Office of the Historian

142. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

JCSM–897–64
Washington, October 22, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Possible Pathet Lao/Viet Minh Moves in Laos (U)
1.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the apprehensions and convictions of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos concerning a major Pathet Lao/Viet Minh (PL/VM) military offensive in Laos, possibly as early as October, as reported by Ambassador Unger. They have also noted the belief of the US Intelligence Board that the communists will react to recent Government successes and to the failure of Souphanouvong to gain concessions from Souvanna in the recent Paris talks.
2.
Historically, the communists have made their moves during the dry season, which commences mid to late October. Also, in the past, the communists have responded to Forces Armees du Royaume (FAR) gains by strong military actions. In this connection, the PL, with VM military assistance, are still given the capability of overrunning Laos almost at will.
3.
Germane to this matter are the frequent expressions of US support for Souvanna; it was at our urging that he stood firmly during the Paris talks and made no concessions to Souphanouvong. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Souvanna should be assured of US military support, should the PL/VM launch a new offensive as he fears. This support should be at the request of Souvanna and in the form of:
a.
Interdicting the supply routes from North Vietnam into Laos, primarily Routes 6, 7, 8, and 12.
b.
Prompt US air strikes against PL/VM forces, utilizing optimum conventional ordnance, to the extent that, in conjunction with the Royal Lao Air Force, the Laotian ground forces can withstand successfully the PL/VM attack. Aircraft used should be those US aircraft based in Thailand, RVN, and at sea on the CVA(s) in the South China Sea.
4.
Prompt US air strikes in response to communist aggression would not only significantly assist the Lao in resisting such actions, but also would convey to others, friend and enemy alike, that the United States is ready and willing to assist those who are on the front line of the fight against communist aggression.
5.
In the event the PL/VM persist in their aggression in Laos, additional measures should be taken as required and as recommended to you in paragraphs 6 and 7b of JCSM–565–64 (extracted in the Appendix hereto).2
6.
Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that governmental approval in principle be sought for prompt US air strikes against communist LOCs in Laos and against attacking PL/VM forces in Laos, should a major PL/VM offensive be initiated and should Laotian forces be unable to withstand the attack. Such approval should include authority to use Thai-based US aircraft.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Curtis E. LeMay
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw it on November 11.↩
  2. Document 103. The appendix is attached, but not printed.↩