Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

119. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, January 25, 1966, 1040Z.

797. Ref: A. Deptel 728;² B. Depcirtel 1387, 1390, Deptel 741.³

1. Yesterday evening Jan 24 I delivered messages contained reftels to Chiang Ching-kuo. Meeting lasted over one hour. I took along comustdc VAdmiral Gentner.

2. Would not have been advisable follow instructions Ref B which stated I should try to convey substance Pres. Chiang, because to do so would have invited reiteration of Great Torch Five (GT–5) as solution for Vietnam. I considered it important, therefore, to deliver message Ref A first, and decided to deliver Ref B to Chiang Ching-kuo at same time, making clear that two instructions not directly related.

3. CCK showed considerable disappointment and irritation. Stated that GRC had tried to make helpful suggestion in honest belief that US has no way to solve Vietnam without solving ChiCom problem. Said it is not good that US refuses to discuss GT–5 and stops the planning; it will have bad effect on GRC morale and won’t help USG. Said US is making mistake, and that someday such a plan might be used, even if not now, and that planning now for the eventual contingency would be useful.

4. Gentner and I several times pointed out that we wish to broaden Blue Lion consultations to include discussion of concepts and strategies, even though we do not wish to discuss “plans”. CCK replied that he understood US position very well. Said that if USG unwilling even consider this kind of operation, in light USG view of weakness number one (Ref A, para 4–A)⁴ there was little point in continuing discussion.

5. I pointed out that exchange of intelligence appraisals should continue since it had bearing on weakness number two (para 4–B), but CCK said he saw little point in this. When I asked if he did not wish to continue plans for exchange of appraisals, he seemed to reconsider. Said that everyone should know that there could be no significant rebellions on mainland without outside pressures and without a place to defect to. Said when time came and GRC forces landed with US backing there would be defections. I agreed that we would not expect actual rebellion or defections at present time, but that intelligence appraisals might show some indications which could be used in estimating likelihood of defections. CCK doubted there could be such indications, but insisted that defections would occur when mainland attacked. Cited recent IL–28 and LCM defections as evidence and pointed out that both had occurred even in absence of battle conditions. Stated that in wartime many more defections inevitable. Said that ChiComs obviously fear their own people and that GRC is best judge of state of mind of people on mainland.

6. On para 5, CCK brushed aside as useless any further discussions of unilateral GRC plans in Blue Lion framework. Said that without US help no plan could succeed. Said that while GRC does not want or need US ground forces would obviously need other help. Therefore unilateral planning is pointless.

7. He repeated at some length arguments we have heard before. Said that ChiComs only fear strength, and that US show of weakness only encourages aggressive acts. Said that ChiComs have stated that US forces total only 2 million, which must be divided into half million for US itself, half million for eventual use Vietnam, half million for other areas, leaving only half million for use on mainland China, which would not be nearly enough and which ChiComs do not fear.

8. CCK asked if US answer to Great Torch Five was related to present Vietnam peace offensive. I repeated my earlier statement that two instructions coincidental, and pointed out that answer on GT–5 was result of Washington examination over several months. GT–5 and peace offensive related only in general sense that they both involve Vietnam, and that US is not at war with ChiComs and therefore cannot consider the air strikes against mainland that would be necessary under GT–5.

9. CCK said he would convey request for views on Vietnam (Ref B) to his govt, but said GRC had already given its views on recommending GT–5 as only long-term solution to Vietnam problem.

10. CCK calm and controlled throughout, but obviously disappointed and irritated that proposal which GRC had hoped would open door to joint consideration of future contingencies had been turned down flatly. He came close to saying that exchange of intelligence appraisals useless, and he did say he saw no point in further Blue Lion plans. He brushed aside suggestion for broadening scope of Blue Lion to include discussion of concepts and strategies. How much of this was quick reaction that will be reconsidered later, we will have to wait and see.

11. At lunch today Jan 25 which CCK hosted in honor of Senator Miller and Congressman Dorn CCK got me aside and said he had not yet reported to Pres. Chiang. Said that when he did he wanted to be sure he was conveying accurate summary of USG reaction, and asked if I could furnish informal written summary. He said next day would be soon enough, and went on to say he thought we should continue discussions these topics. I replied I would try to furnish written document, perhaps morning of Jan 26, and that I thought it very important for us to continue discussions.

12. Believe that CCK may now be worried about Gimo reaction, and hoping for some softening of language Reftel A which would minimize reaction. Also probably wants to be sure he is accurately conveying US intentions, although his aide and interpreter Col. Pat Wen took notes, and there should be no confusion.

13. Recommend that Dept send me soonest text of summary of Ref A which could be passed as informal document, unheaded, undated and unsigned. If possible summary should contain insertion of words “at this time” in appropriate spots, and should amplify para 7 to indicate what is meant by broadening of Blue Lion concept.

14. We are still faced with strong advisability, if not necessity, of having some future contingencies in mind which we can talk to GRC about. So far our responses, when viewed from GRC perspective, have been entirely negative except for assurances of future discussions of general strategy, and exchange of intelligence on mainland. CCK’s reaction shows that the day is past when we can give GRC sensation of being consulted and having its plans seriously considered without some demonstration of “give” in US views. Blue Lion framework served very useful purpose in previous years, but is inadequate now.

15. Believe Dept not willing to consider discussions of specific contingencies under which GRC forces might be used, and I also believe this is wise. However would be very helpful if we can say something along following lines: “Vietnam situation still contains several unused US options for further US pressure and suasion. Until we have explored these we are unwilling to consider any significant action against ChiComs, even through agency of GRC. At some later time, after more US options have been exercised and if there is still no hope for a settlement in Vietnam, we would re-examine our premises. In meantime we are still anxious to exchange views on present situation, and to discuss basic concepts and strategies.”

16. This telegram not repeated info CINCPAC because of exdis Pinta slug on some references. Dept please repeat appropriate portions.

Hummel

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House.
2. Telegram 728 to Taipei, January 19, transmitted U.S. comments on the proposal that Chiang Ching-kuo gave to McNamara on September 22 and instructed Hummel to convey them to Chiang Ching-kuo. (Ibid.)
3. Circular telegrams 1387 and 1390, January 22 and 23, and telegram 741 to Taipei, January 23; not printed. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
4. The statement in paragraph 4 of the two fundamental weaknesses of the plan is similar to the statement in paragraph 3 of telegram 762, Document 120.