6. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Hilsman) to
Secretary of State Rusk
1
Washington, February 25, 1964.
SUBJECT
- Southeast Asia: Your Meeting at 4:00 p.m., February 26
On February 15 you authorized me to undertake inter-agency discussion of
the desirability of strengthening the US posture in Southeast Asia,
particularly in connection with recent developments in Laos.2
Attached is a draft Memorandum For The President entitled “Stabilizing
the Situation in Southeast Asia” for discussion at your meeting at 4:00
p.m., February 26 with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Administrator of the Agency for
International Development, and Mr. McGeorge
Bundy.3 The draft has the informal approval of
the agencies concerned; the purpose of your discussion is to obtain
final inter-agency approval of the version to be forwarded, at your
discretion, to the President.
The situation within Laos itself is now somewhat less threatening than it
was a week ago, although the Communists continue to occupy the area in
central Laos into which they had been moving. Our discussions of the
problems confronting us in Southeast Asia have, however, only
re-enforced our judgment that we should move promptly to counteract the
widespread speculation on neutralist solutions for the area and to
reassert US determination to exert its power effectively to frustrate
Communist advances there. The continued flagrant Communist violation of
the Geneva Accords4 in Laos provides us with the
clearest and most understandable immediate issue on which to base
actions to these ends.
The draft Memorandum sets forth a broad program of political, military
and covert actions designed to have an immediate impact upon the
situation in Laos as well as to convey a mounting sense of US
determination to do whatever is necessary in Southeast Asia generally to
defend Free World interests. This program is not specifically aimed at
preparing us for any particular military courses of action with respect
to Laos, South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam which may commend themselves
to [Page 14] us at some point in the
future. Nor is it designed to pre-judge decisions on such military
courses of action. If the program is successfully carried out, we would
expect the Communist side to be substantially more cautious in taking
actions which could force us to make these difficult decisions and we
would expect our friends in the area to take new heart. In any case, we
will be in no worse a position to face the possible difficult decisions
on military courses of action if events eventually require them.
We do not feel that it is possible at this point to be too precise on the
details of the various actions included in the program. Close and
continuing consultations between the agencies concerned will be required
as the various steps are taken. At all times we must keep in mind the
sensitivities and interests of our friends who are most directly
concerned, particularly the Thai and the Lao. Undoubtedly, we shall have
to tailor some of our actions to fit their desires. What is important,
however, is the general concept of coordinated political, military and
covert actions—within the limits set forth in the Memorandum—as a means
of achieving a limited and essentially political end.
I also attach a paper setting forth—in broad outline—our view of how we
might expect the proposed program to be implemented.
Attachment 15
Draft Memorandum for the President
SUBJECT
- Stabilizing the Situation in Southeast Asia
The Communists may well see an opportunity for broad forward movement
in the recent course of events in Southeast Asia. The political
climate is dominated by widespread speculation on neutralist
solutions for the area sparked by France’s recognition of Communist
China and DeGaulle’s statements as well as Prince Sihanouk’s efforts to obtain
international guarantees of Cambodian neutrality by threatening to
turn to Hanoi and Peiping. The Communists may well believe that the
United States is unwilling to exert its power effectively to defend
its positions in [Page 15] Southeast
Asia. They, as well as DeGaulle and Sihanouk, must be disabused to any such ideas; and
our friends, especially the Thais and Vietnamese, must be reassured
as to our determination and intentions.
In our view the recent Communist advances in central Laos highlight
the continuing erosion of the situation in Laos. We have a clear and
understandable immediate issue—the continued flagrant Communist
violation of the Geneva Accords.
Objectives
With respect to Laos, we must undertake a series of coordinated
political and military actions designed (1) to discourage the
Communist side from continued advances against the
neutralist/conservative forces, (2) to give us additional time to
augment the efforts we have been making to strengthen and
consolidate areas under the control of neutralist/conservative
forces, and (3) to preserve our freedom of action in responding to
any further actions undertaken by the Communists. The actions we
propose do not involve committing U.S. forces to Laos.
