137. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State1

1536. Ref: Embtel 1535.2 Prior to opening of meeting I asked about Wang’s home leave and welcomed him back. He seemed reasonably relaxed and courteous. In course of conversation I mentioned he had missed Governor Harriman’s visit when he was on home leave. Wang laughed and said perhaps it was just as well. An army of photographers which had been lurking at the door was admitted by mutual agreement. They left ten minutes later and I opened with an expression of my personal sympathy for the victims of the recent earthquake in Hopei. I used Department’s guidance in Deptel 1331 [1303].3 Wang listened with considerable attention, despite length of statement, and took extensive notes.

Wang’s response seemed short and almost perfunctory. He read it with a calm and almost detached air quite different from his more emotional charges of the December meeting. Part of his problem may have been the lack of substance in his charges of US military provocations against China. He could only muster up serious warnings 397 and 398 (without details), a GRC plane and two US robot planes shot down and March 2 attack on Chinese fishing vessel which caused no damage. Wang threw in Taipei Sofa agreement, Kung Kuan Airbase, and US Air Force activities and lodged what he termed a strong protest and serious warning through me to the USG. He said he wanted to tell us in all seriousness that the Chiang clique had been long repudiated by the Chinese people. “Taiwan will certainly be liberated by Chinese people and US will never succeed in perpetuating its occupation of Taiwan.”

Wang then charged that US since last meeting had taken grave steps to expand its war of aggression in Viet-Nam. He listed resumption air raids, Honolulu Conference, increase US troops in South Viet-Nam, allied assistance, building bases round the clock in SVN, and Thailand, to accommodate more troops “to slaughter SVN people.” Said US mopping up operations in SVN burned, killed and destroyed. Claimed US used poison gas and toxic chemicals. Said US was using more barbarous means than those of Hitler and was not only expanding effort in Viet-Nam, [Page 277] but was trying to spread war flames to Laos and Cambodia in attempt save self from defeat in SVN. Said if US dared spread war flames to all of Indochina, its efforts will only meet with more disaster, defeat and nothing else.

Wang then lodged protest about bombing Chinese Consulate Phong Saly, saying it was deliberate act of provocation and that he was instructed once again to lodge strong protest to USG. Wang said US actions proved US, not China, is aggressor. He repeated claim China does not have single soldier stationed in foreign land. Said US can solve no problem by attacking China and continued with comments reftel on Chinese determination to fight to end.

Wang mentioned US peace talks plot and said test of US sincerity is whether or not US honors Geneva Agreements with withdrawal all troops, US must accept DRV’s four points, Front’s five points, and recognize Viet Cong as sole legal representative of SVN people.

Wang then dredged up and dusted off April 1964 draft-agreed announcement on Taiwan Straits. Repeated it and said US acceptance was only way to effect improvement in Sino-US relations. “If USG really has sincere desire for better relations it should accept the draft-agreed announcement.”

Wang ended his initial presentation with this parting thrust. I responded by reiterating that we had no hostile or aggressive intent towards his country. Said we had treaty obligations protect Taiwan against attack and said we hoped for peaceful solution this and other problems in Far East. If we could agree to renunciation of force in Taiwan Straits this would be major stride towards peace. I also dwelt at some length on US sincere desire for peace in Viet-Nam. I told Wang that I would request a further investigation by DOD on Phong Saly charge and would let him know if there were any results of further investigation at next meeting.

Wang responded by repeating charge focus US strategy has shifted to Far East. He said “aggression against our fraternal neighbor is also a threat to our country so we can by no means sit idly by… . These are facts and you cannot deceive others by lies … so long as you refuse to change your policy it is impossible to improve relations.” Wang said US has no right to say that there should be renunciation of force in Taiwan Straits. “As everyone knows, it is an internal affair and US has no right to interfere… . The only means to improve relations is for US to withdraw forces from Taiwan and Taiwan Straits.”

Wang said that his side not fundamentally opposed to talks but in problems like Viet-Nam it impossible have talks because US aggression in Viet-Nam absolutely unjust and violation Geneva Agreements. He said as long as US refuses to change its policy our talks about a relaxation of tensions is false. Also said it impossible for his side take part in disarmament [Page 278] discussions because US not sincere. In mentioning prisoners, Wang said his government’s policy was to give time off for good behavior. But said this a matter for Chinese Government to decide. Made no mention of Captain Smith.4

I made brief reply to Wang’s statement. Wang then ended by complaining about leaks of the talks by USG officials. He cited three instantly (including that reported in Embtel 1535). I think it is advisable when mentioning the talks in the future to avoid any reference to substantive content. Wang proposed next meeting for June 22. I told him I extremely busy in mid-June with Poznan Fair and other travel, and suggested mid or late May. Wang suggested May 25 and I agreed. Meeting lasted three hours. After meeting I gave Wang copy of testimony on China before Zablocki committee and then asked him, in interest of becoming better acquainted, to dinner at my home with his staff during week of April 3. He did not reject invitation, but received it courteously. After deliberating he said he would let me know.

As reported Embtel 15345 our security officer has again taped broadcast of meeting. During meeting strange whirring noises occurred occasionally in nearby closet attracting attention of Chinese as well as ourselves.

After the meeting I gave brief, very general press statement. NBC and CBS then taped a television interview in my office.

Gronouski
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHICOM-US. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Taipei and Hong Kong and passed to the White House.
  2. Telegram 1535 from Warsaw, March 16, reported briefly on the 129th meeting of the Ambassadorial talks that day. (Ibid.) Gronouski reported in detail in airgram A–697, March 21. (Ibid., POL 1 CHINAT-US)
  3. Telegram 1303 to Warsaw, March 10, conveyed guidance for the meeting. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-US)
  4. Reference is to Captain Philip E. Smith, USAF. The New China News Agency reported on September 20, 1965, that a U.S. F–104 plane had been shot down by PRC aircraft over Hainan that day and that Smith had been captured. Telegram 406 to Warsaw, September 21, instructed Cabot to send a letter to Wang Kuo-ch’uan stating that the plane’s navigational equipment had malfunctioned, expressing regret for any intrusion it might have made inadvertently into Chinese airspace, and requesting that Wang’s government facilitate Smith’s release and return. (Ibid., POL 31–1 CHICOM-US) Cabot reported in telegram 445, September 22, that he had done so. (Ibid.)
  5. Not found.