Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

71. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 4, 1964.

SUBJECT

• White House Meeting on Southeast Asia, 4 June 1964

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary McNamara, General Taylor,
• Assistant Secretary McNaughton, General Goodpaster
• Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Forrestal
• Assistant Secretaries Bundy and Manning, Mr. Green, Mr. Sullivan
• Mr. McCone, Mr. Colby

1. This meeting was in preparation for a session with the President on 5 June.² Assistant Secretary Manning will be developing a comprehensive public information program and Assistant Secretary Bundy took on the job of drafting a Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia. Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the following meeting discuss where we stand, develop the problems of Laos, cover the actions to be taken in Vietnam, mention the fact of the need for a public information program and go over a checklist of the range of military choices.

2. With respect to Laos, it was accepted that the value of the Lao situation is that we have a positive position, although we are not apt to regain any geography. Mr. William Bundy suggested that we stick to Souvanna Phouma’s precondition of Pathet Lao withdrawal, and take certain steps to indicate strength. We should divide our potential actions into pre-impasse and post-impasse actions. Mr. McNamara noted that we do not wish to take military action soon but that we should do more than talk. He suggested that an impasse or a breakdown of the coalition government of Laos might occur any time and would call for stronger effort. Mr. William Bundy also indicated the importance of initiating some planning for actions on the Mekong with the Thai, at least on a hypothetical basis.

3. A discussion then took place of specific actions in the attached list with respect to Laos, with a selection among them as to various things to be done in a pre-impasse period. Few of these were selected as most were postponed for the impasse period. During the conversation the point was made that CIA hoped for somewhat looser restrictions on its covert operations to build strength within Laos; this was generally accepted. The measures to be recommended were to be summarized by Mr. Bundy in a separate paper the next day.

4. A discussion of the steps to be taken after an impasse brought up the problem of how we can keep from going to Geneva. Mr. Bundy opined that this depends largely on Souvanna Phouma, although the Thai and GVN will probably refuse to go. It was noted that the President wants a massive diplomatic effort to settle the problems in Indo China. Mr. Sullivan and others believed that it might be necessary to give some assurances to Souvanna Phouma of military action and to actually take some military steps in addition. The DCI commented on the difficulty of taking U.S. military action, and also whether it would be effective in holding back the Communists or keeping us from Geneva in the light of the pressures upon us to go there. It was also noted that Souvanna might be overthrown by the rightists if he started to go to Geneva. Various actions were then discussed for possible application after an impasse and these will be included in Mr. Bundy’s memorandum above.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam.]

6. Arrangements were made for a meeting the following day with the President.

WE Colby
Chief, Far East Division

Attachment³

ILLUSTRATIVE MILITARY MOVES DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE U.S. INTENTION TO PREVENT FURTHER COMMUNIST ADVANCES IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Continue high and low-level reconnaissance over Laos.

2. Continue high-level reconnaissance over DRV (20 flights per month).

3. Introduce GVN recon. teams into Laos (with or without U.S. advisors)—4 approx. 6/15; 16 by 8/15.

4. Authorize hot-pursuit into Cambodia.

5. Initiate selective low-level recon. into DRV along supply lines feeding the Laotian corridor.

6. Re-introduce a MAAG into Laos (shift from Thailand).

7. Re-introduce White Star teams into Laos—(15 teams in 20 days).

8. Introduce GVN harassing forces into Laotian corridor (with or without U.S. advisors)—60 days.

9. Send 500 additional military advisors to SVN to expand the counterinsurgency program (announce immediately; complete in 120 days).

10. Expand T–28 operations in Laos, their use of U.S. military pilots.

11. Accompany U.S. recon. flights over Laos with fighter escort.

12. Authorize VNAF air strikes against DRV activities in Laotian corridor.

13. U.S. Force movements:

a. 1 or 2 B–57 squadrons into SVN—24 hours.

b. 1 interceptor squadron into SVN—24 hours.

c. 1 or 2 fighter squadrons into Thailand—24 hours.

d. 1 Army Brigade (5150 men) into Thailand (5 to 12 days)

e. 1 Marine Brigade and Air Group (5700 men and 40 aircraft) into SVN on exercise or assignment (8 days).

f. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)

g. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days).

h. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China Sea (2 weeks).

i. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days).

j. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22,900 men) CONUS to Okinawa (40 days).

k. 1 Infantry Division (11,500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days).

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memo for the Record, 6 Apr-8 July 1964. Secret. Drafted by Colby on June 8.
2. See footnote 1, Document 73.
3. Confidential.