Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

243. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, January 29, 1968, 1:04–1:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Notes of the President’s Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff

[Here follows brief discussion of the situation in Vietnam.]

The President: What about the charge that we called up the reserve because of Vietnam and not Korea?

Secretary McNamara: That is not true. We do not need the reserves for Vietnam. In fact, I believe we will demobilize the reserves after Korea.

The President: I sure like the way in which you announced the movement of the aircraft. (The aircraft movement announcement was kept secret in terms of numbers and in terms of the units sent.)²

General McConnell: 56 land-based aircraft have already arrived in South Korea. There are 68 planes on carriers. This is roughly 125 already available in South Korea. We will move in 30 more tonight. 29 more are in route.

The President: How many aircraft do we need in South Korea to handle the situation?

General McConnell: The North Koreans have 450 planes. We need at least an equivalent number in South Korea.

The President: Well, I want all of you to know that you have had complete freedom on this matter. But you have got to be ready. I think all of you should be prepared to explain why, if the ship captain needed planes and they were not there, why it was. They were not there because it was not prudent from a military standpoint for them to be there.

General Wheeler: That is correct, Mr. President. I have General Brown sorting out all the facts. There are several reasons why no planes were sent. This includes the location of the ship, the time of day, the inclement weather and the fact that there was superior enemy air power in the area.

General McConnell: We had only 24 fighters in Japan. There are 70 enemy fighters that were in the area around Wonsan.

The President: Well, say that. (When asked or when the question is raised about why no aircraft were sent to support the ship.)

The President: How many Navy ships do we have doing intelligence work like this?

Admiral Moorer: About 30.³

The President: What about the question, Why didn’t we escort this vessel?

Admiral Moorer: It would be a provocative act. We could not accomplish the mission. It would take all the entire Navy to escort them.

The President: I think you should set up an independent board to investigate this whole matter to head off any investigations by the Congress or other groups. Have you checked this Gulf of Tonkin incident theory?

Secretary McNamara: Yes, sir.

The President: I think you should take the orders, explain them, and justify them. I do not have a log of this incident yet which is satisfactory to me. Everybody is looking for a scapegoat, and you had better get the facts.

General McConnell: Commander Bucher did not know he was in serious trouble in time to do anything anyway.

The President: Well, say it.

General Wheeler: We would have been in a fine fix if we had sent planes up there. We probably would have been in a war.

The President: You should go up to Congress with all of your guns blazing. Give them the facts before they have time to question you on them. I thought Senator Stennis handled himself very well yesterday. Did anyone talk with him before he went on the air?

General Wheeler: General Brown talked with Senator Stennis.⁴

[Here follows discussion of the situation in Vietnam.]

The President: What can we do if diplomacy fails?

Secretary McNamara: We have ten items put together by State and Defense to suggest for consideration.

The President: What is your guess on the possibilities of the North Koreans turning our men and the ship loose?

Secretary McNamara: The odds are more like 60–40 in favor of turning them loose.

The President: I think we should look at what we have learned from this. Let’s look at what our intelligence ships are doing and determine if that is what we want them to be doing.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Pueblo, VIII. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
2. On January 28 the Department of Defense issued a statement that the United States was “taking certain precautionary measures to strengthen our forces and to reinforce our tactical air capabilities,” mentioning only that “certain units” had been “alerted for possible movement.” The statement was reportedly intended as a reply to an article in The Las Vegas Review-Journal that identified specific units affected by the alert. (The New York Times, January 29, 1968)
3. In January 1968 approximately seven U.S. Navy ships were engaged in intelligence-gathering operations; cf. McNamara’s comment in reply to the President’s inquiry, Document 244. (NSA, The Capture of the USS Pueblo and Its Effect on SIGINT Operations, United States Cryptologic History, Special Series, Crisis Collection, Vol. 7, 1992, pp. 9–13; NSA, Technical Research Ships, 1956–1969: An Historical Study, United States Cryptologic History, Special Series, No. 2, undated, passim)
4. A memorandum of the discussion between Brown and Stennis on January 26 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo, Vol. Ib, Part A (beginning February).