72. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1
JCSM–479–64
Washington, June 5, 1964.
SUBJECT
- Use of Thai Special Forces in Laos
- 1.
- Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–24061/64, dated 8 May 1964,2 subject as above, which requested views on the possible use of Thai Special Forces in Laos, with particular attention to whether they could be employed fruitfully and taking into consideration other current operations in Laos.
- 2.
- Except for a modest overt military assistance program and the
small-scale cross-border operations from South Vietnam into Laos
which were recently authorized, the paramilitary operations in Laos
are under the operational direction of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). These programs are:
- a.
- Operation Hardnose, which is a covert program primarily designed to develop intelligence of Viet Cong/Pathet Lao activity in Central and Southern Laos utilizing indigenous Lao and Kha tribesmen.
- b.
- A covert program designed to support tribal elements engaged in village defense and guerrilla activities against the Pathet Lao. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
- 3.
- Certain of CINCPAC’s operations plans provide for the utilization of Royal Thai Army (RTA) Special Forces along with other local national and Allied forces. In this event, such forces would be employed as part of a larger Allied military effort.
- 4.
- [2 lines of source text not declassified] the RTA Special Forces could be used as cadre and trainers for FAR and Neutralist regular Lao units. However, such use of Thai Special Forces at this time would probably create major problems in coordination and control. In addition, current training deficiencies of the Thai Special Forces make it unlikely that their use would be effective at this time.CINCPAC has the capability to provide the training necessary to improve their effectiveness for either overt or covert employment.
- 5.
- In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that RTA Special Forces should not be employed at the present time in Laos. They recommend Foreign Minister Thanat be informed that the United States can provide training for RTA Special Forces. CINCPAC has been instructed to arrange for a mobile training team to conduct such training as soon as he is requested to do so by the Royal Thai Government through the Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand.