Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, March 23, 1966, 7:23 p.m.

602. Ref: A. Deptel 82 to Vientiane July 24, 1964.² B. Embtel 984.³ Joint State/Defense message.

Use of Napalm in Laos

1. Believe use of Napalm will enhance effectiveness of strikes against targets in Lao Panhandle and provide increased flexibility for US tactical air operations in Laos. We also believe that Napalm should be provided RLAF for use at General Ma’s discretion as you suggested.

2. To maximize effectiveness against infiltration-related targets and simultaneously to ensure maximum safeguards against inadvertent strikes on Laos civilians (i.e., prevent use against villages and huts, inhabited areas or civilians) and friendly troops, use of Napalm should be integrated into well-established procedures for FAC operations currently in effect in Steel Tiger area. While it is appreciated that initially limiting the use of Napalm to newly proposed Shinning Brass area might have some advantage, this limitation could cause operational difficulty by establishment of still another boundary, within relatively small operating area, involving another set of operating rules.

3. Accordingly, if Souvanna concurs,⁴ you may authorize (a) selected use of Napalm on FAC-directed missions (i.e., with Lao participation in accordance with para. 3 of Annex B of BR/SL operating rules, 2nd Air Div OPORD 433–66⁵ only against validated RLAF targets within Steel Tiger Recce areas, D, E, F, and G, and (b) release Napalm for use by RLAF. In seeking Souvanna’s concurrence you should reaffirm to him that every possible precaution is being taken to ensure use only against authorized targets.

4. You are still authorized, with Souvanna’s concurrence, use of Napalm elsewhere in Laos in a situation which you consider to be an emergency or a situation in which particular offensive or defensive military action already undertaken would otherwise fail.

5. Use of Napalm like other U.S. combat air operations in Laos will not be publicly confirmed, although we must anticipate possibility that it may become matter of public knowledge.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Slutz; cleared with Blouin, Mustin, Jorden, in substance with Trueheart, and paragraph 5 with Richard L. Sneider, the Public Affairs Officer, and FE; and approved by Unger. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon,CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and 2d Air Division.
2. This telegram contained the basic guidance on use of napalm in Laos: “to prohibit use of napalm without prior authority from us except in a situation which you consider to be an emergency or a situation in which particular offensive or defensive military action already undertaken might fail. Souvanna’s concurrence of course continues to be required.” (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 984 from Vientiane, March 14, Sullivan reported that he had only authorized the use of napalm by U.S. aircraft twice, both times at Lao request. MACV and the 2d Air Division wanted to employ napalm in Tiger Hound/Steel Tiger Missions. General Ma of the RLAF also wanted to use napalm in some of his operations. Sullivan did not see a problem with Communist propaganda charges since the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese had already charged the United States with the use of napalm in Laos. What worried Sullivan was a mistaken napalm attack on a friendly village. He suggested that the Department review the matter with other agencies in Washington. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 1024 from Vientiane, March 25, Sullivan reported that he had obtained Souvanna’s concurrence in the use of napalm by U.S. aircraft in the Steel Tiger area and his agreement in principle to its use by the RLAF. Souvanna wished to delay the actual delivery of napalm to the RLAF until he had personally discussed with General Ma the limitations for its use. (Ibid.)
5. Not further identified.