Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, March 1, 1964, 7 p.m.

927. Deptel 664.² Question raised refDeptel cannot be answered solely in context immediate situation. Required first that we ask ourselves whether we intend continue consider ourselves bound by Geneva Accords, working for realization neutralist solution and basing our policy on preservation at least appearance Government National Unity with our principal support going to neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Following comments based on assumption (which we favor—see Embtel 846)³ that this continues to be our policy, even though we may be prepared shade it somewhat more than in past; if this not the case, what follows of course does not apply.

Numbered para 3 under recommendations refers to “solution” to Laotian problem. Given ground rules under which we have been operating here I have not considered it realistic to expect that we could arrive at any definitive solution in Laos at any early date.

Instead we have been working here toward limited objective of:

1) Keeping Geneva structure intact as far as possible against day when some progress could be made toward full pacification and unification of country and acceptance throughout territory of authority Vientiane government; impossible guess how remote this may be but certainly unlikely as long as there is no solution South Viet-Nam;

2) Meanwhile concentrating on friendly (i.e. conservative-neutralist) zone of Laos to preserve its integrity as far as possible and build up its stability and internal security.

Thus immediate problem of Laos is one of preserving integrity and stability this zone against limited Communist military and para military actions which have as their present objective not taking over entire friendly zone but rather paring that zone down so that all that remains are points taking of which would in Communist view precipitate unacceptable reaction, particularly by US. Central threat to this zone is Viet Minh support, without which PL containable.

If fundamental US objective in Laos is simply to defend Mekong lowland because of importance to security Thailand then our policy should be to keep Communists clearly on notice that encroachments on places like Thakhek will provoke reaction from us which unacceptable to them. Beyond that we would not need to be unduly concerned about loss hinterland territory as long as towns and connecting roads along Mekong, including Ban Houei Sai area, in friendly hands and there remains government in Vientiane which in critical situation could ask for free world help and provide foothold on Laotian side Mekong as base of operations for such help.

If fundamental objective goes beyond that outlined in preceding paragraph and envisages preservation of Laos as country in friendly hands (albeit neutral) then we can ill afford to see Communist nibbling proceed much beyond what it has already taken. Otherwise friendly zone will be cut down to point where inadequate provide base for regeneration. Presume this describes what is in fact our present holding policy.

If fundamental objective for present period also includes interdiction use Ho Chi Minh Trail by getting it out of Communist and into friendly hands, then present policy entirely inadequate; moreover I am persuaded this cannot be accomplished without commiting substantial US forces to Laos.

In contemplating actions to be taken Laos we must focus again on philosophy Prime Minister Souvanna in view his key importance to question. His fundamental objective for Laos has been and remains to remove it from field of East-West conflict. While he does not wish communism for Laos, and presumably also not for other countries Southeast Asia, he has much more confidence in possibility avoid this through neutralization and policies such as those pursued by Sihanouk than we do. While he may share our concern over situation Southeast Asia as a whole he is not sympathetic to having our actions with respect to Laos coordinated with those regarding Thailand and South Viet-Nam and influenced by very different international status and orientation those countries.

(See my letter Secretary McNamara dated Dec 26, 1963).⁴ Souvanna believes story in Lao proverb that when buffaloes fight it is grass which gets hurt and however much he now understands more clearly nature of Communist threat and tactics, he remains persuaded Laos will only suffer more from being made scene of escalated conflict. I would therefore expect him adamantly opposed recommendation A–5 for launching guerrillas from Laos against North Vietnamese targets in DRV.

Whenever we consider adopting stronger military actions in Laos we also come up against inescapable fact that friendly armed forces in Laos are woefully limited in their capabilities, as has recently been amply demonstrated. Believe over time they can be made capable of protecting friendly zone Laos before too much more whittled away, if they have support such as recommended Embtel 846⁵ and if PL is not too strongly supported by Viet Minh. Therefore actions are called for which would discourage this support, such as prompt and strong ICC activity and, if possible, application pressure on North Viet-Nam by USSR and military responses to evident Viet Minh involvement, for example by expanded use T–28s. At same time we must recognize that as long as South Vietnamese problem involved, every action taken in Laos which in any sense appears to threaten availability to DRV of Ho Chi Minh Trail can be expected to bring sharp reaction, albeit limited, which will seek to keep clean zone of trail and push friendly forces back toward Mekong. Plaine des Jarres appears to be special case both because important psychologically to PL and as means for Communists keep dagger poised, pointing both toward Vientiane and Luang Prabang.

