Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

115. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Taipei, December 29, 1965.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Chiang Kai-shek
• General Earle G. Wheeler, CJCS

1. I called on President Chiang Kai-shek on the afternoon of 29 December 1965. The conversation lasted from 1705 hours until 1855 hours. The conversations were continued both before and after a dinner which the President gave for me that evening; however, nothing of substance arose additional to the areas covered during the afternoon call. Chinese present were: President Chiang Kai-shek; Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-Kuo; Admiral Ni Yue-si, Chief of the General Staff; and General Yu Pak-Chuan, Vice Chief of the General Staff; Mr. James Shen, Interpreter. On the U.S. side, in addition to General Wheeler, were Charge d’Affaires and Ambassador Ad Interim A. W. Hummel, Jr.; Vice Admiral William E. Gentner, Commander, Taiwan Defense Command; and Major General D. B. Johnson, Chief, Military Assistance Aid Group, Republic of China.

2. This long conversation was conducted in a friendly atmosphere and the President was calm and courteous although frank and direct (I understand from Mr. Hummel unusually so). Moreover, the President repeated several times that he desired that I convey his views to President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara.

3. After the usual amenities and serving of tea, the President questioned me closely regarding our strategy in Vietnam. I responded by quoting President Johnson as to the limited nature of our political objectives (no territorial ambitions; no bases; want predator nations of SE Asia to permit their neighbors to seek their own destinies unhindered by outside forces) and our consonant military strategy in South Vietnam and North Vietnam. The President stated that not to go into North Vietnam did not make military sense; however, he understood the political reasons behind this American decision. The fact is that the Americans do not recognize the North Vietnamese as merely puppets of the Chinese Communists; the ChiComs are your enemy and must not be left untouched if there is to be a lasting settlement in Vietnam. You are already fighting Communist China by proxy; indeed, you are fighting forces trained and supported by the ChiComs. There are Chinese troops now in North Vietnam. It is time for a basic plan to be formulated to deal with the ChiComs; such a plan is entirely lacking. Some time ago MOD Chiang Ching-kuo gave the U.S. Government a plan for seizing and holding the five southwest provinces of China, thereby severing the lines of communication by which the Communists supply the North Vietnamese. To date, I have received no reaction to this proposal.

4. I replied that we knew there are Chinese railroad engineer units in North Vietnam and, probably, some anti-aircraft units. The MOD had told me that electronic intercepts revealed four infantry regiments had been deployed there also. [less than 1 line of text not declassified] As to the plan for invading mainland China, General Yu had briefed me earlier that afternoon on the concept. The requirements for such an operation were very large, as I had pointed out to the MOD the needed naval and air effort would be great. The President then made the following points:

a. I am convinced you cannot achieve any lasting conclusion of the Vietnam problem until you have settled the problem of Communist China;

b. In reaching this settlement you should use local troops to a much greater extent. You should not send U.S. troops into North Vietnam or Thailand. You should think of ways to use GRC forces, and the best way to use GRC forces is the plan I have proposed to seize and hold the five southwest provinces of China. This plan would require no U.S. ground forces; GRC ground forces could do the job and effectively sever ChiCom support to the trouble spots in Southeast Asia.

c. We know that the people of the mainland would welcome our forces. If you were to use one-half the power you are using in South Vietnam and help put GRC troops on the mainland, you could solve your Southeast Asian problems. The ChiComs are in no degree as strong as the Germans were in Europe; you would not need to involve yourselves on anything like the scale of Normandy.

d. We should make greater efforts to arrive at common understandings and common plans for action. In dealing with Asian problems, you should consult with Asians more than you do. In dealing with the Chinese Communists, you should listen more to the GRC; we have knowledge and experience which could help you.

e. I am speaking very frankly and honestly as to my convictions. I am speaking as a long-time friend of the United States, not exaggerating here and holding back a little there.

f. Please inform President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara of my views.

5. To the foregoing statements, which were not delivered in that order or in one declaration, I replied substantially as follows:

a. The planning by the GRC for invasion of mainland China should, as already discussed, be continued. I would hope that we would continue to be informed.

b. The reason I was in Taiwan was to consult with GRC officials, to attempt to see Asia through Asian eyes. I pointed out that the forthcoming visit of Vice President Humphrey would give the President the opportunity to present his views directly to the second-ranking elected official of the United States.

c. I had no doubt but that he was speaking from the heart; no one who heard him could think otherwise.

d. I would, of course, convey his views to President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara as he requested.

6. Comment: An interesting sidelight on my conversations with President Chiang Kai-shek is provided by the context of my earlier meeting that day with Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo and certain senior officers of the Chinese General Staff. This meeting lasted one hour and twenty minutes. The greater portion of that time was devoted to a general discussion of the situation in Vietnam, deficiencies in GRC forces and a discussion of Chinese proposals for additional military assistance in critical areas such as modern radars, submarines, and an accelerated F–5 program. Only about ten minutes was consumed by a briefing by General Yu, Vice Chief of the General Staff, on the plan for the invasion of mainland China to seize the five southwestern provinces and sever ChiCom lines of communications into North Vietnam. General Yu made the remarkable statement that “99 per cent of the population of the five southwestern provinces” would adhere to Chiang Kai-shek’s cause. Other than that, I gained the distinct impression that the presentation was pro forma and that the military had a far better appreciation of the difficulties of transportation and air support required for such a considerable operation. At any rate, when I pointed out the logistic and other problems involved, very little rebuttal was attempted by the Chinese officers except for the implication that I overestimated the difficulties and underestimated the degree to which the Chinese people would welcome Chiang Kai-shek’s return to the mainland of China. On the other hand, President Chiang Kai-shek made two demands for action in straight forward language. These were: (a) An explicit request for the United States to put GRC forces ashore to reconquer the five southwestern provinces; and (b) a complaint that the U.S. Government fails to consult him with sufficient frequency or to heed his advice when it is offered.

7. Recommendations: If one considers the age and background of President Chiang Kai-shek, his remarks are perfectly understandable. He probably recognizes that the Vietnamese War provides him with his last opportunity to return to mainland China with any hope of establishing and maintaining himself there. Moreover, he probably believes that if he were consulted more frequently he would gain influence in U.S. Government Councils which, over time, would lead to the adoption of the plan for the invasion which he advocates. In view of the fact that his military staff continues unilateral planning for the invasion, keeping our Embassy and our military personnel in Taiwan informed, we can adopt one of two tactics in dealing with him. First, we can tell him frankly that an invasion supported by United States forces is out of the question at this time; or, second, we can continue our present posture of being interested but uncommitted onlookers. I, myself, advocate the first course of action, although it would have to be done tactfully and perhaps sweetened by some addition of military assistance to assuage his pride. As to additional consultation, I believe it would be in the best interests of continued amity and cooperation for the U.S. Government to consult with President Chiang Kai-shek frequently on many aspects of Asian problems. After all, we would not be committed to accept his views anymore than the views of other Asian leaders whom we do consult on a regular basis.

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol V. Secret. Wheeler sent the memorandum of conversation to the President under a January 11 covering letter. (Ibid.)