143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
412. Secretary called in USSR Ambassador Dobrynin this morning for half hour talk on Laos. Secretary said he felt it timely in view Chou En-Lai’s presence Moscow, to discuss Laos with Ambassador as US wishes see this problem solved and removed from agenda. Sole basis for solution is complete and meticulous observation 1962 accords with all foreign interference removed as originally agreed. Question of conference, however, has been complicated by Hanoi and Peiping retreat from 1962 agreement. Two points of Souvanna Phouma’s conditions for conference [Page 290] are especially important. Re Souvanna Phouma’s position at conference, he was USSR’s candidate whom US had accepted, who wanted genuinely neutral and independent Laos, and it not possible for him to go to new conference as less than Prime Minister. If Souvanna could speak only when three factions agree then Laos would have no voice at conference. Re ICC, denial of access to PL territory is problem of fundamental importance, simple to eliminate. If these two obstacles not overcome, conference could not be successful and US sees no way of entering upon it. US has no interest in Laos other than full compliance with 1962 accords, this our sole purpose which US ready support completely. Observance these accords in both US and USSR interests, Laos should be no cause for differences between us, and solution of problem calls for urgent attention as future not bright if compliance with 1962 accords is not achieved.
Dobrynin asked if US agrees to conference.
Secretary said US never rejected conference in principle, has not consulted with other governments and wished to start with USSR by stressing importance of two points (1) Souvanna Phouma’s position and (2) ICC access.
Re (1) Dobrynin said basic principle underlying 1962 accords was unanimity of three Laos factions.USSR has presumed from beginning this principle accepted, otherwise no united Laos could exist. This basic presumption might be said to apply both de jure and de facto, and is subject for conference discussion and resolution. Same applies ICC access—that is what conference is for.
Secretary said if unanimity principle denies ICC access and destroys ICC then 1962 accords are violated. US would understand occasional “not this time” denial but “not any time” refusal as at present would mean entering upon conference as though 1962 accords nonexistent. Starting point of any new conference on Laos should be the agreements achieved at the 1962 conference, particularly on such matters as Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister of a neutral, independent nation and ICC as effective observer of compliance. Conference could not succeed if it started as though 1962 agreement had never occurred.
Dobrynin stated USSR has no bases, technicians, officers or soldiers (except Embassy staff) in Laos, but information re US presence well known.
Secretary explained US would have no objection to this as subject for conference, US had withdrawn 600 men from Laos in 1962 but NVN force in Laos has never fallen below 6,000 despite ICC observation some token border crossing, which maybe reversed next day. Question of US, UK, French, or Thai, activity Laos might be considered for conference topic. US sees no profit however in conference at which Peiping or Hanoi [Page 291] could seek concessions in exchange for acceptance of Souvanna as Prime Minister. One does not buy same horse twice.
In response Dobrynin query what US proposes as further steps, Secretary stated if two problem points worked out, US would be in position approach other governments about conference.
Dobrynin said he would report to his government but personally concerned as Secretary’s presentation sounded somewhat like preconditions.
Secretary responded that it is Hanoi and Pathet Lao which have initiated challenge of Souvanna as Prime Minister and that problem with unanimity principle is that PL unlikely at conference to take line divergent from Hanoi and Peiping.
In answer Dobrynin query, Secretary said US has not raised these particular points with CPR in Warsaw talks, although SEA generally discussed.
Dobrynin asked if Secretary could give him any views on question of conference on Cambodia, which might provide great power guarantees of security and independence, solve Cambodian border issues, resolve difficult relations with SVN, and render Sihanouk less turbulent.
Secretary said US not yet prepared give views, will continue study idea of conference. Cambodian border disputes, however, more easily solved bilaterally than in conference, and Sihanouk might better start by settling his problems with Thais and SVN.
It was agreed that Dobrynin would tell press, if asked, that Secretary had raised question of Laos. No press was present at arrival or departure.
No separate memcon will be prepared.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Vladimir I. Toumanoff of SOV; cleared by David H. Henry, Director of SOV, Dexter, J. Harold Shullaw, Director of BNA, Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and Thompson; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Moscow, Saigon, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, London, Paris, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Ottawa, and CINCPAC.↩