Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

13. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, March 3, 1964, 7 p.m.

942. Use of T–28’s. Deptel 664;² Embtel 927.³

I. Revision of Policy. Limitations on size of RLAF, deficiencies in individual skills, staff work, and ground/air coordination, and hobbling effects of necessity for detailed consultation with U.S. make marked improvement in RLAF performance unlikely over short run under present ground rules and with present equipment. (A review of T–28 utilization is summarized in A–249, March 4, 1964).⁴ ARMA, AIRA and RO reps will continue advisory efforts to improve staff work and instill cooperative spirit between FAR and RLAF; prospective special air warfare detachment in Thailand⁵ should improve both aircraft and pilot performance. But these efforts will take time.

In addition to factors of Lao performance, effectiveness of T–28’s limited by restrictions on armament and BT factors of timing. The margin of utility of bombs (including 500-pounders) over rockets derives from nature of warfare in Laos—absence of large troop concentrations, particular importance of artillery and armor to outcome of fighting, and exposure of slow aircraft to ground fire during high-angle attack required with rockets or machine guns. Timing presents multiple problems: 1) several days frequently elapse between request for strike and completion necessary military planning and approval; 2) required U.S. consultation (sometimes including referral to Washington) adds delay at minimum and apparently has discouraged FAR/RLAF to point that fuzes are no longer requested, in expectation of refusal; 3) present need to clear individual actions with Souvanna requires additional time.

We therefore believe early step-up in deterrent effect or in FAR/neutralist capability to contain Communist attacks by air activity requires relaxation in restraints currently imposed on use of aircraft and bombs and grant of greater discretionary authority to Lao. We specifically recommend:

1) Turning over limited number of bomb fuzes to RLAF on understanding that they are to be used for defensive purposes in consultation with us as to types of targets and that replacement of fuzes obviously conditional on evidence of prudent and effective use; 2) introducing 500-pound bombs to make strikes effective against targets such as those suggested in section II below; 3) broadening approved uses of T–28’s. For present we recommend retaining napalm containers in Thailand; Lao are not trained in sophisticated use of napalm and random use seems politically unacceptable.

Under this proposal, I would need to obtain Souvanna’s advance approval for release of fuzes and his understanding of tactical concept (below), but decision to undertake individual missions would become Lao responsibility.

(II) Tactical Concept. Our guidance to FAR and neutralists for use of T–28’s, to be discussed and agreed in advance, would continue to emphasize use of aircraft, bombs or not, for defensive purposes only, but defining defense to include both reprisal for aggressive actions and interdiction of build-up for attack.

1. Specific recommendations to RLAF would depend on circumstances following completion of Washington’s review of overall policy. As general proposition, believe we should initially stress step-up of visual and photo reconnaissance and a substantial road-cratering effort on principal lines of supply from North Viet-Nam into Laos. Road-cratering (principally routes 7, 8 and 12) commends itself because A) it is measure which comes as close as any available to isolating Viet Minh support from indigenous Pathet Lao effort, and it is Viet Minh who threaten precarious balance of power in Laos; B) it requires less expertise than finding and hitting moving targets and thus provides reasonable intermediate test of RLAF capabilities; C) chagrin would be principal cost of failure; and D) success would have marked effect in reducing pressure on front-line units.

2. Other targets or operations which are currently appealing include:

A) Three known artillery positions used in occasional harassing fire against Kong Le headquarters at Muong Phan;

B) Support of guerrilla operations (cover/diversion) principally in Xieng Khouang province and designed, as road-cutting, to reduce front-line pressure;

C) In-bound convoys;

D) Supply depots in combat areas (one such located east of Khang Khay cannot be touched with rockets due surrounding anti-aircraft but could be taken out by low-level bombing);

E) Armor, wherever found;

F) Phou Khe and adjacent artillery positions, in connection with possible operations for its recapture.

(III) Cautions. Preceding recommendations are advanced, and should only be approved with recognition of accompanying reservations:

1. Use of bombs and less discriminate use of aircraft would represent a degree of escalation. Moreover, escalation danger not manageable in detail since Lao would have control over operations subject only to threat of withholding replacement weapons, and this introduces hazards of some dimensions. We cannot surely predict whether first use of bombs will have deterrent or inflammatory effect, and see no way to a determination short of having a few test cases.

2. Improved armament will not make the RLAF a sophisticated air force. We do not believe that six T–28’s, whatever their equipment, will tip the balance in favor of FAR and neutralists against the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh forces they confront except, possibly, in specific tactical situations. Even this exception assumes relatively skillful use of equipment by virtually untried pilots.

3. Expansion in use of T–28’s will require active role by AIRA and ARMA personnel in advisory capacity with respect to target selection, mission planning, and coordination. It will probably require a kind of on-the-spot surveillance of work of aircraft armorers, by RO personnel, that would be visible to any observers at bases (presumably Vientiane and Savannakhet) from which combat strikes launched. (French are already sensitive to role of U.S. personnel presently at Savannakhet.)

Initiation of RLAF bombing program should be preceded or accompanied by effort to arrange with RLAF for use of bombing range in Thailand to permit evaluation of RLAF performance by U.S. observers.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok also for DEPCHJUSMAG, CINCPAC for POLAD, Saigon also for Harkins, and Phnom Penh.
2. See footnote 2, Document 11.
3. Document 11.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
5. The Special Air Warfare Detachment was a proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy four T–28’s and pilots and 30 to 40 support personnel in Thailand. The detachment could augment the Royal Lao Air Force in the event of a serious offensive by the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese, assist the Lao Air Force’s maintenance training, provide advice for planning and employment of T–28’s in Laos, and give impetus to Thai up-country development programs and counterinsurgency efforts. It would also serve as an adequate cover to justify the presence of U.S. T–28’s in Thailand. (Letter from William Bundy to Hilsman, January 11; ibid., DEF 19 US–LAOS) On March 5 McNamara approved the assignment of a SAW T–28 detachment to Udorn.