142. Memorandum for the Files1
SUBJECT
- Ray Cline’s Observations on Taiwan
1. The following is a summary of the more important points made by Ray Cline in conversation with Mr. Bundy April 19:2
U.S. Attitude toward Asian Allies
2. Mr. Cline said President Chiang made the point to him that the U.S. should take greater care in its relations with its Asian allies to ensure that they not appear as U.S. puppets. There was, Cline thought, in this an implied criticism of our treatment of Vietnamese Prime Minister Ky and of the handling of the Honolulu Conference. Cline thought there was also probably an implication, which Chiang did not wish to make specific, that the U.S. should take greater care with respect to the GRC itself to let it appear that GRC actions were those of an independent country, not responses to Washington’s bidding.
[Page 287]State of Morale
3. Cline said that he found the state of morale in the upper echelons of the GRC very bad. He found President Chiang and Chiang Ching-kuo dispirited and discouraged. They seemed to have lost the dynamism and drive which he had always found in them in the past. During his conversation with Cline, President Chiang did not argue the GRC point of view but told Cline that he had already made his points to American officials from President Johnson on down, that they all knew his points of view, but that he had failed to persuade them.
Viet-Nam Policy
4. Chiang Ching-kuo told Cline that he doubted that our present military course in Viet-Nam could succeed. Chiang took the view that manpower was one thing the Communists had plenty of, and that we could not hope to defeat them solely by draining off their manpower. Cline said that this all led to the usual GRC argument that the only real solution to the Southeast Asian situation was an attack on the mainland of China; but he thought that Chiang in advancing his comments was sincerely persuaded that we were not on the right track in Viet-Nam.
Chinese Representation
5. Cline talked to certain Chinese officials, including a former Ambassador to Australia, Chen Chih-mai, about the prospects for the Chinese representation issue in the UN. These felt that, if the U.S. made an all out effort, it would be possible to get through the next General Assembly by a margin of possibly 3 or 4 votes. Cline said that the fundamental GRC attitude toward the UN was that, while there was some prestige in membership, it was not really essential. Chinese take the view that the UN problem is really more a U.S. problem than one for the GRC. They are willing to cooperate with us on it, but they feel a defeat in the UN would be more a U.S. defeat than a GRC defeat. In answer to a question by Mr. Bundy, Cline said he thought the GRC would go along with a tactic designed to preserve its seat by making the minimum necessary gesture in the direction of a seat for Communist China while safeguarding the position of the GRC—but only if the GRC was persuaded that we were doing this for the purpose of helping the GRC, not simply to avoid embarrassment to the U.S.
The Air Force
6. Cline said he found morale in the armed forces poor, and especially in the Air Force. Air Force officers are afraid that they are being rapidly outstripped by the competition on the mainland and they no longer have confidence that they are a first-class fighting force. Our MAP has not been sufficient to keep the Air Force in modern condition. A high number of planes have been lost and a high percentage are deadlined for [Page 288] repairs. He said that some 25 F–86s had been lost last year. (On checking with DOD we found the correct figure to be 11.)
Chiang Ching-kuo’s Health
7. Mr. Bundy wanted to know whether Chiang Ching-kuo’s somewhat unresponsive attitude might not be a result of poor health. Cline believed not; in fact, Chiang Ching-kuo’s health was about as good as it has been in recent years. Cline said that the younger Chiang is suffering from diabetes. So long as he takes care of himself and does as the doctor orders, his health is good; and in the last several months he has been very careful. Chiang is now 55 and the doctors give him another 8 or so years of good health.
Election of C.K. Yen
8. Cline observed that the election of C.K. Yen is being interpreted as President Chiang’s solution of the succession problem. President Chiang is thought to have realized that it was necessary for a person of the younger generation to be named as Vice President. At the same time, he did not wish to set up as Vice President a person of sufficient political power to rival Chiang Ching-kuo. The future pattern, as Cline sees it, is that C.K. Yen will occupy the titular position while Chiang Ching-kuo holds the substantive power.
Madame Chiang
9. Cline said he heard gossip in Taiwan that there is an estrangement between President Chiang and Madame Chiang and that Madame Chiang will not be returning for the inaugural ceremonies May 20.
(Intelligence Exchange—In a separate conversation Cline told me that the intelligence exchange with the GRC on mainland China conditions was proceeding. The GRC had no great enthusiasm for it, but he (Cline) felt it was worth carrying on with it.)
Recommendations:
10. Cline said there were two things which we could do to improve the situation in Taiwan: (1) appoint a new Ambassador and (2) increase MAP for the Air Force. He felt these two steps were urgently needed to repair the eroded morale of the GRC leadership. When the new Ambassador is installed in Taipei, Cline said his first concern should be to reestablish a policy and strategy dialogue with Chiang Kai-shek.
- Source: Department of State, EA/ROC Files: Lot 79 D 120, Exdis Material, 1965–1966. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bennett.↩
- Cline visited Taipei as part of a trip to several countries in the area. He sent Rostow notes of his impressions of the psychological climate in the area with a covering memorandum of April 13. His notes on Taiwan were headed “Free Chinese Government in Taiwan Tragically Low in Morale About U.S. China Policy.” Rostow sent the package to the President on April 18. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA, Vol. II)↩