on the ground) were accepted, all other problems could be solved. Stopping of American bombing of North Vietnam and reunification would present no problems if basic conditions were met. It would also be easy to implement the Geneva Agreements which stipulated that Vietnam should not take part in military alliances. The SVNLF could discuss this matter with the North Vietnamese without outside interference.
5. The British Government could help by stressing these two Vietnamese preconditions. The Chinese and the North Vietnamese would regard any proposals divorced from these conditions as being pro-American.
6. Naturally Ch’en Yi wanted to see China’s rightful seat in the United Nations restored. But more important was the question of relations between China and the U.S.: If Sino-American relations were improved, then the question of the UN would be solved. The question now was that the Americans were not willing to stop their aggression in Vietnam and no matter what “His Excellency Rusk” said, they were preparing to escalate that war. There were of course other outstanding Sino-American issues but if there were no withdrawal from Vietnam there was no question of talking about the improvement in Sino-American relations. Some people said that China was not interested in acquiring her seat at the UN. The Chinese would definitely not make any concessions in a matter of inherent rights. But the main question was Vietnam and the danger of escalation of the war to China.
[Page 323]7. When the Americans had withdrawn from Vietnam leaving the South and the North Vietnamese to settle their problems themselves, there would be hope of improving Sino-US relations.
8. Ch’en Yi referred to the four points made by Chou En-Lai on 10 April2 (my tel No. 358) and asked that these should be conveyed to the Americans as well as to the Conference of British Heads of Mission. Chou En-Lai’s four points (“China will never start a war with U.S.; what China says counts; China is prepared for escalation; if Americans extend war to China there will be no boundaries to that war”) all revolved around the question of Vietnam and Sino-American relations.
9. Referring to Ch’en Yi’s “two preconditions,” I reminded him of the English saying that “politics is the art of the possible.” I said that the Americans had entered into obligations with the South Vietnamese Government which made it impossible for them to withdraw from Vietnam immediately without further ado. For those obligations to be fulfilled, the right conditions had to be created. Moreover what was the basis for calling the SVNLF the only legal representative of the Vietnamese people? The SVNLF might represent a faction—perhaps an important faction but there was nothing legal about their status. I had no doubt that if a conference were convened, ways could be found of ensuring their participation or representing their point of view. But there was no legal basis whatsoever for claiming that they were the only legal representatives. If therefore Ch’en Yi’s two preconditions were rigidly applied no solution was possible.
10. Ch’en Yi said that he knew that the Americans could not accept them, but he also knew that the Vietnamese would not accept any departure from them either. The only course therefore was to be prepared for the worst.
11. Vietnam and Sino-American relations also figured to some extent in the exchanges on Sino-British relations for a summary of which please see my immediately following telegram.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 CHICOM. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Dean, cleared by Robert W. Drexler in INR/RFE, and approved by Jacobson. Repeated to Saigon and London.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 153.↩