156. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to the President’s Special Assistant (Moyers)1

Attached is the memorandum I wrote to the President November 19, 1964.2 Much of it is now outdated, except the fundamental truth that the image of the President abroad is the single most important factor in molding world opinion towards the United States.

It seems to me that today much can be made of the fact that the President has achieved an extraordinary victory in the Dominican election in proving his faith in the ability of people to decide their own future if given the opportunity without interference. This ties in with his objectives in Vietnam.

We discussed the profound impression which the President’s speech made on the African Ambassadors. This I believe could and should be gotten across in some way to the African peoples.

It is difficult to carry the worldwide unpopularity and misunderstanding of Vietnam along with an unpopular China policy inherited primarily from Dulles. I feel the President could well gain in most parts of the world by a spectacular change in attitude towards Red China. It would then, I believe, be easier to gain better understanding of Vietnam.

Without being specific, I would suggest the President’s acceptance of “containment, but not isolation” through adoption perhaps of a two-China policy. The Department has been studying this matter for five years to my knowledge. But the subject requires considerable study to bring it up to date, although a part of this has already been done. I understand there is a notion being considered to let some other nation propose this in the UN without our opposition. The US would cover up its past by abstaining. To me, this would miss a real opportunity for the President to take leadership.

I fully recognize the problem of giving full support to the war in Vietnam, while at the same time making a gesture towards Red China. But on balance I see an enormous “plus” in this move towards obtaining greater credibility and more understanding of our Vietnam policy in world opinion.

Incidentally, there might be an opportunity for a public rapprochement with Bill Fulbright as the instigator of the China hearings, without embracing Fulbright’s softness on Vietnam.

[Page 319]

I can only assure you of one thing, that a suggestion of the above would be opposed by the State Department for a dozen reasons, including unhappiness in Taipei.

Bob McNamara had an unusually good public reaction to his Montreal speech.3 I am speaking of the body of his speech, not his final proposal for the two-year service. I refer particularly to his readiness to have a new look at our relations with Red China, as well as his emphasis on other policies, rather than military power, to achieve security. Of course, the latter got attention because of Bob’s position. He really said nothing new, but it confirmed the newsworthiness of “man bites dog.” It seems to me, however, that since Bob’s speech went over well it might be worth while for the President to take some occasion to indicate his support of Bob’s ideas (omitting two-year service proposal).

I mentioned to you the possibility of the President’s taking leadership in advocating action by NATO to break down East/West European barriers, possibly at the conclusion of the Brussels Foreign Ministers conference. An opportunity exists prior to DeGaulle’s visit to Moscow.

You asked me for suggestions. The above is all I can come up with this afternoon. I thoroughly enjoyed lunch and look forward to talking with you next week.

Averell 4
  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, L.B. Johnson, Jan.–July 1966. Secret; Personal.
  2. Attached but not printed.
  3. Reference is to an address given by McNamara on May 18 before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Montreal. The text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 14–21.
  4. Printed from a copy that indicates Harriman signed the original.