Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

73. Memorandum for Discussion¹

Washington, June 5, 1964.

LAOS

The enemy has two choices in Laos, each with a number of shadings.

• First, he can at any time initiate substantial military action on the ground aiming toward the Mekong Valley.
• Second, he can try to keep what he has for the present and leave any military initiative to us. This is our major problem.

I. Action if the enemy moves strongly toward the Mekong.

While we rate its likelihood very low (less than one in ten) we must obviously be prepared for this first case—substantial enemy pressure toward the Mekong. In this case we believe that it would be necessary to be prepared to move U.S. and other forces into Thailand at once and to be prepared, with the Thais, to occupy selected Laotian cities on the left bank of the Mekong. This of course would imply a still sharper de facto partition of Laos, but since it would by definition be a response to clear-cut Communist military aggression, we believe it would be internationally and nationally acceptable—and indeed almost inevitable.

Recommendation 1

Our recommendation is that contingency planning against this possibility should be undertaken at once with Thailand, and we believe that military discussions of this contingency will have a useful diplomatic effect in Thailand, Laos and North Vietnam.

II. Politico-Military Scenario if there is no further major Communist movement in Laos.

The second enemy choice poses us a more complicated problem. In essence our objectives are three:

(1) not to let the situation develop so rapidly that we are faced with a choice of humiliation or major military action before we are ready to take decisions in the context of SEA and especially SVN.

(2) not to lose whatever prospect there is of maintaining a Souvanna government and at least a nominal maintenance of the political status quo in Laos.

(3) not to permit a diplomatic “victory” for neutralism and Communism which would reflect heavily against our position and that of our friends in SVN and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Our belief is that the following politico-military scenario is the best available for these purposes. By a minimum of force, and an absence of direct hostile action unless they shoot first, it aims to show

(1) Our determination

(2) Our readiness for peace

(3) More specifically, our continued dedication to the Geneva Accords and especially to the Souvanna government.

1. The Article IV consultations. These are proceeding in Vientiane now and we should do our best to string them out and to wring out of them a sharp picture of Pathet Lao aggression in the Plain of Jars. The Article IV consultations are limited to our friends and include neither French nor Communist representation. They have their value and it should not be we who bring them to an end. But already pressure is very high for the next step which is likely to be the Polish Proposal.

Recommendation 2

We recommend continuation of the consultations in Vientiane, exploitation of the evidence they produce, and readiness to move to the Polish proposals at the latest workable time.

At this stage our military pressure consists of fairly regular reconnaissance flights over the Plain of Jars and over Southern Laos, together with high-level U–2 reconnaissance over North Vietnam.

Recommendation 3

We recommend that these programs continue.

2. The Polish Meeting. We are in favor of the Polish proposal for discussion among the British and Soviet Co-Chairmen, the ICC Members (Canada, India and Poland), and representatives of the three parties in Laos.

It remains our position that the pre-conditions for any Geneva conference are as stated by Souvanna—cease-fire and withdrawal to previous positions, acceptance of Souvanna’s position and powers, re-establishment of the Souvanna government of National Unity, and effective functioning of the International Control Commission. We must hold this stand strongly, less for the sake of our own prestige than for the protection of Souvanna’s position vis-à-vis his Right Wing, and the position of the Khanh government in South Vietnam. We do not suppose that these conditions will be accepted in toto, but we do not at all exclude the possibility of real progress toward them if we follow the program set out below.

In one form or another the Polish discussions are likely to occur within the next week or two. Under proper conditions these meetings can be useful in gaining time. Nevertheless, it is most unlikely that these discussions will produce any substantial result, and when they reach an impasse, there will be stronger calls than ever for a new Geneva conference.

We therefore believe it important that the Polish meetings be accompanied by additional military signals on our side to underline our determination to insist on a certain degree of Communist pull-back before a Geneva meeting is held.

The best available military indicator for this purpose is the extension of present U.S. low-level reconnaissance over Laos into North Vietnam along supply lines feeding the Plain of Jars and the Laotian corridor toward South Vietnam.

Recommendation 4

We recommend the initiation of such low-level reconnaissance at about the time of a Polish meeting.

Recommendation 5

We recommend further that if such planes are downed either over Laos or North Vietnam, fighter escort should be provided with instructions to return ground fire and attack anti-aircraft installations.

3. Impasse in the Polish meetings. The actions recommended to this point are those which would occur before an impasse in the Polish discussions. When such an impasse has been reached, we expect to recommend selections from the following additional actions to strengthen our general position. No specific decisions are recommended at present, but such actions might include the following:

(1) The expansion of T–28 operations in Laos, including the use of third country pilots, but not Americans.

(2) The introduction of harassing action by South Vietnamese forces into the Laotian Corridor (with U.S. advisors).

(3) The authorization of South Vietnamese air strikes against North Vietnamese activities in the Laotian corridor.

(4) A number of movements of U.S. forces from our West Coast toward the West Pacific in ways that will increase our readiness posture and give a general warning signal. These movements might be selected from among the following:

a. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)

b. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days)

c. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China Sea (2 weeks)

d. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days)

e. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22,900 men) CONUS to Okinawa (40 days)

f. 1 Infantry Division (11,500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days)

4. Political steps after a Polish impasse.

Our present belief is that after an impasse is reached in the Polish discussions, the next step politically should probably be discussion in the UN. Such discussion need not necessarily be limited to Laos, and at this stage we might well wish a general discussion of the threats to peace in Southeast Asia in the UN forum.

We believe it important to have in reserve additional military deployments, warning of which might properly be given in the UN debate. It is possible that on further discussion some of the actions listed above might be withheld for this purpose, but our preliminary thinking has been that the most valuable item in this context would be the deployment of U.S. ground forces, of about 5,000 men to Thailand.

It is our current belief that this general politico-military scenario could be expected to last about a month to six weeks, and that at the end of that time further action should be closely related to our wider planning for South Vietnam and Southeast Asia as a whole.

III. The Special Problem of the Laotian Right

One continuing danger, in all our Laotian efforts, is the Right Wing. Both the relatively skillful Phoumi and the quite unpredictable Siho are capable of acting to overthrow Souvanna and take power at Vientiane at any time. De facto, they have much power there now. Any Right Wing takeover would be most destructive to our whole position.

Recommendation 6

We recommend that Ambassador Unger continue to use all appropriate diplomatic pressures to prevent any such takeover, including the specific warning that the U.S. would not support those executing such a coup. At the same time, we must avoid as far as possible action which might trigger such a Right Wing reaction. This is one important reason for keeping the finger of accusation pointed at the Communists and avoiding a Geneva conference which tacitly accepts the status quo in the Plain of Jars.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Special Meetings on Southeast Asia, Vol. I. Top Secret. Prepared for the President for a meeting on June 5 at 6 p.m. A copy of this memorandum was attached to a June 5 memorandum from McNamara to the President, entitled “South Vietnam Action Program”; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 461–464. A title page to that memorandum indicates that the paper and its attachments were prepared in the Department of Defense for the use of the President at a meeting on June 5, at 6 p.m.

   The President met with Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and McNamara from 6:52 to 7:43 p.m., June 5. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) No other record of the discussion has been found.