Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

113. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (Cline) to the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone)¹

Washington, December 6, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Chinese Nationalist Military Forces vis-a-vis Vietnam

1. One element in the balance of military forces in Southeast Asia is seldom mentioned, for reasons I find difficult to understand. This element is the half-million or so Chinese Nationalist ground forces supported by qualitatively good though small air forces and naval forces. The Chinese Nationalists are reasonably well trained and equipped and are highly motivated against the Chinese Communists and in favor of US objectives in Southeast Asia. They have argued strongly for an assault on the South China coast on a scale that would threaten logistic lines to Vietnam and probably would supply a considerable number of ground forces for employment in South Vietnam if requested to do so by the US.

2. Reluctance to use this Free World military asset stems from fears of provoking or at least providing a public excuse for Chinese Communist intervention in Vietnam. Now that some Chinese Communist troops (albeit probably logistic ones) are already in Vietnam, this nicety on our part may be somewhat anachronistic. In any case, I think we should do some serious thinking about when, if ever, and how we might employ Chinese Nationalist forces.

3. My own recommendations would be:

a. do some contingency planning jointly with the GRC for landing Chinese Nationalist forces in South China, since this will undoubtedly leak and frighten the Chinese Communists as it did in 1962; this is probably the greatest deterrent (short of US nuclear attack) we can bring to bear to keep Communist China from intervening directly and massively in Vietnam.

b. add realism to this contingency planning exercise by accepting a 10,000 man Special Forces unit from Taiwan to engage in search-and-destroy operations in the highlands area of South Vietnam.

c. in fact decide and work out realistic plans for a Chinese Nationalist landing on the South China coast (supported by US Navy and US Air Force elements) when and if Chinese Communist military commitments of troops to North Vietnam pass the 50,000 mark or result in Chinese Communist combat troop contacts with US forces in South Vietnam or friendly forces in Laos or Thailand.

4. Somehow or other the admittedly delicate politics of using Chinese Nationalist forces always suppresses serious inquiry into this subject. My own feeling is that the kind of Communist threat we face in Vietnam makes this particular political delicacy a luxury the US can ill afford. If the Chinese Communists are forcing us into a war of attrition on the ground in Southeast Asia, we should feel free to use Chinese Nationalist troops against them.

Ray S. Cline

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII. Secret. Sent to Bundy with a January 11, 1966, covering note from Cline.