254. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Donnelly)1
SUBJECT
- Shining Brass
I have your memorandum of September 30 to Mr. Bundy2 and, by means of a review of how Shining Brass has come to be what and where it is, would like to explain our reasons for asking that you seek to clear the proposed Public Affairs Guidance with Mr. Moyers.
Shining Brass operations involving small reconnaissance teams were first authorized in September 1965. They began in October 1965 on an infrequent, experimental basis, with shallow penetrations along the border in the southern portion of the panhandle. The mission was detection, not harassment, of the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam via Laos.
Although the pattern of individual missions has varied, the military authorities judge the over-all operation an unqualified success and an essential adjunct to effective pursuit of our military objectives in Vietnam. The most dramatic result has been an ability to pinpoint targets for tactical air strikes, and in many instances the ground teams have verified good results. Less spectacular but of importance to MACV have been the myriad of particular intelligence items that, in combination with information from other sources, have helped build a picture of the infiltration process.
[Page 500]From the beginning the Department’s approval of Shining Brass operations has been predicted on their being conducted in a deniable fashion. This was done initially by severely limiting the depth and method of penetration and by briefings of the teams and other devices to make credible the story that such operations were taking place within Vietnam. This posture has been necessary because Shining Brass has never been discussed with Souvanna Phouma (though some of his military staff officers are aware of it) and because of his flat opposition to U.S. military ground action in Laos. In one statement of his position, on October 24, 1965, he said publicly that he opposes entry of U.S. ground troops into Laos: “So long as I am Chief of Government I will not involve my country in this adventure.”
Over the intervening months, at the urgent request of General Westmoreland fully supported by the JCS, the nature of Shining Brass operations has gradually altered. The authorized depth of penetration has been increased and the use of helicopters for infiltration purposes has been extended from a depth of 5 to 12 kms. The approved operating area has been temporarily extended northward to the area in Laos adjoining the DMZ. Further temporary extensions have been granted because of military requirements for flank protection (strategic warning of enemy movements derived from the Recce Team reports) for major U.S. military operations in Quang Tri and adjacent areas in Vietnam. We have authorized limited use of platoon-size “exploitation forces” against targets which the Recce Teams have found attractive for destruction of cached supplies and similar harassment. Ambassador Sullivan reviews all proposed missions in advance and we retain a “veto” power in the Department.
The message3 which occasioned your memorandum was prepared concurrently with our approval of another temporary extension in the authorized Shining Brass operating area—into a heavily infested area north of Route 9 and to a depth approaching 20 kilometers from the Vietnam border. This, again, is directly connected with a major current operation in Vietnam and is designed to ensure timely intelligence of any enemy movement aimed toward entrapment of U.S. units along the western Laotian border in South Vietnam. In this new area, the ever present risk of contacts and disclosure will increase. Furthermore, we anticipate military requests for further expansion of operations during the coming dry season. Hence the need for explicit public affairs guidance; earlier the guidance was most general and rested on the relatively easy deniability of the operations because of their proximity to the frontier.
[Page 501]In the light of Souvanna’s position and our relationship with him we simply have not been able to devise an alternative to denial. I realize, of course, the possibility of evidence being adduced that would require comment beyond the initial denial. What our proposal means, therefore, is that any disclosure following a denial would have to be dealt with by devising an explanation of a mistake. We would hold firmly to the proposition that the U.S. “is not conducting such operations” (i.e., deliberately, as a matter of policy) and if under pressure from Communist charges explain any transgression as inadvertent (e.g. bad weather, bad maps, retreat in wrong direction). Paragraph 2 of the proposed message is designed to elicit promptly enough information for us to prepare an explanation tailored to the specific circumstances.
We are sympathetic to and respectful of the credibility problem we may face. There are the major domestic factors of the Manila Meeting and the elections. We are also concerned about the possibility that the Communists might spring some specific story connected with these operations timed to undercut Souvanna’s expected denunciation of North Vietnamese aggression against Laos before the UN General Assembly in mid-October.
I am satisfied that the military requirements of the situation in northern South Vietnam are such that we cannot withdraw operating authority that has been given only after searching inter-departmental examination. I therefore recommend that, as I understand is your intention, you discuss the problem with Mr. Moyers, for he should be thoroughly aware of this issue, and seek his approval of the proposed guidance.