Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, January 28, 1966, 4:30 p.m.

762. Ref A—Embtel 797 (being repeated CINCPAC); B—Deptel 728.²

1. Following is summary requested Ref. A of guidance contained Ref. B for conveyance in writing to Chiang Ching-kuo:

2. Begin summary. The concept to seize five southwest provinces of China which Minister of National Defense Chiang Ching-kuo left with Secretary McNamara last September has been studied with the greatest care by the highest military authorities in the United States Government. Although the terms of reference for Blue Lion consultations do not provide for U.S. critique of military plans which are based on the assumption of U.S. participation or materiel support, this fact did not prevent us from giving it the most serious consideration, because we value the views of the Republic of China and because we recognize the need for our two governments to exchange views at the highest level.

3. Regarding the feasibility of the concept, which appears to us the basis of Great Torch 5, the plan in our view has two fundamental weaknesses:

(a) It contemplates a commitment of U.S. forces to protect a GRC invasion force against Chinese Communist air and naval attack but not U.S. air strikes against the supporting Chinese Communist bases. We regard this as militarily unsound. On the other hand, air strikes against the mainland would initiate war between the U.S. and Communist China, which we are not prepared to do.

(b) Intelligence on mainland conditions available to US intelligence authorities is deficient in evidence that the population—or even a substantial portion—of the five southwest provinces of mainland China would rise in support of a GRC invasion. The concept proposed appears to be impractical without such support and concomitant military defections to the GRC. We therefore conclude that there is at present no possibility of executing Great Torch 5 under such conditions.

4. We continue to stand ready to examine and prepare critiques of GRC unilateral plans for actions against the mainland in the Blue Lion Committee on the basis of the agreed terms of reference.

5. Since an understanding of the intelligence picture in mainland China is essential to any plan for military action against the mainland, we wish to push on with the project we have agreed on to exchange intelligence appraisals. These appraisals would include study of the dissidence potential in the five southwest provinces as well as elsewhere in mainland China. We understand that these intelligence appraisals are now being worked on within our two governments and that the exchange will be effected [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

6. We would like to broaden our Blue Lion consultations with the GRC to include examination with the GRC of concepts and strategies (but not plans) for dealing with the Communist threat in Southeast Asia.

7. We would also like to hear GRC ideas on means of making our consultations, both in the military and political fields, more responsive to the needs of the existing Far East situation. End Summary.

8. We have serious reservations about statement proposed para 15 Ref. A. Statement would not only encourage further GRC mainland attack plans along the lines of Great Torch 5 but would also be subject to misinterpretation and possible anticipatory action by ChiComs should they learn of statement, as is entirely possible. Suggested statement should accordingly not be used.

9. We are unable to expand usefully on para 7 Ref B. You may nevertheless tell Chiang Ching-kuo that we hope through broadened Blue Lion consultations to benefit on regular basis from President Chiang’s and GRC’s views on Southeast Asian situation, while at same time acquainting GRC with our own thinking particularly in respect to Viet-Nam.³

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Bennett; cleared by Fearey, Jacobson, Smith in CIA, Friedman and Admiral Blouin in DOD/ISA, and Colonel Reichner in J–5; and approved by Berger. Repeated to CINCPAC and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. See Document 119 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. Telegram 813 from Taipei, January 29, reported that the summary in telegram 762 had been given to Chiang’s aide, Colonel Wen, that morning. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US)