Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

226. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane March 23, 1966, 09095Z.

1015. Ref: Embtel 1010.²

1. There seems to be little evidence to support Souvanna’s view, as expressed reftel, that Hanoi’s primary objective in its current aggressive military action in northern Laos is to threaten Laos so severely that it will “draw in” American ground forces. If their aim were provocation, there would seem to be more direct actions they could take. For example, NVA troops would have no real difficulty in destroying Thakhek or another town on the Mekong, an action Hanoi must assume would bring about some kind of American response. We assume on the contrary that Hanoi wants to avoid actions that might bring about the deployment of American ground forces, that it will probably restrict its actions to what is considered acceptable under current ground rules and that its present objectives in the north are motivated at least as much by political as military considerations.

2. Hanoi’s current offensive in the north has been made possible only as a result of key decisions and actions made months ago, including a decision to expand its logistic operations. It has long diverted far more supplies and trucking, if not troops, for military operations in northern Laos than are required merely to hold its own and PL positions. The decisions that lay behind this considerable effort were probably based on a variety of considerations, some of which might be the following:

A. Hanoi wants to show that it can still call the shots in northern Laos. As a result of both Lao and American air action in 1964 and 1965, limited as it was, NVA and PL forces were at first unable to take effective action against friendly positions in the north. Meo and FAR troops in fact were able to make modest advances and strengthened their enclaves in enemy territory. Hanoi may have concluded that the increased relative strength of FAR and Meo forces, the determined Meo attack against Hua Muong, stepped up air action and some boastful Lao talk presaged a serious effort to dislodge VNA and PL forces from key positions in the north. It was time to give the FAR and Souvanna a hard lesson. Hanoi then took steps to counteract the effects of air harassment through an improved road network and increased trucking of supplies and resumed its former practice of taking the offensive against friendly positions during the dry season. They have by now dislodged friendly forces from most of the positions north of the PDJ which were taken since the summer of 1964.

B. As a corollary to A above, Hanoi probably wishes to demonstrate forcibly to Souvanna that no amount of American intervention short of deployment of US troops, if even that, can prevent NVA military successes whenever Hanoi chooses to take the offensive. Hanoi may regard an impressive series of victories in northern Laos, even though limited in scope, as a means of raising doubt in Souvanna’s mind about the utility of his American support. Souvanna’s proposed trip to Moscow will doubtless give Hanoi further incentive to keep up the pressure.

C. The PL, which is discredited as a political movement, probably put heavy pressure on Hanoi to sustain its military and political position. The PL needed several strong shots in the arm, and Hanoi could not afford to allow further weakening of a movement that has been so useful to its expansionist objectives.

D. Continued NVA military successes can badly demoralize the FAR and Neutralists armies. Hanoi would probably hope exploit such demoralization through political offensives.

3. We ourselves would not expect Hanoi this year at least to press its military advances much beyond the Plain of Jars area and into key valleys and routes that lead into it from the north, east and south. At this point operations carried FAR to the west to their main bases might impose serious logistics problem for NVA troops. Nevertheless we believe they could attempt push to this junction of Routes 13 and 7 if they are prepared to pay a heavy price, and NVA forces might be able carry out operations which could become a threat to Luang Prabang, e.g., a push down the Nam Hou from Dien Bien Phu.

4. At any rate, one lesson from NVA actions in northern Laos is by now clear. Whether or not the North Vietnamese choose to move further in northern Laos they have already demonstrated they are willing and able to mount an impressive logistics and offensive operation in the face of air and guerrilla harassment in a theater that has no direct connection with their main military efforts in South Vietnam. Thus far, of course, our air attacks in the north have largely been only harassment. We have until this week avoided out of political consideration such key supply areas as Ban Liang (because of its proximity to Khang Khay). But heavy and frequent attacks against such targets and stepped up armed recce and interdiction in the BR area should make it much more costly and difficult for Hanoi to maintain an offensive, which, limited as it might be, poses a serious threat to the political and military stability of Laos.

5. Finally, if friendly forces and positions survive dry season relatively intact, we still hope they will be able recover some recently lost terrain during the monsoon.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ASIA SE. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Moscow, London, Hong Kong, and CINCPAC. The time of dispatch on this telegram is an error; it was received at the Department of State at 5:17 a.m., March 23.
2. Dated March 22. (Ibid., POL LAOS–USSR)