144. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Relationship of Laos Situation to Next Moves on Viet-Nam
The following is in response to your request for an analysis of the relationship of the Laos situation to next moves on Viet-Nam, with particular reference to a possible further Geneva conference on Laos.
[Page 292]Present Situation
On May 24, reacting to various demands for a new Geneva conference on Laos, Souvanna Phouma spelled out the conditions under which he could accept a new conference. These were (1) a cease-fire “throughout the Laotian territory” and (2) withdrawal of the Pathet Lao forces from positions which they had taken in the Plaine des Jarres. The second of these conditions was subsequently modified to call for a tripartite administration of the PDJ under ICC supervision. Souvanna from the first also laid great stress on strengthening the position of the GNU and especially that of the Prime Minister. One of the main ways in which Souvanna wanted the Prime Minister’s position strengthened was to give him clear authority to call on the ICC “for the control and the correct and sincere execution of the Accords.”
Souvanna has held to these preconditions ever since May, including during talks in Paris with Souphanouvong in the course of which he was subjected to extreme French pressure. Throughout this period the US has consistently urged Souvanna to maintain his preconditions and, more important, the preconditions have come to be regarded in Laos as symbols of Souvanna’s firmness in resisting Communist and French pressure.
Looked at without regard for neighboring countries, political and military conditions in Laos today are more favorable from our standpoint than they have been for many months. In my recent visit to Laos I was struck by the air of well-being and relative optimism which seemed to pervade the place—an attitude quite in keeping with the Lao Ambassador’s remark to Kohler in Moscow the other day (Moscow’s 1444).2 This derives from the undoubted improvement in the military situation following the success of Operation Triangle and the proof-testing of the RLAF. This situation could be reversed by a renewed PL offensive, but I think it would be wrong to assume that such an offensive will necessarily materialize in the next few months, or succeed if it does. On the political side, the situation is also manifestly improved, with Souvanna and the neutralists on our side and collaborating with the conservatives. There are, of course, many things still wrong in Laos, including Communist control of large areas of the country, but I think it is fair to say that our side is “one up” for the first time in a long while and that, so far as Laos alone is concerned, the pressure for a new move is not on us but on the Communists. There is no showing that the Communists are prepared to make any concessions in terms of territory or in terms of strengthening the position of the GNU or the ICC, or otherwise cooperating with the non-Communists. Until there is some sign of movement on the Communist [Page 293] side, there is no particular incentive for the non-Communists to go to a conference. Contact between the factions continues in Paris so that a conference is not required for this purpose.
It might, of course, be considered that a Geneva conference on Laos would provide a convenient device for sounding out Communist (Peking and Hanoi) views on a Vietnamese settlement. A new conference could indeed do this. However, in almost every other way, it would appear to conflict with our likely courses of action over the next few months. In the first place, as matters stand a conference could only be brought about by Souvanna’s abandoning one or more of his preconditions—very probably the vital ones relating to his own position and the operation of the ICC. Given the way these conditions were developed and the significance, real and symbolic, which they have taken on, this would run the gravest risk of Souvanna’s overthrow by rightist elements in Vientiane. Even if a conference could be convened without losing Souvanna in the process, it would still almost inevitably involve a cease-fire. This would greatly inhibit or prevent the kind of operations in the Laos corridor that are envisaged for the next few months, while in no way putting similar brakes on Viet Cong use of the corridor.
Finally, indicating US willingness to attend a conference on Laos under foreseeable conditions would certainly detract greatly from the ominous image which we wish to present during this period.
In sum, setting up a new Laos conference as a way of establishing a channel of communications with Hanoi and Peking seems to me a long run for a short slide. If a conference is the desired vehicle, I believe one on Cambodia is a better bet, although it, too, presents grave difficulties notably in terms of Thai and Vietnamese attitudes.