Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

151. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, May 17, 1966, 1929Z.

4920. For the Secretary and the President from Goldberg. US-Canadian talks re ChiRep.

1. Goldberg, accompanied by Butterworth, Sisco, and Pedersen called on PriMin Pearson. FonMin Martin and Under-Secy Ritchie also present on Canadian side. One hour’s conversation devoted almost exclusively to China reflected Pearson’s and Martin’s strong feeling there is need for movement on ChiRep issue at UN. Both stressed that they under strong pressure domestic opinion to make some change. Both feel Red China should be subjected to world opinion at UN. In responding to their views Goldberg adhered to line contained Goldberg-Rusk memo to Pres.² Our impression is that over coming weeks Canadians will develop and refine their ideas on “two Chinas” tactics for discussion with us. Pearson and Martin gave categoric assurances, however, that no move would be made by Canadians without further consultations with us. Pearson seemed firm on need to protect GRC’s position at UN, saying that Canada would be “hard put not to vote in favor of a two-China res”; at same time it would be “hard put not to be against res which would expel GRC”.

2. Goldberg reviewed ChiRep experience in last GA, indicated no change had been made in our policy but matter had been reviewed by Secy and himself in recent days and was under active consideration. Our assessment, based on 47–47 vote, that past traditional tactic unlikely to hold, particularly since Africans, who will be pressing at UN on Rhodesia and SWA, cannot be relied upon in such circumstances to maintain line on ChiRep.

3. Alluding to Pearson speech, Goldberg indicated interest on our part in any new thoughts Canadians had developed, stressing at same time that no new move be launched before we had opportunity for full consultation with Taipei as well as other key Asian friends such as Japan, Australia, Thailand, and Philippines. Said we would talk to Canadians again after we had talked to Chinese to try to induce more realistic understanding of situation by them. In meantime stressed US talking only to Canada and not even to UK in this sense. Asked Canadians to respect our confidence.

4. Pearson said if asked whether his speech indicated change in Canadian view he would reply to effect that, yes it represented sense of need to bring Communist China into contact with world but also that Communist Chinese views and behavior and their conditions on UN membership made it difficult to see how change could come. Said we could be guaranteed of Canadian confidence and that they would give us their views on how to proceed.

5. Goldberg stressed as he had earlier with Martin that he thought neither US nor Canada had yet examined carefully enough what effect of change in ChiRep policy might be on USSR. Sovs might think we were doing it only to embarrass them in relation to Chinese. We had important objectives with Sovs, such as nuclear treaty and non-proliferation, and would not want to jeopardize Sov movement toward West. Pearson said Sovs difficult to talk to at best and ChiRep would be subject almost impossible to discuss with them. Agreed to importance of factor and said they would give it consideration.

6. Pearson said he very conscious of difficult situation ChiComs would create in UN. Thought this period we would have to ride through. Noted Molotov and Vyshinsky had been about as difficult and nasty as possible but that exposure to UN over years had ultimately moderated their behavior. Suggested exposure to counter-debate might similarly make it difficult for ChiComs to maintain outside China some of more outrageous positions they took at home.

Goldberg

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis.
2. Document 149.