Office of the Historian

253. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report1

[document number not declassified]
September 27, 1966.

SUBJECT

  • An appraisal of the political situation in Laos as of 27 September 1966

ACQ

  • [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

SOURCE

  • Staff officer of this organization. This [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appraisal of the current situation. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is not an official judgement by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation.

1. Summary. Since the defeat of the budget on 16 September 1966 and the subsiding of the flood waters in the city without serious epidemic or starvation, there has been the most intensive period of political maneuvering in Vientiane since the July 1965 elections. The main contestants, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and a majority grouping of the Assembly, have competed to influence the King, the King’s Council and the army without, however, resorting to violence or even a serious threat of violence. The extremity of the positions initially adopted by each contestant eased somewhat and a compromise solution which would preserve elements of the positions of both sides can yet emerge from the continuing discussions. The intense political activity that took place in the period from 16 to 26 September was characterized by the following main thrusts:

A.
The Assembly acted with a greater degree of cohesion than heretofore, first in its disparate elements combining to vote against the budget and later when the repercussions of this action and Souvanna’s counteraction became apparent, to work under some degree of leadership for its survival.
B.
Souvanna plunged into the political fight using his influence with the King, with the King’s Council and to a lesser extent with the army to bring pressure on the Assembly to back down.
C.
The King has not shunned his constitutional responsibility for playing a decisive role in resolving controversies of this sort, but he has thus far sought to let the parties play their game out with a minimum of interference.
D.
Lastly, the army as an organizational entity did not intervene to influence the Assembly directly in favor of the government and Souvanna did not seek this. Its overall political role was more passive than in previous crises and it worked to control its own rebellious elements, the perennial angry colonels of the Fifth Military Zone.

[Here follows a 5-page report.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.↩