Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

256. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 11, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Prince Souvanna Phouma

You have agreed to see Laos Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma at 9:30 a.m. on Thursday in New York.

He comes at a time of political conflict and uncertainty in Laos. The National Assembly has been dissolved after rejecting his government’s new budget, tantamount to a vote of “no confidence.” New elections probably will be held early next year, but the viability of the tripartite coalition government established by the 1962 Geneva Agreements has been shaken. Souvanna, nevertheless, continues to personify “tripartitism,” and your meeting with him will serve to buttress his leadership.

Souvanna is openly dedicated to Lao neutrality but in private strongly supports our actions to end North Vietnamese aggression.

King Savang Vatthana has told Ambassador Sullivan that our policy in Laos is “exactly right” in all respects and hoped we found Laotian policy “useful” to our larger purposes in Asia.

At the outset you may want to:

(1) Regret that your illness a year ago prevented your seeing Souvanna then. A meeting had been tentatively arranged.

(2) Note the unfortunate loss of life and crop damage from the recent flooding of the Mekong—the worst in 40 years—and promise our continuing assistance to help the Lao recover.

I recommended that you then give Souvanna an opportunity to present his general views on how to achieve peace in Vietnam and prospects in Southeast Asia. Specifically, he will want reassurance from you personally that

• —We still hope to work positively with the Soviets toward stability in Southeast Asia. He has long viewed a tacit U.S.-Soviet détente as the best bulwark against Chinese ambitions.
• —We have no desire to expand the Vietnam conflict beyond present boundaries. He is highly sensitive to Communist propaganda on this point as it affects Laos.
• —We will continue to encourage other nations to augment their technical and economic aid to Laos. He is grateful for our aid but sees his country’s neutral status and tenuous balance with the Soviets endangered by any appearance of being dependent on the U.S.

Aside from reassuring him on these matters you might also:

(1) Reaffirm our desire for Laos to live in peace and tranquility with its neighbors, our continuing economic and military assistance to build the economy and enable Laos to resist Communist pressures, and our commitment to the 1962 Geneva Agreements.

(2) Express understanding of Souvanna’s difficulties in implementing those Agreements and our support for his continuing efforts as Prime Minister.

(3) Let him know how much we appreciate the political risks he takes in collaborating with our operations against infiltration routes into South Vietnam. (As cooperative as he has been, it should be noted that he has no official knowledge of Shining Brass operations and only limited knowledge of the Arc Light program.)

(4) Summarize briefly your expectations from the seven-nation conference in Manila and your Asian trip.

There are three specific matters that Souvanna may introduce:

Soviet overflight request. The Soviets have requested permission to make Soviet “air line” overflights of Laos en route to Hanoi. Souvanna has deferred a response pending discussion with us. You might note the complexity of this and steer him to Secretary Rusk.

Foreign exchange stabilization. We support a Foreign Exchange Operations Fund along with the UK, France, Australia and Japan. There is a shortfall in CY 1966 funds available. If Souvanna expresses concern he might be reassured of our efforts with the other donors and again be referred to State.

Future of “tripartitism.” Souvanna and other Lao leaders are increasingly doubtful of the further utility of the coalition governmental arrangements specified in the 1962 Geneva Agreements. They tend to believe that an avowed neutralist prime minister, replacing the tripartite facade, would still satisfy the Soviets. This is a tricky area, and it might be advisable to hear Souvanna out without substantive comment.

Souvanna has keen insight and knowledge about most Southeast Asian leaders and their policies, including the North Vietnamese. He is particularly interested in the shifting relationships among Moscow, Peking and Hanoi. As committed as he is to maintaining the neutral image of Laos he recognizes that aggression from Hanoi is the source of troubles in Indochina. Advance information is that he will identify Hanoi as the aggressor in his UN address on October 18, and by implication condemn “wars of liberation” as well. Laos had an observer at the ASPAC meeting in Seoul, has joined the Asian Development Bank and is cooperating in regional programs as politically feasible.

Secretary Rusk elaborates on these matters in the attached memorandum, which includes a biographic statement.²

W.W. Rostow ³

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt. W. Rostow, Vol. XIV, October 1–31, 1966. Secret.
2. An October 11 memorandum from Rusk to Johnson with attachments was attached but not printed.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.