In the broader context of Southeast Asia, our actions must be
designed to give the Communist side reason to believe that we are
prepared to escalate the conflict in the area in order to defend our
positions there. Our actions should in no way foreclose options we
may later wish to pursue with respect to South Viet-Nam or North
Viet-Nam as well as Laos. Communist concern should be reinforced by
gradually accumulating evidence of our willingness to support
actions against North Viet-Nam itself under the presently approved
plan (OPLAN 34–A–64)6 or on a more extensive scale. We should make it
clear that our actions stem from our concern over the situation in
Southeast Asia as a whole, and that our actions with respect to
Thailand and Laos are indeed coordinated with our assistance to
South Viet-Nam.
While none of the actions we propose is decisive in itself, a number
of them taken together should represent some actual increase in
United States military capability within Southeast Asia and
demonstrate our concern over the course of recent events together
with our determination to reverse that course.
Reconvening of Geneva Conference?
We do not propose to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Laos at this
time. Nevertheless, the Communist side could do so, and Prince
Souvanna might if he became extremely discouraged over the situation
in Laos. Moreover, at some future time, it might actually be in our
interest that a conference be held. In any event, the measures which
we are proposing [Page 16] would tend
to put us in a stronger position to participate effectively in such
a Conference should one occur.
Regional Cooperation
In view of Souvanna’s key importance in the Geneva settlement, it is
essential to coordinate closely with him, obtaining his support or
tacit acquiescence.
Because Thailand is an avenue for introducing U.S. power, we must
obtain full Thai cooperation and support, consulting in advance and
treating the Thai as partners.
This coordination is particularly important because both Souvanna and
the Thai may have reservations on varying specific actions to be
taken. Their reaction will be conditioned by the intensity of
Communist pressures and our willingness to meet them squarely.
The actions we propose will not in themselves cause Prince Sihanouk to accelerate his
timetable to threats unless they are executed in such a manner as to
cause suspicion that they are directed against Cambodia.
Recommendations:
- 1.
- That we resume the US program of graduated actions which
were contained in the memorandum for the President attached
to NSAM 256 of July 31,
1963.7 Specifically,
it is recommended that the following actions be taken
promptly (exact timing to be determined by the Department of
State with the concurrence of the Department of Defense):
- a.
- With regard to Laos:
- (1)
- Encourage selective use of 6 Lao T–28s.8
- (2)
- Expand use of [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] other
specialist covert teams.
- (3)
- Resume use of South Vietnamese border
patrols to conduct guerrilla operations in south
Laos against the Viet Minh.
- (4)
- Further enlarge guerrilla units in Laos and
expand operations in enemy held territory.
- (5)
- Expand sabotage operations against the North
Vietnamese within Laos and in areas of North
Viet-Nam adjacent to Laos by guerrillas launched
from Laos.
- (6)
- Conduct high level aerial photo
reconnaissance of Laos9 (timing as mutually
agreed by Department of State and Department of
Defense).
- b.
- With regard to the deployment of U.S. forces,
deploy promptly to Thailand the remainder of the
F–100 squadron,
approximately 12, which currently has a detachment
of 6 there. A decision as to the deployment of
additional forces, with composition to be
recommended by DOD,
[Page 17] will be
deferred until after the forthcoming conference in
Viet-Nam.
- c.
- It is recommended that the current Joint US/Thai
Special Warfare Exercise in Thailand be expanded or
extended as feasible.
- 2.
- That, together with the foregoing measures, we move in the
diplomatic arena (a) to reassure our allies as to our
intentions to stand by US commitments in Southeast Asia, (b)
to indicate that the US is considering further measures for
coping with Communist aggression in the area, (c) to produce
evidence of North Vietnamese intervention in Laos and South
Viet-Nam. Among the diplomatic measures to be taken, we
will:
- (a)
- Publicize fully Communist actions in Laos in
violation of the Geneva Accords.