With regard to entire range of actions posed refDeptel and having in mind considerations described above I must express doubt as to whether these will have any decisive effect on course of events Laos, although at same time I find it hard to propose other measures we could undertake which would have beneficial effect which do not at same time go beyond bounds set by terms of neutral solution and risk conflict with attitude of Souvanna Phouma. Military and para military measures (recommendations (A)-1 through 6), to extent they concern internal situation in Laos rather than interdiction Ho Chi Minh Trail, would probably help begin gradual improvement friendly forces mentioned above. Would not, however, under present circumstances rule out further gains by Communist forces nor could I give any assurance they would seriously deter Viet Minh, from their support of PL when they wish apply it, and to extent measures appear threaten use of Ho Chi Minh Trail they will probably provoke stronger Viet Minh action. (Note: Other factor not mentioned refDeptel which bears strongly on capability local forces is use or non-use of American pilots and aircraft in situation where they would be in violation Geneva Accords; present strict rules this regard not infrequently mean withholding indispensable support in critical military situations. I continue agree Dept’s judgment this must be our policy but do not wish to have overlooked limitations which it imposes.) With specific reservations set forth septel,⁶ concur in proposals (A)-1, 2, 4, and 6 but not in 5 to extent it involves incursions into DRV. (A)-3 will be commented on separately.

As noted septel recommendations along line of (b) for deployment US forces Thailand appear to us as useful general deterrent actions to put DRV again on warning. Recommendation (c) would presumably have same effect.

All of diplomatic measures proposed appear useful although recent Soviet, Polish and Indian actions give us little confidence that we can expect much improvement in those quarters. As regards recommendation 2–B, do not believe we can equate Phoumi with Souvanna Phouma. Phoumi can be expected go along with virtually all proposals leading toward escalation since we believe his fundamental objective is to bring about deeper US involvement, including use of US troops. If we followed his advice but were not ultimately prepared commit US troops, then I believe we would be inviting disaster. I believe it is Phoumi’s honest conviction, as well as a position motivated by personal considerations, that in last analysis only military action with strong free world support can save Laos from communism.

I believe we must clear with Souvanna all actions which are likely to come to his attention; otherwise we would quickly shatter considerable confidence he now has in our sincere and unreserved support of neutralist solution for Laos. I believe this includes virtually everything proposed except perhaps some actions in most remote southeastern areas of country within perhaps twenty-five kilometers of South Vietnamese frontier. Most matters need clearance from Phoumi from practical point of view since cooperation FAR and local officials frequently involved; moreover Phoumi understandably resents US acting unilaterally in Laos as of course does Souvanna, if not more so. Low level photo reconnaissance flights seem to me almost sure to become known and I would not consider their initiation without consultation with Souvanna, with risk this entails his refusal. Comments on effective use T–28s will be contained septel.⁷

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, Phom Penh, and Saigon.
2. Telegram 664 to Vientiane, February 26 (ibid.), transmitted the text of attachment 1 to Document 6 for comment. The references to paragraphs and subparagraphs are the same in both the attachment and the telegram.
3. In telegram 846 from Vientiane, February 9, Unger suggested that while the “Geneva umbrella” handicapped U.S. actions in coping with Communist efforts to subvert the settlement of 1962, at the same time, it “serves to keep Laos under an international spotlight, to provide some instruments for bringing international pressure to bear, to broaden the support for its economy and its neutrality, and, I believe, to circumscribe to some degree Communist choices for action.” Unger stated that the “balance between handicap and advantage” favored continuation of present U.S. policy. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1–1 LAOS)
4. Not found.
5. In telegram 846, Unger recommended re-equipping Kong Le’s forces up to a force level totaling 8,200 men, preparing to increase the military assistance program to Laos if required, making better use of the T–28 fighter aircraft in Laos, and strengthening the economic and political strength of the Souvanna government.
6. Not further identified.
7. See Document 13.