Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

138. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, April 6, 1966, 0813Z.

1086. For Bundy.

1. In last week or so Embassy has encountered serious concern in GRC about eventual drift of US policy toward greater accommodation with Communist China. This is result of estimate of long-range effect of domestic US policy debate, not conviction that administration has decided or intends to decide to change its attitude. However, those GRC officials with long memories, and this includes all the senior people, seem to suspect that US fear of war with ChiComs, coupled with what they believe is manipulation of US debates by subversive elements, will result during coming months in relaxation of US determination to prevent UN admission of ChiComs. In short, they seem to think that we may reenact some events of 1945–50 when, in their view, Communist and leftist elements cleverly and successfully manipulated US policy. This is nonsense of course, but there are, it seems to me, some compensations in this belief, since it may be better for US officials to be considered dupes than thought to be knaves.

2. My own recent exposure to this has come April 2 in conversation with Premier, April 4 in meeting with group of Legislative Yuan members (both memcons pouched),² and yesterday when accompanying Ray Cline in call on President Chiang. Other Embassy officers report similar concerns, and newspaper comment and speculation has also reached high level. Phrase “containment without isolation” has been center of much of this discussion, with newspapers using Chinese word for “containment” that means something close to “isolation” and then complaining about faulty US logic.

3. Cline’s conversations being summarized separately,³ but mention should be made here of unusual tenor of Pres Chiang conversation yesterday. This was only meeting Cline had with Gimo. Chiang seemed glum and discouraged; he made little effort to be communicative, which struck us as strange in light his long friendship with Cline and energetic and forthcoming atmosphere of previous talks. Cline’s talks with CCK were much more relaxed and friendly. They showed little CCK concern over ChiRep.

4. Chiang accepted gracefully our assertions that US policy is firm, but clearly believed some change will occur whether USG now intends it or not. Said he believed elements in US were doing to US Govt what had been done to GRC on mainland by ChiCom subversives. Appeared much concerned by recent alleged Japan Gaimusho spokesman statement that US problem this year would be to keep GRC in after ChiComs voted in. Said “if that occurs, how can we stay in the UN?”

5. Chiang declined to give his views on Southeast Asia when asked by Cline, saying only “I have nothing to say; I said it all in my letter to President Johnson after his election⁴ and I’ve said it on many other occasions.”

6. I realize problems of trying to give unequivocal assurances to GRC in light of probable UN situation this fall, and of other factors involving US domestic scene and Peiping reaction. However I strongly recommend we attempt some reassurance. This could be done in two ways: (a) through continued high level public denials of change in US attitude toward ChiComs entering UN, and (b) personal and private message, preferably from President Johnson to Chiang Kai-shek. Latter message should if possible refer to recent public discussions among Americans who are not in administration, and express resolve not to allow true USG position be misunderstood in third countries.

7. Also desirable would be beginning, if it has not started already, of intensive consultations on UN estimates with GRC officials in Wash and N.Y. Conclusions about US domestic pressures now being drawn by GRC are detrimental to our objective of convincing GRC that any change in US tactics in UN will be result not of USG desire for change but of our hard estimate of UN situation.

8. Ray Cline and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have seen this cable.

Hummel

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHICOM-US. Secret; Exdis.
2. Enclosed with airgram A–807 from Taipei, April 6. (Ibid., POL 1 CHINAT-US)
3. Not found, but see Document 142.
4. See Document 69.