Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

114. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State¹

Warsaw, December 16, 1965, 1527Z.

1003. Gronouski-Wang talks. Deptels 863 and 873; Embtel 998.²

1. 128th meeting. Prior to meeting I was introduced to Ambassador Wang and his staff. Wang regretted that he had been unable to accept my earlier invitation to have an informal conversation and tea after the meeting. He said he really had another diplomatic engagement so he could not have tea but suggested that we might get together at another time. Wang took this opportunity to mention that there had been a lot of “rumors” about the Warsaw talks lately. I assured him that neither I nor my staff would divulge contents of talks. It possible that Wang made this observation because of press commentary about my visit to Paris prior to talks or because he thought we might have used his acceptance of my invitation as basis for more “rumors”.

2. Wang started meeting with some polite phrases of welcome. In brief review of talks he said Chinese government has always stood for peaceful settlement of Sino-US dispute through negotiations and that his side would continue to take positive and reasonable attitude towards peaceful settlement. He soon marred this auspicious start by expressing hope that I would persuade USG to change its wrong position and give up its aggression against China.

3. Wang’s attitude throughout the meeting apparently was milder than his previous behavior. He read 20-minute long list of alleged US provocations in quiet restrained voice. He did not raise his voice when registering his government’s strong protest and serious warning concerning these incidents.

4. Wang listened attentively to my statement. His interest was obviously aroused by our offer to jointly investigate Chinese claims of Chinese fishing boat incidents on high seas, but he later rejected this initiative. He also finessed our offer concerning Chinese journalists and our statement concerning validated passports for doctors and scientists in the fields of public health and medicine by labeling my statements about doctors and journalists as old problems that could not be solved until problem of Taiwan was solved.

5. Wang only became heated when, during his rebuttal, he asked what threat Chinese fishing vessels which had been attacked on the high seas offered to the US. He asked, “what right have your planes to dive and strafe…. We have right to fish on high seas. What threat can such small fishing boats pose? How can they prevent you from your rescue work? What right have you to kill these fishermen?”

6. Wang was careful not to make any new commitments concerning Viet-Nam. However, he repeatedly stressed Peking’s firm intention to maintain its support for Hanoi. He emphasized China’s defensive rather than aggressive intent and said they would fight to defend themselves. Unlike last session, Wang did not dwell at any length on opposition of American public to administration policy in Viet-Nam.

7. I believe our position at this meeting demonstrated our concern about Viet-Nam and our desire to move towards a peaceful settlement. We also indicated reasonable flexibility in our efforts to obtain some meaningful contact with the Chinese. In both my opening statement and in my rebuttal I asked Wang if his side doubted our sincerity about unconditional negotiations why didn’t they put us to the test?

8. I was impressed by inflexibility of Chinese position and their refusal to give any indication of willingness to resolve the Viet-Nam crisis or anything else on any terms other than their own. I believe that others who listened to the talks will also get same impression. In this context our SY officer has tape recorded this session of talks which were broadcast by Polish transmitter concealed in or near the meeting room. (I understand our British colleagues were also aware of the transmitter in the meeting room. We may find that others also listened in.) PZPR Central Committee Plenum, now in session, may have received prompt report of our talks. If so, I suspect they also must have been impressed by our attempts reach some agreement and by Chinese inflexibility.

9. I was also impressed by Wang’s evident belief that US really was hostile and had aggressive intentions towards China. He was particularly eloquent on these points during his rebuttal when he was free wheeling and not reading from his text. He appeared genuinely to believe US harbors aggressive intentions towards Communist China and inter alia twice cited US assistance to Chiang “gang” in slaughtering millions of Chinese as proof of US hostility.

10. Wang seemed to be trying to drag out length of meeting by reading long statement on ChiCom position on disarmament (largely a repeat of previous stand). At end of meeting I suggested that because of critical situation Viet-Nam, we meet next January 19. After some discussion I agreed to March 16 date. Possible that delay until March 16 may be further evidence Chinese desire to extend interval between talks but we subsequently learned Ambassador Wang and interpreter Chien will leave before Christmas for 2 months home leave plus 20 days travel time.

11. I note that Dept instructions sent only to Warsaw. Dept may wish to repeat them to interested posts together with this telegram and Embtel 998. In briefing GRC both in Dept and at Taipei suggest use of paras 5 through 17 of Deptel 863 with changes in Deptel 873, plus Wang’s statements our 998, omitting Wang’s comments about joint investigation para 5 and doctors and journalists para 10.³

Gronouski

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong. A copy of the telegram, omitting paragraph 11, was sent to the President. (Johnson Library , National Security File, Country File, Poland, Gronouski-Wang Talks)
2. Regarding telegrams 863 and 873 to Warsaw, see footnote 3, Document 112. Telegram 998 from Warsaw, December 15, reported briefly on the meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US)
3. Paragraph 5 of telegram 998 stated that Wang rejected the offer of joint investigations of Chinese fishing boat incidents. Paragraph 10 reported that Wang said concerning doctors and journalists, “We have repeatedly made clear our position—no problems can be settled until major problem (Taiwan) settled.”