- (b)
- Consult with Souvanna
Phouma in order (1) to convince him of
our intention to prevent the Communists from
destroying the Geneva settlement and to uphold the
position of his government and (2) to obtain his
support or tacit acquiescence in our course of
action.
- (c)
- Consult fully with Thailand keeping in mind Thai
sensitivities regarding decisions affecting their
interests taken unilaterally by the US. Continue to
encourage the Thai to strengthen their military
forces in Northeast Thailand.
- (d)
- Coordinate with Thailand the extent and character
of SEATO approval
and involvement.
- (e)
- Obtain maximum support and contributions from the
UK, Australia and
New Zealand.
- (f)
- Urge the British to go to the Soviets again
urgently and demand Co-Chairmen action in support of
Souvanna. If the Soviets continue to stall, the
British should issue a unilateral statement in reply
to Souvanna’s appeal.
- (g)
- Follow up the British approach with a direct
approach of our own to the Soviet Co-Chairman. We
should also speak to the Poles.
- (h)
- Inform the Indian and Canadian governments and
their ICC
Commissioners of our projected actions, and continue
to press them for more forceful action in the ICC.
- 3.
- Since the solution to the Laotian problem is intimately
linked with the solution to South Viet-Nam and its
relationship to North Viet-Nam, it is recommended that the
Laotian and South Vietnamese problems be discussed further
in conjunction following the return of Secretary McNamara and General
Taylor from
Saigon.
[Page 18]
Attachment 210
Paper Prepared by the Department of State
IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM FOR STABILIZING THE SITUATION
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
If the program is approved, we envisage implementing it along the
following lines:
- 1.
- Begin immediately to publish in increasing detail
information about the Communist actions in Laos during the
past two years in violation of the Geneva Accords.
- 2.
-
Initiate prompt discussions with the Thais in order to
gain their full understanding of our broad purposes and
our intent to use the situation in Laos as the immediate
cause for action. Our discussions with the Thais will
cover the question of how to manage the extent and
character of SEATO
acquiescence, approval, or involvement in the actions we
will jointly be taking with Thailand. We should be
prepared to modify our proposed program in order to
obtain maximum Thai collaboration and understanding.
Although Ambassador Martin believes that Thai cooperation
will depend upon our assurances that we are prepared to
enter Laos if necessary, it should be possible to obtain
their full cooperation on the general concept we pursue
without explicit statement as to what we might do in
response to hypothetical Communist advances in Laos. We
should, of course, be prepared to indicate that the
option of using US forces in Laos remains open.
It will be absolutely essential that no leak regarding
our proposed program occur before discussions with the
Thais have begun.
- 3.
- After consulting with the Thais, we should tell Souvanna Phouma of the
general nature of our proposed actions with emphasis upon
our determination to be ready, under whatever circumstances,
to defend the position of his government under the Geneva
Accords. Since he will not believe that the situation in
Laos itself really demands this kind of action on our part,
we should be prepared to philosophize with him about the
threat which Communist activities centered in North Viet-Nam
offer to Free World positions in Southeast Asia
generally.
- 4.
- Having talked to the Thais and while we are discussing
matters with Souvanna
Phouma, we should seek maximum political and
military support for our actions from the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and
the Philippines. The manner of approaching these governments
will depend upon the agreements we have reached with the
Thais regarding SEATO
involvement.
- 5.
- Carefully structuring our actions to the degree of
understanding we obtain from Souvanna Phouma, we will begin promptly to
implement the Phase II actions with respect to Laos. Those
actions which are entirely covert will be pushed vigorously
as soon as authorized. Others, such as offensive use of
T–28s, will demand careful tailoring to Souvanna’s
sensibilities as the situation develops. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
- 6.
- Movement of F–100s into Thailand will take place following
full consultations with the Thais. Movement of any other US
forces into Thailand will follow decisions reached after the
visit of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor to the area.
