Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

255. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 8, 1966, 1103Z.

2104. Subj: Souvanna visit Washington and New York.²

1. This is first of two rather presumptuous messages suggesting the sort of scenario which I believe will make Souvanna’s conversations in New York and Washington most profitable to all concerned. This telegram will concern the meeting with the President. The second will cover conversations with other U.S. officials.³

2. Meeting with President. Souvanna clearly regards this meeting as the prime objective of his visit. Therefore, he will doubtless have a carefully prepared presentation in mind. I would consequently suggest that the best way to start off this meeting would be for the President to ask Souvanna’s general views on Southeast Asia, how to achieve peace in Vietnam, or some equally broad subject.

3. This discussion will doubtless lead into the meat of Souvanna’s concerns. There are basically three matters on which he would welcome reassurance from the President personally:

A) That we continue to hope to work positively with the Soviet Union towards the ultimate development of stability in Southeast Asia (Souvanna has long seen the only hope for Southeast Asia as a tacit entente between U.S. and USSR to bulwark against ChiCom ambitions—at least until such time as ChiComs tame down at home and Southeast Asian infrastructure is in better shape).

B) That we have no intention mount invasion of Laos or across Laos from U.S. military positions in Thailand or Vietnam. Communist propaganda (especially Soviet) constantly accuses us of having this intention as sole means effectively cutting Ho Chi Minh Trail. I don’t know how explicit President might wish to be on this point. It could conceivably be covered by a more generalized statement about “no desire to expand war beyond its current boundaries, etc.”

C) That we will do our best to persuade other nations, such as Japan, Germany, UK and Australia, to continue and to augment their economic and technical aid to Laos. Souvanna is extremely grateful for U.S. aid, but his status as a “neutral” and his ability to hold his tenuous balance with the Soviets will depend upon avoiding the appearance of being a total dependent of the U.S.

4. Aside from these points and whatever Souvanna may wish raise in his presentation, President may also wish:

A) Express our admiration for political risks Souvanna has been willing take in collaborating with our military efforts;

B) Express sympathy for suffering and damage caused to Laos by recent Mekong floods;

C) Give Souvanna brief summary of U.S. expectations in seven-nation Manila conference.

5. There is always possibility Souvanna may unpredictably raise some particular request for aid—as he did with helicopters when he saw Vice President last year. These requests are usually result of promises he had made to general staff or some minister here in Vientiane. I fear I cannot forecast what form this sort of thing might take.

6. President should be aware that Souvanna is not an expert in fiscal affairs, economic development or regional planning. He has good individual ideas and his enthusiasm can be aroused for specific projects. However, he has no coordinated plan and is not much of a genius in this field.

7. I don’t know whether Souvanna will specifically raise with President the Soviet proposal to overfly Laos in order avoid China.⁴ I think this may depend on how far advanced the Soviet-Chinese rupture is at the time, and whether proposal has been formally made. Since Souvanna will probably not have seen Gromyko before he sees President, I would rather expect him to defer this point until his talks with Secretary Rusk and State Department officials.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Moscow, and USUN.
2. Souvanna attended the 21st UN General Assembly session in New York as the head of the Lao Delegation. William Bundy recommended that Souvanna be invited to Washington October 10–14, and Rusk approved. (Memorandum Bundy to Rusk, September 28; ibid., POL 15–1 LAOS)
3. Telegram 2105 from Vientiane, October 8, in which the Embassy suggested that U.S. officials commend Souvanna for the Lao Armed Forces accomplishments against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese; remark on his Finance Minister’s efficient direction of the Ministry; and listen carefully for signs of Souvanna’s increasing disenchantment with tripartitism. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 1854 from Vientiane, September 28, Sullivan reported that Souvanna had received a request from the Soviet Union to reroute its “airline” to Hanoi over Laos to avoid overflying China. Souvanna told Sullivan that he assumed the Soviet Charge was talking about Aeroflot, and not a military airlift. (Ibid., POL LAOS–USSR)